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ABSTRACT
A 3tudy of the evolution of the jurisaiction ana administration
of the remote Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands frooi its inception
to the present. The roles of the Department of the Interior and the
Navy in the area of Micronesia since World War II are considered alone;
with the development of policy responses to the ex- Japanese iiandated
Islands. In viev of the ever- increasing criticism in the United nations
about United States stewardship in the Trust Territory, much discussion
is devoted to this vexing problem. The overall record of progress to-
ward the goal of self- government for the inhabitants of the Trust Ter-
ritory is evaluated and comment made about the prospects for the future.
Hew developments which portend substantial changes in the administration
of the Islands are considered in some detail. Finally, a summary
analysis indicates some of the courses of action which may be taken to
improve both the position of the islanders and the Administering
Authority, the United states.
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This study deals with the scattered, but significant (those
responsible for America' 3 defense posture in the Free World might use
the adjective "vital"), area of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands— the scattered islands of Micronesia spreading across the
Central Pacific. Formerly mandated to Japan, these groups of islands
were placed under the United Nations Trusteeship System following World
War II with the United States as the Administering Authority.
While the Trusteeship System has run its full course in regard to
most territories, it seems probable that the islands of Micronesia may
remain under trusteeship for an increasingly embarrassing length of
time. This paper focuses broadly upon this contemporary problem in an
attempt to arrive at an evaluation of present policies and to suggest
some alternative courses which might be explored. The United States
appears to be in a position where it cannot let the Trust Territory go
and, yet, cannot continue it as it exists today.
To gain perspective on this area, it is essential to understand
the role of the Interior Department and the Navy in the Trust Territory
since the war, the development of policy within the government, the
problems connected with review of United States administration by the
Trusteeship Council of the United Nations and the overall record of
progress toward the gsal of self-government for thp inhabitants of the
Trust Territory.
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It is lamentable, but true, that the area of Micronesia has been
somewhat neglected by students of colonial administration in the past.
This paper will attempt to shed some light on problems which have now
almost forced their way into view.
Although an earlier cut-off date had been planned, the signifi-
cant changes, which took, place in the Trust Territory recently, necessi-
tated a cut-off date of August 1, 1962. The reasons for the choice of
this date will become evident as the reader progresses through the thesis.
Credit for the idea of a study on the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands must be given to Professor Robert R. Robbins, Professor
of Government at Tufts University. His help and encouragement in the
preparation of an earlier study on the Northern Marianas was of inesti-
mable value in the preparation of this paper.
The unexcelled opportunities in the Washington area for research
in the field of Micronesia must be mentioned. In this regard, the
dedicated members of the staff of the Library of Congress were more than
kind.
The assistance of Dr. John L. Taylor, Consultant on Territorial
and Indian Affairs to the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs is very gratefully acknowledged. His efforts to provide mate-
rial and encouragement all along the line will not be forgotten.
Particularly helpful were interviews with Congressman Wayne N. Aspinall
(D-Coloraao) and Congressman John P. Saylor (R- Pennsylvania), ranking
members of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Commander
Chester £. HerricK, U. 3. Navy of the Office of the Chief of Naval
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Operations (OP-09), Mr. Curti3 Cutter, Office of Political and Security
Affairs (UNP), Department of State, and Mr. Delmas H. lucker, former
High Coiiuaissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and now
Chief of the Division of Insular Affairs, Department of the Interior.
The generosity of these officials both in matters of time and ideas is
appreciatea.
To Mr. Calab Udui of Palau, at present on the staff of the Office
of Territories, Department of the Interior, my sincere gratitude for his
reflective comments on this thesis. The Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands will most certainly profit from his maturity and ability in the
formative years to come.
Finally, one should mention the advice so readily available from
the members of the student's committee, Professor Mary £. Bradshaw and
Professor Durward V. Sandifer of The American University. Without their
penetrating review, this paper, in its present form, would not have been
possible.
Although the subject dealt with may hold a special interest for
an officer in the United States Navy, the author, as such, had no
service- connected background Knowledge of it before embarking upon the
study and had no axe to grind. The conclusions reached have been based
on recent study ana in no way are to be construed as official views of
the Navy Department. It goes without saying that any errors of com-
mission or omission are the author's own.
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CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON
IT 5 GOALS AND FUTURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before focusing specifically on the central subject of this paper,
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, it would appear desirable to
afford the reader a brief sketch of the Trusteeship System of the United
Nations. In the process of doing this, the niche occupied by the Trust
Territory, our "sacred trust" in Micronesia, will be shown in proper
perspective.
The system once encompassed eleven territories under the adminis-
tering authority of the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, New Zealand,
Australia, Italy, and the United States. Today, only the United States
and Australia remain as "Administering Authorities." In addition to tne
sharpened focus that this evolution places on the policy of these two
countries toward their "trust," there will be at least two proble.as of
significant magnitude which will have to be faced by the Trusteeship
Council: (1) as the trusteeships under the cognizance of the Trustee-
ship Council decline in number, a change in the organization and
procedures of the Council may becoaie necessary; (2) the goal of inde-
pendence for such areas as Nauru, New Guinea, and the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands aay not be feasible in the foreseeable future.
Ii
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2Certainly it is an optimistic one. Therefore , a change in this ex-
pressed goal of trusteeship might be considered for these areas.
II. THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFLRENCt
At the United Nations Conference on International Organization at
San Francisco in I9h$, the principles of "sacred trust" and "interna-
tional accountability" were afforded a hearing in a sympathetic and
conciliatory atmosphere. It wa3 recognized that the aspirations and
advancement, of the millions of people in dependent territories was of
iiamediate international concern and an integral part of any proposals
for an international organization which would foster peace and security.
At Yalta, President hoos<iVtlt, Prime Minister Churchill, and
Marshall Stalin had agreed that consideration should be given to the
establishment of machinery for trusteeship which would apply only to
mandates of the League of Nations, territory detached as a result of
World War II and such other territories as would be voluntarily placed
under it. In the process of implementing this agreement at the San
Francisco Conference, proposals on trusteeship were presented by the
United States, France, China, Australia, and the United Kingdom. 2 A
^See Ralph J. Bunche, "Trusteeship and Non-Self Governing Terri-
tories in the Charter of the United Nations," U. S » Department of State
Bulletin , Vol. XIII, pp. 1037- IOUU5 and Slizabeth H. Armstrong and
William I. Cargo, "The Inauguration of the Trusteeship System of the
United Nations, 11 U. j . Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 19^7,
p. 3 for a complete analysis.
2Charmian Toussaint, The Trusteeship System of ttie United Nations
(New York* Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 207 see also Postwar
..
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synthesis of these five papers resulted in a final draft which was sud-
sequentiy approved by the Conference.
It is interesting to note that the political objectives outlined
in the various proposals were the cause of much debate. Some delega-
tions aavocated independence a3 the goal of all dependent peoples.
Other delegations were of the opinion that soae territories, because of
lack of resources, could never attain full independence. The United
States proposal aavocated only self-government as a goal with the im-
plication that independence would quite naturally come about for those
peoples who were capable of its responsibilities. The British, tailing a
somewhat similar position, held that the degree of self-government would
vary considerably because of cultural development, degree of civiliza-
tion ana the like.-* A compromise of sorts was reached by providing for
both goals of independence and self-government.
In retrospect, this compromise has been quite significant as the
growing temper of anti-colonialism, which could hardly be envisaged in
191*5* has fostered the belief that independence alone is a proper and
just goal for dependent peoples. Although it is naive to suppose that
this evolution would never have occurred had the goal of trusteeship
remained self-government (with independence implied but not stated), it
Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939- 1°U5 (Washingtoni U. S. Government
Print!nLi*fT&:~ I9<h) > pp. T&^lWT
3James N. Murray, Jr., The United Nations Trusteeship 3y
(Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1957), p. 3U.
^See Article 76, Charter of the United Nations.
>'i:L,-}^
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ucan be properly asked whether the change of mood toward a consensus
among the underdeveloped countries that full independence was a "right"
regardless of existing conditions would have been quite so rapid. In
addition, one can speculate as to the reason for the lack of specific
provisions in the Charter for the administration and care of a trust
territory having little capacity for self-government and, relatively
speaking, none for meaningful inceptnee nee. But this bespeaks the
paradox; frequently one must deal with less than th~ iueal or seemingly
rational in the field of international relations. However, one is com-
ptiltu to note that vihen considering the problem of non- self- governing
territories (areas which, in general, could be considered more viable
than many proposed trust territories), this same Conference approved as
an objective only "self- government.'^ In addition, under the League of
Nations aanaate .System, "independence" was not established across the
board as a goal for all Mandates but, rather, was restricted to only
those considered capable of this status. If more restrictive, this
policy, nevertheless, appears now to have been more realistic than the
setting down of seemingly unattainable goals.
Be that as it may, the Conference did, in fact, establish goals
of self-government and independence; Chapters XII and XIII of the
Charter were completed and the actual formation of a system for inter-
national supervision of dependent territories became imminent.
->U. s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The
United Nations and Dependent Territori es, ongress, 1st Session,
Staff study No. 9, p. k.
-:>rf
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5Although agreement had been reached on the framework of trustee-
ship organization, it is stating the obvious to note that the first
order of business had to be the negotiation of some trusteeship agree-
ments to bring into being trust territories. This was accomplished on
December 13, 19U6, when, by resolution, the General Assembly, in accord-
ance with Article 85 of the United Nations Charter, approved the terms
of trusteeship agreements for New Guinea (Australia); Ruanaa-Urundi
(Belgium)} Cameroons (United Kingdom); Tanganyika (United Kingdom);
Togoland (United Kingdom); Cameroons (France); Togoland (France); and
Western BMW (New Zealand). This act also, by it3 very natuie, estab-
lished the Trusteeship Council.
Under the provisions of Article 62 of the United Nations Charter,
the United States on February 26, 191+7, submitted the text of a
"strategic" trusteeship agreement to the Security Council. This strate-
gic concept was a recognition of special circumstances whereby an area
was considered to be of such vital importance to security that ordinary
provisions of trusteeship could not apply. Under Article 65, the
Security Council was to be responsible for all functions relating to
strategic areas. As a practical matter, however, the Security Council
has delegated all functional tasks to the Trusteeship Council. On
April 2, 191*7, the Council approved this strategic agreement fc ' the
nf. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade
of American Foreign Policy , 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. No.""l23,
"(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 1025.
. p ngiKV. ;,
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6fonaer Japanese Mandated Islands; the Trust Territory of the Pacific
7
Islands vas a reality.'
On November 1, 19k7, the General Assembly approved a trusteeship
agreement for the former mandate of Nauru. Although this agreement
provided for joint administration by Australia, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom, moat authorities held that, because Australia exercised
the administration of the trust territory under Article 8l, she was, in
fact, the Administering Authority as provided for in the Charter.
As Article 8l did not specify that an Administering Authority
must be a member of the United Nations, it was held that Italy could be
authorized to take under its protection its former colony, Somali land.
As will be recalled, Italy did not gain admission to the United Nations
until December 1955. On November 21, 19^9, the General Assembly pro-
posed placing Somali land under the Unitec Nations trusteeship system
with Italy as Administering Authority for a ten-year period.' This time
limit, rather than being an analytical computation based on economic
growth et al, was more of a political decision and reflected, to some
extent, Italy's past role as an unsuccessful participant in World War
II.
?See U. S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Prepara-
tion
, 1939- 19U5 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office) pp.
hi^h3k for an analysis of the United States position on trusteeship.
o
See Tousssint, og. £it«, PP» 97 and 207 for a complete dis-
cussion of this point.
^Lawrence Finkelstein, " Somali land Under Italian Administration :
A Case Study in United Nations Trusteeship" (New York: Woodrow Wilson
Foundation, 1955), p. 3.
A
7After a particularly acrimonious debate of many months in the
General Assembly, the agreement was approved on December 2, 1950. The
Trusteeship Council now had under its cognizance eleven trust territo-
ries. (The strategic Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is included
in this number due to the Security Council's ceiegation of supervision
to the Trusteeship Council.)
in. the npsrn .-.up council
Working under the authority of the General Assembly, the Trustee-
ship Council is composed of all states administering trust territories,
permanent sieabers of the Security Council not administering trust ter-
ritories, and as many other ..lumbers as Wjf be necessary to ensure th?t
the number oi rs on the Trusteeship Council is equally divided
between those members of the Uniteu Nations which administer trust ter-
ritories and those which do not. 1
Although the Charter specifies that the Trusteeship Council has
responsibility only for the formulation of a questionnaire on political,
economic, social, and educational advancement of trust territories which
provides the source of annual reports of the Administering Authorities,
the scope of the Council ha3 been enlarged to include, in actual prac-
tice, the review of petitions, annual reports, and the dispatching of
Visiting Missions to the tru rltorl«6. A.; Right be expected, the
Council can make ', recommendations to Member States.
10See Article 86, Charter of the United Kfttlcfl
•I
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8Although some questions were raised as to the legality of the
procedure, the Trusteeship Council established two standing committees,
the Committee on Administrative Unions (1950) and the special Petitions
Committee (1952). 11 Although no provisions are made for such subsidiary
organs in the Charter, the fact that the Council proceeded as if it
possessed the authority resulted in a fait accompli of sorts, and it is
doubtful if its right to do so would be challenged today. The argument
has actually become academic as the Committee on Administrative Unions
was dissolved on June 13, 1961, and the Petitions Committee was recently
disbanded on June h, 1962.
Representatives on the Trusteeship Council, although assumed to
have some Knowledge of the areas in question, are not independent tech-
12
nical experts as was the case in the League Mandates Commission.
Political overtones, therefore, tend tc lufti the proceedings of the
Council; this is particularly true in regard to the all-encompassing
issue of colonialism. Ho value judgment is implied at this juncture.
Rather, only acknowledgment of anti-colonialism as a most significant
aspect of trusteeship is intended.
Annual reports submitted to the Trusteeship Council by the
Administering Authorities in accordance with the Council questionnaires
are periodically reviewed and a report, based on this review, is for-
warded to the General Assembly. It is difficult to overemphasise tht
^Toussaint, og. £it., pp. 176-177.
*2u. s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The
United Nations and Dependent Territories
, op . cit., p. 6.
-.
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9iuiportance of these reviews. Coupled with the information provided by
Visiting Missions and petitions from the peoples of the territories, the
annual reports provide the core of the trusteeship system, permitting
all parties to express and defend their views on existing or forecast
problems*
IV. PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE GOALS OF TRUSTEESHIP
As a measure of the success of the trusteeship system, it should
be noted that eight of the original eleven trust territories are no
longer under the Trusteeship System. This has not been accomplished
without difficulties nor can it be said that further problems are un-
likely.
The first trust territory to achieve the basic objectives of
trusteeship was Togoland which, unaer the auspices of the United Kingdom,
joined with the Gold Coast to form the State of Ghana on March 6, 19U7.^
The Cameroons under French administration became the Republic of
Caaeroun on January 1, I960; French Togo land became the Republic of Togo
on April 27, I960. Although on January 6, I960, a representative of the
United Nations Mission to Italian Somali land voiced deep concern about
economic conditions faced by Somali land, it was determined that inde-
pendence should not be delayed. Accordingly, Somalia came into being on
July 1, I960. On June 1, 196l, the northern section of the British
1^The International 1961 Yearbook (New York: Funk and tfagnalls,
Co., 196l"77 p. UL5. The explanatory information in this section is a
synthesis of this Yearbook ; The New York Times , Facts on File 1937 - 1962 ;
and Political Handbook of thTTforld (New York. Harper and Brothers, 1961;.
I-
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Cataeroons attained its independence by joining the independent Federa-
tion of Nigeria. Although Nigeria had indicated some desire to absorb
the Southern Cameroons, the people of this larger portion of the trust
territory decided otherwise and, on October 1, l>6l, it became the
western province of the Republic of Ca^eroun. Tanganyika under British
administration attained internal autonomy in Septeiaber, I960, and at-
tained independence on Deceuioer 9, 196i. In the Pacific, Western Saiaoa
under New Zealand administration has had internal se If- government since
I960 ana e.>,tainea its indepenacne*, on January 1, 1962. It still retains
close ties with New Zealand, however.
Ruanda- Urund i has nac a checkered career. One cannot help but
speculate as to the effect of the Co: leraras on the movement of
Ruanda- Urund i toward indepe. i ily it flawed progress to some
extent. However, in spite of difficulties, it becaae independent on
July 1, 1962, as two separate countries, Burundi and Rwanda. With the
iaoveaent of Ruancn- Urund i out of the Trusteeship -System, only three
isolated 1. u&t Territories reMi&edj Vei duinea, Nauru, and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands. Their future status is far frcia clear.
v. nil nyys pegs of trustee,hip
The Trust Territory of lev Guinea encclasses an area of 93,220
square sixes with a popuiatio ei approx i lately 2 million. Joined with
the Australian -dependency of Papua in an administrative union, it makes
up the eastern half of the island of lew Guinea with We3t New Guinea
(West Irian), under Dutch control, eekin lip the western portion. In
addition, the mew Guinea trust includes the islands of the Bisniark
i-
.
E
11
Archipelago and the two northernmost islands of the Solomons Group.
The area is tropical and very mountainous. Indigenous languages nuaibir
in the hundreds. i4ineral resources, including some gold, lend them-
selves to further development. However, only the most optimistic
proponent of increased responsibility ior dependent peoples could fore-
cast either self- government or independence in the near future. This
is not surprising when one consiaers that a large part of the population
live under near Stone Age conditions. Responsible officials talk in
terms of at least another generation even for self-government. Be that
as it way, the Trusteeship Council has repeatedly suggested that target
dates be set for political, social, and educational development, as well
as eventual self- government and independence for the trust territory.
The mid-pacific atoll of Nauru remains as even more of a problem.
Some indication of its possibilities for self- government or independence
can be gained from the fact that its population numbers only 2,li97 and
its area covers only eight 3quare miles. Phosphate is almost the sole
asset of the island, and reserves of this will be exhausted in approxi-
mately thirty years. Already the Australian Government is looking for
a resettlement location.
With these facts in mind, it becomes difficult to envisage any
meaningful implementation of the Charter as regards self-government or
independence for Hauru. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Hammer
de Roburt, head chief of the Nauruans, made such a plea before the
-"
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i£teat session of the Trusteeship Council. " Whether the hard facts of
oonoi^ics will make such a status almost impossible to attain can be
argued.
Spftttd over some threu million square mile3 in the Western pa-
cific is tin Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the central subject
of this paper. Some appreciation of spatial relationships in Mcrone3ia
can be gained from the realization vnac within this vast area (roughly
equivalent to the size of the United states) 21ul islands exist. The
problems of administration due to transportation difficulties alone are
enormous. But the Trust Territory will be. considered In detail below.
Problems of transportation and communications alone make any considera-
tion of independence in the near future less than meaningful.
VI. :m PROBU& OF COvJPOSITION OF THE TRUSTchSHLP COUNCIL
The decline in the number of trust territories has been outlined
and some comments have been made on problems within the renaining ones.
Discussion may now be appropriate on the effect of this decline and
these problems on the composition of the Trusteeship Council. As has
been noted, under Article 86 of the United Nations Charter, the Trustee-
ship Council consists ofi members of the United Nations that administer
Trust Territories (now two); permanent members of the Security Council
that do not administer Trust Territories (four); and enough other mem-
bers elected by the General Assembly for three years to ensure that the
^Tbe New York Times, July 8, 1962.
.<
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total numoer of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided
between those members that administer trust territories and those that.
do not (should be two).
The present membership of the Trusteeship Council (10) consists
of France, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Sovl
Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, New Zealand, Bolivia,
and India. Therefore, in terms of the Charter, the Council is improp-
erly constituted; at best, only eight members should be permitted.
However, France and the United Kingdom, although no longer Administer-
ing Authorities, qualify for membership as permanent members of the
Security Council. If the Trusteeship Council maintains a membership of
ten for 1>'2, it will continue to be in violation of the Charter. How-
ever, if the membership should be rtdwil to four, the principle of
parity and the principle of the inclusion of the members of the Security
Council in the Trusteeship Council will clearly be in conflict. The
Council, therefore, is on tne horns of a dilemma. If 1961 is any indi-
cation (twelve members were authorized but membership totaled thirteen),
the Trusteeship Council will maintain its present levels. The General
Assembly, at its 979th plenary meeting on April 7, 1961, decided to
retain tti membership at thirteen.*-^
This exercise in addition and subtraction is included to demon-
strate both the success story of the Trusteeship Council and, at the
same time to point out some of the many problems which will crop up as
1
^U. M. Doc. A/u63U/Add. 1.
.-4N
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efforts ere continued to find wsys to bi*ing Nsw Guinea. Nauru, and the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Isiand3 along th3 road to fulfQlment of
the of trusteeship.
VII. THE 00AL3 OF H Hf
Another siae of the coin of diminishing numbers of territories is
the question of the applicability of the present goals of trusteeship to
such areas as Nauru, tile Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and, for
the foreseeable future at least, New Guinea. Self-government or inde-
pendence is still the objective of all trusteeships. Even this state-
ment must be qualified to reflect the fact that self- government and
ind£pendence are treated by many members of the Trusteeship Council as
one and the same thing j some members consider only independence as a
proper goal. With these attitudes in mind, one needs to ask if the
three areas in question can ever qualify and whether the two Administer-
ing Authorities will not be placed in a most awkward and embarrassing
position when attention is primarily focused on their efforts to attain
the objectives provided for in the Charter?
Certainly it is conceivable that, in the future, New Guinea could
reach a level of competence either by unification witn Papua and West
New Guinea or with Papua alone so that independence might be possible.
The Trust Territory of Nauru holds little hope for independence . i'he
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands holus scant promise for indepen-
dence. The problems of communications are overwhelming; furthermore,
there is little evidence that the people even desire such a status.
.-
'
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From the foregoing discuss ion, several considerations seem to
flow: First, ths very keystone of the Trusteeship System, the objec-
tives, do not appear to reflect a true picture of reality today.
Independence does not appear likely for the soon- to-be remaining terri-
tories for a considerable period, if ever. Also, setting an unrealistic
goal for the Administering Authorities can only result in embarrassment,
irritation an;?, conceivably, some lessening of concern for the actual
welfare of the dependent peoples, as the Member States, through United
Mations pressure, are pushed too rapidly to achieve the objectives of
trusteeship. With this in mind, it might be maintained that a revision
of Article 76 of the Charter to provide for "self- government" instead of
"self- government or independence" could be considered by the United
Nations.
In addition, considering that the number of Administering Au-
thorities has bQzn reduced to only two States > there are those who main-
tain that 3uch territories as Hew Guinea, Nauru, and the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands, in view of their continuing dependent status,
vculd be managed better by the United nations under Article 8l of the
Charter rather than by Australia and the United States who, because of
unrealistic goals would be under constant fire to progress ever more
rapidly. There is some merit in the idea of a United Nations Commission
of international civil servants, knowledgeable in trusteeship matters,
managing the affairs of dependent areas not capable of sustaining them-
selves. This bears some similarity to the League of Nations system.
:-^>^C
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The reaction of Australia and the United States to such a pro-
posal cannot be stated, of course, with any degree of certainty.
However, the reaction would probably be a negative one. There is little
evidence that the peoples of these areas would welcome such an arrange-
ment; there is even less indication that either Administering Authority
would be willing to give up certain rights attendant to their steward-
ship.
Other alternatives are open, however j and, although the fin I
status oi iiauru and New Guinea are beyond the scope of this paper, the
status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands will oe ics main
concern. To a e^ore complete discussion of this vast area, we now turn.

CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM AND ITS BEGINNING
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Consideration of problems relating to United states administra-
tion of the Trust Territory of the pacific Islands invites attention to
certain inescapable factss (1) land areas are small and spread over a
large ocean area; (2) a common language, culture, tradition, or feeling
does not exist at present j and (3) economic resources are meager at
best. Those who are familiar with the Pacific Islands are abundantly
aware of the spatial nature of the Trust Territory and the tremendous
problem of communication. The Caroline and Marshall Islands and all of
the Marianas, except Guam, are referred to officially as the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands. As has been noted, this vast area
covers three million square miles, about the 3ize of the United States
or Australia. It has some 96 island units, various small islands or
island clusters which number about 2, 111 separate is lanes with a land
area of only 687 square miles. By comparison, the State of Rhode Island
contains about 1,060 square ailes. Sixty- four of the island groups are
regularly inhabited.
x iee U. 3. Department of State, iLth Annual Report to the United
Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands "{Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, i 9"S 2 ) j and*
United Nations Visiting Mission Handbook of Information on the Trust
territory of the Pacific Islands (Guam; Office of the High Commissioner,
1961) for a more complete description of the Trust Territory.
2lnfra, Appendix T.
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The Trust Territory is divided into seven Districts: Palau, Yap,
Rota, iaipan, Truk, Ponape, and the Marshall Islands. Major population
concentrations are found around the administrative centers of these
Districts and the population totals approximate ly 77>913. Extending
from latitude 1 degree to 20 degrees north and from longitude 130 de-
grees oo 172 degrees east, the Trust Territory measures 2,700 miles east
to west and 1,500 miles north to south. The approximate center of the
area falls at Truk in the Carolines. Truk is almost $,000 miles south-
west of San Francisco and 2,000 miles east of the Philippine
Guam, the southernmost island of the Northern ?-i?.rir: 1 also
the largest, has been an American possession since 1898 and, therefore,
is not a part of the Trust Territory in the political sense, but cer-
tainly is in the ethnic, geographic, economic, and social sense.
The term "Micronesian" is frecently used synonymously with
"Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands." This is not precisely correct
albeit understandable. The many different island groups ire subsa
for convenience under the general term "Micronesian" or "People of the
little islands," but the inhabitants of the southernmost islands,
Kapingsmarangi and Nukuoro. culturally are pure Polynesian. It should
also be noted that the Gilbert and Ell ice Islands are part of nicronesia
although not included in the Trust Territory. With these clarifications,
the term "h i c rones i an" will be used frequently to designate all thi
peoples of the Trust Territory throughout this paper.
The majority of the islands are cootposed of terraces of coral
limestone over a submerged volcanic base. In many instances, hundreds
.ftMV
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of miles of ocean separate islands classified as neighbors. Administra-
tive centers are located up to 1,000 miles apart. Not all of the islands
are completely flat as witness A^rihan Island (3,166 feet) in the
Marianas and Ponape (2,579) in the Eastern Carolines.
The climate of the Trust Territory is tropicai with relatively
uniform temperatures and barometric pressures. The average temperature
is 78 degrees. As Bight be 2;<pect*d, however, tropical disturbances
have caused severe AUttgt Ml occasion. For instance, typhoons struck in
the Marshtllj and In the Eastern Carolines in 1957 and 19>6 causing
widesp- amage. ait, in general, the climate is healthful with no
epidemic diseases— such as cholera, yellow fever, or malaria.
The Microne3ian is of medium stature with brown sk*n and wavy to
straight hair. IfMQdloid features are more evident in the peoples of
the West and Central areas. Australoid characteristics are found in
the southwest islands while Polynesian ones occur in many of the low
islands groups. As an ethnic group, the Chsuaorro of the Marianas stands
somewhat apart. The old Hicronesian base of a fish and gardening economy
and an emphasis on ancestral ties was modified by cultural intrust ions
from Spain, the Philippines, Germany, Japan, and the United States.^
The name "Chaworro 51 has been used since early Spanish times and is said
to be derived from the Marianas wcrd for a high chief or noble
(Chamorri). One notes., however, that the people of Saipan seem to pre-
fer to be known as Saipanese rather than Chamorros.*4
3Arthur L. Dewi (fed.), ,; Issues in Micronesia" (ftew York: African
Institute oi Pacific Relations, 19li?). p. I
HJ. o. Department of State, l?.th Anruial import to whe United
..:.f
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Although there are similarities of an ethnological, linguistic,
religious, and social nature u M various groupings, it cannot be
hela that a common culture ever existed or, indeed, exijts toaay.
Variation <<xtenG3 to the language diversity of Kicronesia. Hine major
languages exist with various regional dialects.
In political and social structure conraon feature? ao exist. With
scwae few exceptions matrilineal organization has be^n the pattern. All
children inherit land frois their sothers. There appear to bt BO "land-
less" people. Land, as might be expected, Utau an oveiriaing importance
as the foundation of prestige and social position.
The area of the Trust Territory was explored by various Spanish
and Portuguese explorers during the 16th century. Ferd inane hagelian
discovered what is now Guam in 1521 but Spanish rule did not begin until
l66fi. Graaually the area near Guam was more thoroughly exploreu and,
many years later, in honor of the Queen of Philip IV, Maria Anna, they
were named the ...ariana Islands. The Portu ;overeu Yap and Ulithi
in 1^26. Later Spanish explorers exploring the,3e and other nearby
islands named the area "Carolina" in honor of Charles II of Spain. The
Marshalls were named after English Captain .iarshall who aade a voy
throughout the area in 1788. With the exception of Guaa, which became a
regular port of call for Spanish vessels, the rest ol the area received
little attention until the latter part of the l?th century.
Mati oas on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Isl^us l[Wsh~ingtont U. >. Government Printing Office, 19o0), p. h.
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The main objective of the Spanish appeared to be the conversion
of the natives to the Roman Catholic faith plus the maintenance of
orderly government so that Spanish vessels could continue their use oi
Agana as a fooo and water stop.
German traders gradually moved into the area and, by 1885,
Germany had assumed a protectorate over the Harshalls. In the same
year, inroads were made in the Carolines. Spanish opposition, as might
be expected, was immediate, and the matter was referred to Pope Leo XII
for adjudication. The sovereignty of Spain was confirmed but Germany
was awarded substantial rights in the area.
In 1898, after the war with Spain, the Unitea States acquired
Guam. Spain, weakened and unable to fulfill its obligation in ^icronesia,
sold Germany her other Pacific island possessions in 1899 • In general,
the standard of living of the natives was improved by German adminis-
trators who did not attempt to upset the patterns of native culture, but
concentrated on economic matters. The outbreak of World War I marked
the termination of German influence in the area as the Japanese Expedi-
tionary Squeiron moved into Nicronesia in October 19lh and a military
administration was set up.
On December 26, 19lU, a provisional Naval Garrison took over
matters of defense and administration, and the islands were ruled in
this manner until 1918 when a Civil Administration Department was set
up with six administrative stations. ^ However, this department remained
^Luther Harris Evans, "The mandates System and the Administration
of Territories under C Mandate" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford
sose
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under the control of the naval forces. As we shall see below, a pro-
cedure similar to this was presented to the United States Congress when
the islands came under American jurisdiction.
The Germans had governed Micronesia with only twenty- four to
twenty-five officials. The Japanese established a comprehensive organi-
zation which eventually numbered 9h\\J Local chiefs were permitted to
exercise their powers provided there was no interference with Japanese
interests. This meant, in reality, that their say in the actual govern-
ment of che area was minimal. However, a village or town council system
a
wa3 established in 1932 in order to centralize local administration.
On December 17, 1920, the jurisdiction of Japan in the Carolines,
Marshalls, and Marianas (except for Guam) was confirmed by the League of
Nations which assigned to it a Mandate over these three island groups.
After extensive ..egotiation. concerning certain rights the United
States claimed on the island of Yap, a treaty with Japan was signed at
Washington on February 1, 1922, recognizing the latter' s mandate.
°
The Provisional Naval Garrison was replaced in April, 1922, by
the South Seas Bureau under the supervision of the Prime Minister of
University, 1927), p. 13h.
"Rupert Eiaerson and others, ''America's Pacific Dependencies" (New
York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 19U9), p. 110.
•Tadao Yanaihara, Pacific Islands Under Japanese Mandate (London
and New York? Oxford University Press, 19U0), p. 259.
SIbid
., p. 262.
?See Evans, "The Mandates System and the Administration of Ter-
ritories under C Mandate," og. c_it., pp. 3U3-3U6 for a complete discussion.
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Japan. Political affairs continued under the direct control of the
Japanese. Although fortifications were forbidden under the provisions
of the league of Nations, the Jc.-panose began to strengthen defenses in
1938. This year also marked an end to the submission of annual reports
to the League of "Nations. As is well Known, the area was used exten-
sively in World War II for military purpose j.
Economic development was by and for Japan. Japanese nationals
were imported in vast quantities; sugar plantations were established;
private enterprise was encouraged through the extensive use of sub-
sidies. Although there are those who claim that Japanese rule was very
beneficial to the Micronesians, it does appear that, on balance,
Japanese basic policy was something less than humanitarian toward the
natives. 5u~ar plantations provided the ingredient for alcohol to fuel
torpedoes; mining provided bauxite to furnish the aluminum for airplanes.
In the process of exploitation from 1920 to 19k0, however, beneficial
aspects developed. Roads, harbors and docks were built; lands were
cleared and crops planted.^ Sugar cane acreage, 1,10U in 1920, was
increased Ml 30,U0C acres by 1938. Commercial fishing was developed to
a most commendable extent reaching a level of 100,000,000 pounds of fish
products yearly exported to Japan.
*
^Department of State, 12th Annual report to the United Nations
on the Trust Territory of the Pacific , op. cit.
, p,
11Time Magazine
, June 23, 1961, p. 25.
**5t» Bail J. Sady and others, Report of a Transportation Survey
itioane r\€ ReKahHshinn Coo mmA A i -i- TMn^nn^tiaHnft in + K« Twi»f
'
the .'leans of Establishing Sea and Air Transportation in the Trust
rritory under Civilian Administration for the U. S. Department of 1
.: i
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One must reiterate, however, that the Kiero&ettMUl shared in thi3
economic development only in a very tangential manner, perhaps the
Japanese scholar, Tadao Yanaihara, summed up the prevailing attitude of
the ruling class best by noting:
Viewed from a realistic, utilitarian point of view, it may
seem more profitable for the government to leave the natives
to dwindle naturally and let the Japanese immigrants fill their
place . . . . lio country on earth can be expected to administer
a colony purely or solely for the protection of the natives.*-'
Certainly such a philosophy is almost diametrically opposed to current
thinking on the rights of dependent peoples, and such a posture would
hardly square with traditional United States concern for the basic worth
of the individual. Furthermore, one needs to consider the variety of
the various considerations which have gone into United States policy to
prevent exploitation of the local inhabitants which have tended to dis-
courage further economic activity. Our anti-colonial tradition and long-
standing record of sympathy and understanding toward dependent peoples
would not, even in the era before World war II, have pereiitted the
United States to pursue an economic policy at the expense of the
Micronesians.
Allied conduct of the war against the Japanese resulted in the
establishment of the United States position in the Japanese Islands by
right of conquest. Japan surrendered on September 2, I9b.$ and, as
srican troops occupied each island, "it became subject to U.
Interior and the Department of the Savy (Washington* U. S. Department
of the Interior, April, 195077 PP* 9i>~96 for more complete information
on Japanese exploitation.
Uyanaihara, op. clt.j pp. 298 and 30i*.
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authority in accordance with the international law of belligerent occu-
pation until July, 19U7 » when the islands formerly became a U. N. Trust
Territory."**4 It was inconceivable at the time, and no serious thought
has since been given to the idea that tnese islands should ever revert
to Japanese administration.
Under the Atlantic Charter, the United States pledged itself to
"seek no aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise. ,! As Aomiral Willi
D. Leahy has stated in his autobiography, I Was There , this was a fixec
principle with President rranklin Roosevelt. The President believed
that the United States should place any bases essential for its security
under the control of the United Nations. This view was far from being
generally acceptable at that time. Admiral Leahy, as did mo3t military
men, disagreed vehemently with this proposition. Then Secretary of the
Navy James Forrestal indicated in a diary entry on July 7, I9kk 9 les3
than enthusiastic approval for United Nations control by writing in
part, "... It seems to me a sine qua non of any postwar arrangements
that there should be no debate as to who ran the Mandated Islands."^
He continued to press his objection to anything less than full United
States control of the Pacific Islands in the ensuing months.
The evidence of difference within our government over this issue
is indicated hy the extended interval between the time when we played
^Department of State , lLth Annual Report to the United Nations
on the Trust Territory of the pacific Islands
, p
.""?
.
Salter tiillis (ed.), The Forrestal diaries (New York: The
Viking Press, 1951), p. 8.
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such a positive rok in the apBefii and inauguration of the Trustee-
ship System cf the United Nations ane. cur cccing forward with proposals
to place the former Japanese mandated islands under tne Trusteesnip
System. 16
By the Cairo Jaclaration of 19id, the United states declared that
they "coveted no gain for themselves and had no thought, of territorial
expansion. nl ? None the less, a Gallup Poll published May 23, 19'uh, when
war in the Pacific was at its height, indicated that 6? per cent of the
American public desired to "keep Hicronesia and ai30 the islands owned
or controlled by Britain and Australia which the United States had
18
captured." Only limited significance can be attachec to this sampling
of American oolnion since no alternative to annexation appears to have
been offered in this poll.
Although the structure of a United Nations Trusteeship System had
been formed;, the fundamental question for the United States as to whether
the Japanese mandated islands should be placed within this system or
annexed had not been answered. Support for United States retention of
the islands was provided for by a Sub-Committee for Pacific Bases of the
Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives. In a formal
*°For a comprehensive outline cf United states efforts to develop
a Trusteeship System (efforts that were materially added by one of the
student's advisors, Dr. Durward V. Sandier) s^e Pos twar Foreign Policy
Preparation , 1939- 19k$ (Washington: U. 8* Government Printing Office,
1950), pp. U2*B7Tl3Tr560, 688, and pass im .
^Eiitrson, op_. cit., p. 119.
^"Huntington Gilchrist, "The Japanese Islands: Annexation or
Trusteeship?" Foreign Affairs
, Vol. XXII, p. 61*2.
'
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report submitted In August, 1915, it recommended that in the interest of
the security of the United states, the Western Heaiisphere, and the pt
of the Pacific, the United states should keep at least a dominating con-
ic
trol over the Japanese u 1 islands. The report reflected the
p interest and the concern within various quarters of the government
in support of the idea of retaining Uni; atea control over the
islands baaed on security considerations* The Navy and the fear Depart-
ments, as miyht be expected, were disturbed about the preparations for
"trusteeship or internalization of the Pacific Islt oart-
ment of the Interior, on the other hand, could see in the islands
another possibility for its administration. The military position was
succinctly stated in a "Meraorandua for the Secretary of State" from the
Secretary of War Henry L- ion on January 23, 19h£:
/The Pacific IslandsJ do not really belong in such a classi-
fication ^/colonial areas/. Acquisition of them b>
S does not represent an attempt at colonization or
exploitation. Instead it is merely the acquisition by the
Uni .ates of the necessary bases for the of the
security of the Pacific for the t . To serve such a
purpose they must belong to the Unii ates with absolute
power to rule and fortify theru. They are not colonies; they
are outpostj, and their acquisition is appropriate under the
general doctrine of i no* by the power which guarantees
the safety of that area of the world. 21
n, op. £it., p. ii
orothy £. Richard, United states Naval Administration of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (2 Vols., Washington: Q.~"s.
Government PrintlKgroTfTce, 19$1), p. 58. I I that a
third volume is now in preparati.
21
James N. Murray, Jr., The United. Nations Trusteeship 5ys
(Urbanat The University Press, T9i>777pT WT~

In I9k6, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, stated:
The ultimate security of the United a .is in aajor
part on oar ability to control the Pacific Ocean, that these
islands are part of the co<apU i ntial to that control, and
that the concept of Trusteeship is inapplicable here because
these islands do not represent any colonial problem nor is there
economic advantage accruing to the United states through their
ownership.
Admiral Ernest J. King stated:
These atolls, these island harbors will have been paid for by
the sacrifice of /.merican blooc .... Failure to maintain the
bases essential for our own defense raises the fundamental question-
how long can the Unite "-,ates afford to continue a cycle of
fighting and winning and giving away only to fight and build and
win and give away again? 23
On the other ha: "dry of State stettinius on Kay 28, I9h$ stated
that:
... We have stood with equal firanes3 for a trusteeship
system that will foster progress toward higher standards of
living and the realization of human rights and freedoms for
ependent peoples, including the right to independence or
another form of self-government 3uch as federation.
President Truman neatly straddled the two positions in his Wavy Day
add; m October 27, I9h$, by affirming:
We uo not seek, for ourselves one inch of territory in any
place in the worlc. Outside of the ri c-ablish necessary
bases for our own poptection, we look for nothing which belongs
to any other power.
^
National sovereignty and strategic need were being balanced against
internationalism and the principle of trusteeship.
illis, op_. cit., p. 2iii.
2%ra7 and Navy Journal , April 7, I9h5, p. 987.
2i40uotations from U. , apartment of State Bulletin, December
I9k$ 9 p. lOhh. ~ - •—*
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As noted above, opposition of American military leaders to the
idea of a United Nations Trusteeship over the Pacific Islands had UM
support of our first Secretary of Defense, Jaxaes Forrestal, while
serving as Secretary of the Navy in 19hh» By 19hS the strategic im-
portance of Micronesia was not difficult to demonstrate. Not only had
American jurisdiction been acquired there at the co3t of tremendous
amounts of materials but also at the cost of perhaps as many American
casualties as there were local inhabitants throughout the whole area.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained that national security could best
26
be served by the outright annexation of the islands. In line with
this posture, at a meeting of State, War, and Navy representatives on
April 15, I9h5, the military advised postponing discussion of the
trusteeship question at the San Francisco Conference (see Chapter I)
and issuing a public statement to the effect that the United States
would retain full control of areas necessary for future peace in the
Pacific. The State Department objected to both ideas but agreed to the
concepts of not discussing any specific areas and including within any
general system, provisions for protecting United States strategic
interests.
At the final meeting on April 17, 1°U5, before the San Francisco
Conference, Secretary Forrestal stated the Navy position as follows! 2?
^Richard, pj>. £it., p. 59.
26Ibid
., p. 60.
^Willis, 0£. £it., p. U5.
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I taKe it as a premise about all discussions of world peace
that the United States is to have the major responsibilities for
the Pacific Ocean security, and if this premise is accepted
there flows from it the acceptance of the fact that the United
States must have means with which to implement its responsi-
bilities ....
One could see that loyal and conscientious Americans, mindful of
the increased responsibilities of this country for building and main-
taining the security of the Free World and the development of a newly
created United Nations system toward this aiifi, could, at the same time,
have honest differences.
For a time after the submission of the report of the Sub-Committee
on Pacific Bases, the Navy's point of view appears to have been upheld.
In the House of Representatives, Andrew J. May, Chairman of the House
Military Affairs Committee, and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce joined with
Secretary of the Navy Forre3tal in echoing Navy views. A proposal
favorable to the Navy was contained in a bill introduced by Representa-
tive Sterling ¥• Cole of New York on January 6, 19l;5> which would have
placed responsibility for civil affairs in the Pacific Islands in a
civilian agency. Ultimate responsibility for the conduct of government,
however, would have remained with the Secretary of the Navy. It is
interesting to note, as indicated above, that this coincided with the
procedure followed by the Japanese in 1916. The ideas contained in this
bill were reiterated in January, 19k7, when Congressman Cole intro-
duced House Joint Resolution 70 to provide for an Office of internal
sessions inside the Navy Department headed by an Assistant Secretary
vj; .
i
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and Congressman Henry Jackson introduced H.J.R. 80 to establish civil
administration. 2 " AH failed to pass the House Committee on Public
Lands
.
Indicative of the importance which the Navy attached to the
matter of maintaining United States control of the islands of Micronesia
was the statement issued by the Assistant Sscrstary of the Navy on
September 3, 19li5> listing those bases which the Navy considered to be
the absolute minimum essential for its use in the Pacific to be Guaa,
Saipan, and Tinian.
°
Anti-annexationists and advocates of trusteeship were extremely
concerned when the President in late 19h5, at the request of the Secre-
tary of the Navy, gave the Navy responsibility for th- administration of
Micronesia as an "interim arrangement.'' Proof that "interim arrangement"
was more than just a high- sounding phrase was evident from the appoint-
ment by President Truman in October, 19U5", of a committee composed of
representatives of State, War, Navy, and Interior to give him recommen-
dations on the ex- Japanese mandated islands M satisfactory to all depart-
ments .
"
Indicative of the seriousness of purpose of the Navy of prepar-
ing itself in the midst of war for handling its post-war responsibilities
for such peoples as the United states might assume jurisdiction of,
""Francis J. West, Political Advancement jn the South Pacific
(Melbourne: Oxford University PressT" 1961), p. 139.
2?john M. Maki, "U. 5. Strategic Area or UN Trusteeship?" Far
Eastern Survey, Vol. XVI, August 13, I9h7
,
p. 177.
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i.-'ti
,
.
32
programs were inaugurated in 19U2 at Columbia University and, subse-
quently, transferred to Stanford University where the School of Naval
Administration was opened on April 1, )9k6. Social anthropology, not
generally established at that time in many institutions as one of the
segments of social science studies, and certainly not a field with which
naval officers were faiailiar, was presented along with training in civil
affairs and government administration. Interestingly enough, the Navy
periodically still trains officers in governmental affairs at the Array's
School of hilitary Government at Fort Gordon, Georgia.
All too often, there is a tendency to Ju ;avy administration
in the Pacific on the basis of it3 record in Guam and -^aiaoa in the
period before World War II. It can be contended t.iat the case of the
ex- Japanese mandated islands was quite different. The Nsvy undertook a
thankless job under an ,; interim arrangement" and, yet, it had for the
first titue, policy guidance provided by the conversations at Dumbarton
Oaks froia August to October, l9Uh, which resulted in the United nations
Charter with its special provisions relating to the welfare and advance-
ment of dependent peoples. Although the connotation of military inter-
ference in essentially civil matters was to prove toe strong for the
avy to continue administration of the entire area of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands, nevertheless, one would be 3orely tried attempt-
ing to prove that it did not follow the provisions of the Charter and
affora the indigenous people of Micronesia just treatment in accordance
with their customs and traditions and the dictates of the United Sat ions
Charter.
IVtM
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II. THE Xl?IR»-fi0*iaKBtfUL UUVTJWUST
In view of the leadership which the United States exercised in
developing the special provisions of the United Nations Charter dealing
with dependent peoples, the controversy which subsequently developed at
home regarding the future arrangements for the administration of the
former Japanese Islands seemed somewhat out of character. However,
there were valid reasons on both sides for a controversy to spring up.
Not that anyone wished to give away the Pacific bases; rather, the con-
troversy centered around the method of retaining control: annexation or
trusteeship.
Prominent among those expounding the principle of trusteeship,
as well as the shibboleth of civilian government for civilian popula-
tions were the then Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes and former
Commissioner of Inuian Affairs, Mr* John Collier, who, at the time, was
chief spokesman for the Institute of ethnic Affairs. For an extended
period of time, these two gentlemen led what might be called a crusade
to get the Navy out of the business of island government and administra-
tion, wr. Collier, in his capacity as President of the Institute of
Ethnic Affairs, published in Washington, the Guam Echo , a newspaper for
the general information of the Quamanians. It also served as a means of
pressing the case against civilian administration by the military.
The fight for public support for divergent views was protracted
and bitter. After his resignation as .Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Ickes
continued to carry on an aggressive campaign against the Navy with respect
to its responsibilities for Island Territories in his syndicated
law ts
3U
newspaper column, in special articles, an<i in public pronouncements. In
an article in Collier's entitled "The Navy at its Worst," Mr. Ickes
denounced the Navy's handling of the Pacific Islands, stating in part
that "it is the Navy which has largely been responsible for our unde-
clared moratorium on democracy in these islands.""^ In his address to a
joint meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Institute of
Ethnic Affairs at the Hotel Mayflower on May 29, 191j6, to which he gave
the Title, "Meet the Navy," he said in part:
It is time that the State Department cease to be beguiled by
the pleasant tinkle of bra-53 md the luster of gold braid which
has been largely responsible for our moral failure to date as
to our dependencies.
The official pressure to designate the ^apanese mandated and
other islands as strategic areas in their entirety or to ann«x
them outright emanates from the Navy's desire to have exclusive
responsibility for governing the population of the areas ....
The record shows that the Navy cannot be trusted to rule civilian
populations. Tht Navy is arbitrary, dictatorial and totally
disregardful of civilian rights. 3°
This extreme statement embodies the basic conviction held by many people
in and outside of government that there is some intrinsic wrong in the
•(Ministration of civilian populations by a military establishment.
As evidence that Secretary Forrcstal'g ire had reached the level
of Mr. Ickes' was his suggestion that "Mr. Ickes be made King of
Polynesia, Micronesia and the Pacific Ocean Area." Although not
3°Harold L. Ickes, "The Navy at its Worst," Colliers , August 31,
1916, p. 22.
-^U. 5. Congressional Record
,
79th Congress, 2nd Session,
Appendix A3205.
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published at the time, Secretary Forrestal painted a satiric picture of
Mr. Ick.es in a memorandum noting:
High in the moral stratospher.. :.r. Ickes, bathed in the serene
light of his own self- approval, emanating the ectoplasm of con-
scious virtue, views the motives of cost men as mean and vulgar,
with, of course, one notable exception. If I should send a
commission to the Pacific Islands to report to me on . . . the
current results of naval administration they will all be ye3 men
.... Mr« Ickes, among other things, is I ert on yes-men.
He has taken pains to have a satisfactory number around him
.... For tolerance, tttfttftftlnrfffQ. wisdom and o the
cause of human ireeaom, I believe til admirals, when called upon
for their final accounting before thtir raker will not have to
step aside unless Harold I ekes does it by force. 3
2
Obviously, the controversy had expander beyond normal intra-
governmental exchange of views to extreme positions which, as Professor
Douglas Oliver has pointed out, "might have been entertaining had it not
involved the welfare of thousands of helpless .xicronesians.
Another side of the controversy involved representatives of the
Departments of State arid Savy, This was reflected in aany ways. Per-
haps one instance will serve to point out the differences which at times
rubbed raw the nerves of coordination. At the first meeting of the
United Nations in London in January, 19U6, the question cf trusteeship
for the ex-mandated islands came up. Secretary of State Byrnes cabled
Washington asking whether he could indicate that the United States was
willing to offer the islands for ordinary trusteeship or strategic
trusteeship. Acting Secretary Dean Acheson, without conferring with the
Willis, og. cjjt., pp. 21 and 232.
•^"Douglas L. Oliver, The Pacific Islands (Cambridge* Harvard
University Press, 195S), p. 2HI.
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military, obtained the approval of President Truman and cabled authori-
zation to Secretary Byrnes. Indicative of the lack of support among the
military for such a posture was the immediate protest of Secretary
Forrestal both as to the method of obtaining Presidential approval and
the substance of the statement.-**4
j
The controversy continued unabated throughout 19U6. A New York
T imes editorial of September 2, 19li6, 3trongly suggesting the position
of Messrs. Ickes and Collier, was equally strongly replied to by Secre-
tary Forrestal as he stated:
Single island positions cannot be considered strong bases.
Selected islands can, however, together with Guam, form a far-
reaching mutually supporting base network, although each alone
would fall far short of being an impregnable bastion.
Your editorial states that our record in American Samoa and
Guam does not givt -.ate assurance of the preservation of
democratic rights of the inhabitants of the Pacific Islands
while assuring the protection of national security interests.
That is the exact objective of naval civil government and for
that Bftttti of military government as well. 35
Secretary Forrestal went on to state that the Navy record in Guam and
American Samoa needed no defense.^
3l
*Millis, o£. £it., pp. 130-131.
3%he New York Times, September 2k, 19U6.
3°The bad blood between Mr, Ickci and Secretary Forrestal, which
revealed itself in the controversy over administration of Pacific
Islands, probably had its roots, according to The New York T imes
(March 10, 19h6) in an earlier, lit—f controversy over the administra-
tion of naval oil reserves which had been shifted to naval control in
1927 as a result of the Teapot Dome _,candai.
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By October, 19U6, the time had arrived to consider the provisions
under which the United States would offer its newly acquired territory
as a part of the forthcoming new Trusteeship System, On October 22,
19li6, the President called a meeting of representatives of State, War,
and Navy to formulate specific proposals. -" Setting the tone of the
conference, the President indicated that the United States would offer
the Pacific Islands for trusteeship under the form agreed upon by the
United Nations. Both Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Secretary Forrestal
expressed concern about this procedure believing, as they did, that the
position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff might be weakened thereby.
Admiral Nimitz stated that the sovereignty of the ex- Japanese mandates
should be taken by the United States. 3 **
As the time for actual proposals in the United Nations concern-
ing the islands drew nearer, positions tended to solidify. The Navy
wanted a "hard-and-fast" strategic trust contract first and then con-
sideration of offering the mandated islands to the United Nations.
Secretary Byrnes told Secretary Forrestal that this sequence ^wouid put
us in an impossible position before the world on the matter of trustee-
ship." 39
As does happen in our system of government when top levels find
agreement difficult, if not impossible to arrive at, the issue was
resolved by a presidential statement on November 6, 19^6, which said
37Millis, op. cit., p. 213. 38lbid ., p. 2lU.
39Ibid., p. 215. k°Infra , Appendix A.
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that the United States would place the islands under trusteeship but
under the provisions of a trusteeship agreement to be considered at a
later date. Secretary Brynes indicated to Secretary Forrestal that "he
had very much in mind his pledge . . . that whatever form the final
agreement took, the Navy wanted something that was tantamount to sover-
eignty at least until the United Nations h?<- be ome a going concern. "'•*•
As American plans for trusteeship left che domestic scene for the
international forum of the United Nations, other points of view soon
became evident. The Soviet Union claimed the right to review the pro-
posal of the United States whereupon Secretary Byrnes, by use of polite
pressure, let it be known that the United States position on the Kuriles
and Southern Sakhalin would reflect the Soviet attitude on our mandated
islands. 1 The Soviet representative to the Security Council reversed
his position and spoke of the "incomparably greater sacrifices" of the
United states.
On the home front again, Congressmen, reporters, and many others
continued to contribute ammunition to the mounting battle for public
opinion. The new Secretary of the Interior, Mr. J. A. Krug, raising
the general level of the controversy, presented a strong case based on a
reasoned argument of principle rather than invective. During a tour of
the Western Pacific and Japan in I9h7 , he found a strong ally in General
Douglas ilacArthur who was, according to ftr. Krug, "deeply wedded to the
kljiiles, oj). £it., p. 216.
"*\James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New Yorki Harper and
Brothers, I9h7), p. 221 j see also Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss,
Jr., American Foreign Policy (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc.,
U Wi
a no t»t£
I UN
39
principle of civilian government for civilian people." In a press
release, both advocated a speed-up of "democratUtation processes for
American-controlled islands of the Pacific. " us> Secretary Krug's approach
was more subtle, more reasonable, and, as we shall see, more successful
than the "name-calling" tactics oi previous participants.
On September 30, 19U6, the Navy's top Pacific commanders, Admiral
John H. Towers and Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownal conferreu with Presi-
dent Truman and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal at the White House.
They emphasised the strategic importance of Guam by stating that "the
Navy's immediate job was to convert Guam into a 'little Pearl Harbor,'
then to link it and Pearl Harbor by a chain of airfields and natural
anchorages."^ On October 3, 19U6, in Honolulu, Admiral Towers stated
that, "eventually our installation in the Guam-Saipan area will be our
key Pacific base. Alaska and the Aleutian bases plus Pearl Harbor in
the middle Pacific and the #ariana3 installation will provide a fulcrum
for the Pacific defense set-up." ^
In 19U7, the tide appeared to be turning against the Navy's posi-
tion toward the position held by the anti-annexationists. Then Repre-
sentative Henry H. Jackson of Washington and the late Senator Huyn Butler
of Nebraska introduced measures to authorize the President to establish
civil administration under the Secretary of Interior for Guam, iamoa,
1951), P. 739.
^Quotations in paragraph from The New York Times , February 26,
19U7 and February ?7, 19b 7
.
^Ibid ., October ±, l?ho. ^Ibid., October h, 1916.
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and the Islands of the Pacific. This extended period of controversy
over the Pacific Islands was ultimately punctuated by an important
policy meeting in fray, 19U7, on this subject attended by the Secretaries
of State, War, and Wavy. As a r*f uit of thi i tocttagj in a letter to
the President dated June 18, 1917, the three Secretaries recommended, in
part, that the Kavy Department should continue to have administrative
responsibility "pending, transfer to a civilian agency of the government
at the earliest practicable date, such date to be determined by the
President." The late Harold Ickes decried this decision of a committee
w to which no representative of the Department of the Interior was invited
or even told about." According to Rr« Ickes, "the three departments
decided on a 'do nothing' policy which, in effect, [\zf.€f the Kavy in
control.',li6
In spite of the protestations of ?Ir. Ickes, the phrase "pending
transfer to a civilian agency" certainly wag looked upon by the anti-
annexationists as tipping the scales in their favor and as a triumph for
those who had pressed for administration of the Pacific Islands by a
civilian agency of the government. The phrase also became particularly
applicable to the problem of administration of the former Japanese
Mandated Islands. The United states had already completed its negotia-
tions with the Security Council of a trusteeship agreement for the
territory which was then before Congress for its approval.
k6Ickes, on. cjt., p. 22,
^l
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CHAPTER III
THE TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FDR THE TRUST TERRITORY
OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
Despite our interest in getting the Trusteeship System launched,
which depended on proposals of certain United iiiations members to place
territories administered by them under the system, the United States
proposal, as has been noted, aid not come until after a number of other
administering powers had proposed trust agreements for other mandated
territories. Our slowness m submitting proposals to the United Nations
for placing the former Japanese Mandated Islands under trusteeship did
not pass unnoticed in the international sphere. The delay, of course,
was due to the continuance of the controversy concerning annexation or
trusteeship.
When the United States did come forward with a trust agreement on
February 26, 19li7, it proposed the establishment of a strategic trust
territory in accordance with Article 62 of the United Nations Charter.
However, as Hanson Baldwin pointed out at the time, "President Truman's
recent announcement that the United States will be willing to place the
former Japanese mandated islands under United Nations trusteeship,
solely administered by the United States, represents a slight deviation
from the policy advocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." 1 It would
appear that the victory for the advocates of trusteeship was not so
xThe New York Times, November 13, 19U6.
;as 3m
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clear cut. The "strategic" aspect of the trusteeship agreement, unlike
those of other Trust Territories—such as New Guinea, Nauru, and Western
Samoa— enabled the United States unilaterally to close parts of the area
for security reasons. Article 82 of the United Nations Charter states
that "There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, strategic
area or areas which aay include part or all of the trust territory to
which the agreement applies . . . .' Article 83 reads, "All functions
of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval
of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or
amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council,"*
It is interesting to note in passing that an article was included
in the trusteeship agreement to provide for an administrative union
(Article 9). A copy of the trusteeship agreement with explanatory com-
ments was prepared for tne Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, un
Article 9> the explanation, in part, went as followst "Provision for
such union or federation is obviously desirable to ensure the efficient
administration of such island areas as Saipan which will face many
problems common to the nearby island of Guam.'1 3
Critics were quick to point out that, in 3pite of the solemn
declarations of the Atlantic Charter, the strategic area concept was a
2For an analysis of the Trusteeship Agreement, see Robert R.
Robbins, "United States Trusteeship for the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands," Department of State Bulletin
, Vol. 16, hay !•, 19U7,
pp. 783-790$ and U. S. Congress, Senate, Report to accompany S.J.R . 11+3,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. U71, July-ID^ T9h1 .
JU. S. Congress, Senate, Report, to accompany S.J.R . lU3, p. 9.
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creation of the United states and was not ooaipatible with the intent oX
Charter, ifcit, as tfaj > .us tin, Ur.: ijpranntrtUt to
the Uni -«a Nations, pointer out to the Security Council on February ?
19li7, "tens of thousands of American lives, vast expenditures of treasure
and years of bitter fishting were accessary to driv* the Japanese aggres-
sors back fror* these islands. ffeMN islands constitute an Integra-'.
strategic physical complex vital to the security of the United states.''**
Too iwy ftUtUm baa died too recently on Saipan for an ordinary trustee-
ship to be satisfactory. The Japanese- had proved that th« islands were
indead "strategic." The viewpoint that ttrftttfita needs could change
with the advent of nuclear weapons and the decline of Japan as a creat
power seened to gain few advocates .^ The key to our policy was still
the Importance that the military attached to these islands as a result
of def<,: d strategic considerate
Debate continued ftfcrff isly into March, efforts M
wade by Australia, itew Zealand, and the United Kingdoa to delay the
effective dftfca of the AfVMMflt until trie peace treaty with Japan 'm*.-
been signed.^ The representative of the ">oviet Union requested
. Congress* ienat*,, OomlttM on F • Relations., j
of Aaerican Foreign Policy , Doc. No. 123* 01st Cong. 1st Sess. (WasTTF
tf7 S. dovernotnt Printing Office, 1950), p. I I B,
%or a discussion of this point, ste John H. Kski, nU. 1. stra-
tegic Area or UN Trusteeship," Far Eastern Survey , Vol. XVI, August 1^,
1917, p. Ww.
m
6nKich r . FuraisF, Jr., African Fore:
Policy Ttorkfl ninehart and Company, Inc., 1951),~ pZ~7T$i ana*"
Cnaraian Edwards Toussaint, Tjje Trusteeshi - » of tnv Uni ted Sat ions
(Hew Torkj Fredrick A, PraeQer, inc., 1956)*, p. 136 for a further
-,
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amendment of the trusteeship agreement draft to read "self- government or
independence" as a future objective for t rritory instead of
if- government" alone. Tnis was agreed to by the United States.
Parenthetically, it is difficult to believe that 3uch an important
"omission" i*as entirely unintentional. The comment of the United States
representative with regard to this amendment seems to indicate that
indepen-.-nce as a realistic goal was considers I than prebal
"The Uniteu states feels that it must record its opposition not to the
principle at independence, ^.o vnich no people could be more ^-ated
than the people of the Unite' State j, but to the thought that it could
possibly be achieved within any for.. ire in this case."
In any event, the Security Council, on April 2, I9.u7 , by resolu-
tion, unanimously approved with slight amendments the trusteeship
agreement for the former Japanese Undated Islands.
One critic claims that ''the Soviet Union acquiesced in this
arrangement, evidently because it realized that the only Alternative was
the establishment of unfettered American sovereignty over the area and
possibly because it nourished kfea vr in hope that it might become the
beneficiary of a similar arrangement.' •
The Trusteeship Agreement vas thus stamped "approved" by the
United Nations} it tnen had to run the Congressional gauntlet.
July 7, i°u7, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met in executive
analysis oi this point.
?Inis L. -, Jr., Sword j lata Plowshares (New York: Ran
House, 1961), p. 367.
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session with representatives from State, War, Navy, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to consider S. J. Resolution 1U3. The representatives includea
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Fleet Admiral
Chester W. Niaiitz, and Rr« Benjamin Gerig, Chief of the Division of
Dependent Area Affairs of the Department of State.
If one cains any single impression from this Hearing it is that
the central concern was to insure United States security in the area of
Hicronesia. General Marshall said that there was "no doubt" in his mine
that security was "fully provided for." Secretary Patterson reiterated
that "the war itself demonstrated beyond question the importance of the
former mandated islands to the security of the United states." General
Eisenhower indicated that the trusteeship agreement gave us !i aii the
national sicurity rights" we needeo. nr. Gerig believed that nothing in
the agreement impinged "in any way upon our autonomy with respect to
national security."
The Hearing demonstrated why the United States came forward in
the Unit -ad Nations with a strategic trusteeship agreement, the first of
its kind, and to date the only one. However, with this emphasis, the
United States was liable to the charge of a "double standard of inter-
national morals in a matter which we considered vital to our safety. **
8see U. S. Congress, Seriate, Coaftittfti Ml Foreign Relations,
Hearl r ik3 i Joint Resolution authorising the President to
ftpprov. the trusteeship Agrecuenc for UM Territory of the pacific
Islands, 60th 'Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 19L?) for additional
information.
°Han« W» iv^igert, "U. $• Strategic Bases and Collective Security;
Foreign Affairs , Vol. XXI, January, 19k7, p. 9
Ml
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We had consistently proclaimed the right of a subject people to deter-
M its own government eventually and, yet, clearly indicated that
national security considerations were overriding in this instance.
Dichotomies of this sort which create dJAowttJ for policy-makers arise
all too often. The Uniteu States 'solution 1 in this instance was to
resort to the "strategic area' 1 concept.
At the same time, we undertook to advance the political, economic,
educational, and social status of the islanders la accordance with the
enlightened principles for the administration of dependent peoples
written into the Charter and to submit our administration, subject to
security considerations, to international scrutiny in conformance with
the formula embodied in the Trusteeship System.
ace the establishment of tne trusteeship, the United states has
given die consideration to rec ttlMa by :ue Trusteeship Council
regarding the Trust Territory; but we decide how and to what extent such
recommendations should be applied. This, of course, is not peculiar to
our particular administration of territories; other countries Ll«¥ '-he
same procedures. This point was underscored with unusual candor by an
Australian representative in l?5h before the General Assembly when he
stated:
Please let me say, with respeel co our critics, that the
United Nations Trusteeship System does not mean that the United
Nations i3 in charge of our Trust Territories. We are in chai
of them and we are footing the bill, and we are meeting our
obii rjauions toward the Trust Territories with all the energy and
sympathy and expert experience that we can bring to it.*
i0Quoted in Claude, on. £it., p. 362,
.-
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So responsibility for the initiation of policy remains with the United
States. This might lead one to conclude that the United States has been
casual in regard to its relations with the people of the Trust Territory.
This has not been the case. It should be pointed out that we make every
effort to proceed along lines compatible with the policies and desires
of the Trusteeship Council. Visiting Missions hav? beex\ quick to point
out that they have not been hampered or restricted unduly in any way.
The^e incursions into the "colonial" policy of the United States
have led us far afield from the Congress where, on July 1) , 19U7, House
Joint Resolution 2j>3, authorizing the President to approve the trustee-
ship agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, was
ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed. The
President signer the Joint Resolution and the United States Government
notified the United Nations on July 18, 1917.
Executive Order 9o75 was 1 on this date, also, whereby
military garernment was terminated and the responsibility for the civil
administration of the Trust Territory was delegated to the Navy on an
"interim basis."
Trusteeship for the peoples of hicronesia was now an accomplished
fact. Provisions for their welfare and advancement under the tutelage
of the United States wa3 now spelled out in an international agreement. -
ll
y* s * Statutes at Large , Vol. Pttj N«rt I (Washington* U. .
Government Printing Office, 191*8), p. _;57.
ji, f.pr a.
*3infra, Appendix C«
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This more precise evidence of attitude and policy of the United itates
toward the peoples of the Trust Territory did not, however, bring to an
end the controversy as to where responsibility for administration of
these peoples should rest within the Federal 'jovernruent. The continua-
tion, of this controversy will ~>e dealt with below. It (tight be useful,
however, at this juncture to ask whether the conclusion of the rustee-
ship ag re --lent and the establishment of civil administration bxtWght
about any significant change in the conduct of government in the Trust
Territory. Both of these queries can be answered in the negativ
Actually, approval of the trusteeship agreement required no aiajor re-
orientation, for the Navy could maintain that, since the tlttfl when United
ites policy had becoi^e spelled out in the United Nations Charter, the
Navy had been guided by the statement of principle and alias for promoting
the welfare ana acvanee^nt of dependent peoples. For example, former
Deputy Hi h Commissioner Carleton H. Wright, Vice Admiral, U. 3. Navy
(Ret.) could rightly maintain that many of the provisions which sub-
sequently became incorporated in the trusteeship agreement had been jU3t
those which the Navy for MM* than two years had been earnestly pur-
i)
suing, '
Evidence in support of this contention is Um Issued
by Adr.iiral R. A. Spruance as Military Governor of the arep on December 12,
&V ;miral Carleton H. Wright, U. S. Navy (Retired) > -Trust
Territory of iflc l£le.r.us, ! U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
,
Voi. LIIIV, November, 19)46, p. 137b.""
"*
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19ii5 (CBCPAC Serial 52855) which deserves to be read alongside the
trusteeship agreement itself. The directive required military governors
to give effect to the announced policy byj
(a) the physical restoration of damaged property and facilities
(b) the continued improvement of health and sanitation
(c) the early establishment of self-governing communities
(d) the institution of a sound program of economic development
(e) the establishment of an educational program
The important provision (c) above calling for the "early estab-
lishment of self-governing communities" was spelled out as folloW3x
It is desired that the inhabitants of the occupied territories
be granted the highest degree of self-government that they are
capable of assimilating. They shouia be encouraged and assisted
to assume as uuch as possible of the management of their own
government. Local governments insofar as practicable, should be
patterned on the politico-social institutions which the inhabitants
have evolved for themselves. Military government ordinances and
regulations should give due weight to local traditions and customs*
Legislation and enforcement machinery should be held to the
minimum requisite to the preservation of law and order, the main-
tenance of property rights, the enforcement of measures for health
and sanitation, and those laws respecting trade, industry, and
labor which are essential to economic well-being. l£
To explain more fully the policy oi self-government, a special
notice on this subject (serial 362—January 10, 19l7) was issued. This
called for a closer scrutiny of local officials and emphasizec. the
importance of indigenous freedom of choice. On May 13, 19U7, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff promulgated an Interim Directive (Serial 12370) on
Military Government in Central Pacific Islands and again "sc 11- government"
was emphasized.
^Felix M, Xeesing, Handbook on the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Is lands (Washington! United States Navy Department, 19E8), p. 93.
^Swi John Sandelmann, "Some Observations on the Problem of
,.
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In a letter dated January 15, 19U8, irom the Chief of Naval
Operations to the High Commissioner, the mission of naval administration
was set down as fcllowst
(a) early establishment of self-governing communities
(b) public health and sanitation
(c) education
(d) economic development
(e) restoration of war damages
Note that "self-governing &MB unities," third in Admiral Spruance's
directive of December 12, 19li5, had now been placed at the head of the
list.
In negotiating the trusteeship agreement with the Security
Council, the United States went no further than this with regard to the
development of self-government which it could scarcely envisage taking
place within the foreseeable future. With policy such as that enunciated
by Admiral Spruance having already become the basis for Navy administra-
tion in the Trust Territory, it is understandable why the advent of the
trusteeship agreement wrought no perceptible change.
Admiral Louis £. Denfeld, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet
was appointed the first High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. The
newly-appointed High Commissioner revealed broad understanding in regard
to United States policy toward and concern for the welfare and advance-
ment of dependent peoples with his appropriate emphasis, with respect to
'Self-Government' in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands"
(Honolulu, 1953) for a complete analysis of the inception of civil rule.
..
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the Territory, on health, sanitation, restoration of property, progress
17
toward self-government, economic development, and education.
II. Tm CHANGING TIMES
The Islands of the Pacific had been shaken by a World War which
transported them to a strange, new world} a world which was now aware
of them; which had provided them with the framework for development of
government and had even gone so far as to say that they must "play their
part" in defense of the Free World. All of this development antedated
not only aspirations on the part of the local peoples for any or a
greater measure of self-government but even, very often, the absence of
any realization of the existence of peoples in other parts of the Trust
Territory and any relation to them. What did an isolated inhabitant of
Yap know of political consciousness, of a regional organization to help
him, of the United Nations, of the modern world preparing to clothe him
in some of the refinements of modern living? One wonders, if given a
choice, whether he would choose "enlightened" civilization or his stone
money and the old ways. These are unrealistic thoughts] change was the
order of the day and two global wars had demonstrated that the outside
world was not prepared to leave the people of the Trust Territory alone
in their Pacific Island paradise. To what extent the "winds of change"
would affect them, only time could tell.
^••Leonard Mason, "Trusteeship in Micronesia; Naval Administration
Projects Plans for Self Government and Improvement in a Difficult Trust
Territory," Far Eastern Survey
, Vol. XVII, May £, 19UB, p. 106.
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CHAPTER IV
TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION
The trusteeship agreement helped little in solving the conflict
between the military and civilian departments of the government. It was
at best a compromise as both sides continued the battle of the editorial
page. Under the handicap of an unresolved "interim arrangement," the
Navy proceeded with the administration of the Trust Territory; long-
range planning was difficult at best. A Civil Affairs Corp3 within the
Navy was discussed which would have established a career branch similar
to the colonial services of other nations. This idea was not foreign
to the Navy, as evidenced by its extensive training program for Civil
Affairs Officers; but it failed to gain broad enough support for
implementation.
The Deputy High Commissioner, Rear Admiral Wright, continued to
administer the Territory from Guam. In keeping with the policy for the
welfare and advancement of dependent peoples, local communities wer-
encouraged to manage their own affairs. As might be expected, thi3
encouragement of democratic practices at times conflicted with the
traditional prerogatives of some autocratic chiefs. While subsidization
levels were generally met, it soon became evident that subsidisation was
an obvious and continuing need to maintain even a minimum standard of
living. No commercial enterprises were allowed in the Trust Territory
i-Leon3rd Mason, "Trusteeship in Micronesia," Far Eastern Survey
,
Vol. XVII, May 5, 19U8, passim .
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unless the inhabitants could participate. In this regard, on January 1,
19L.8, the Island Trading Company replaced the U. S. Commercial Company,
an organization of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, as purchasing
agent for copra, trochus shells, and handicraft. It was pLaced in opera-
tion with a loan of $250,000 from the Navy Bank on Guam and operated
quite successfully until ordered out of business in 1952 by the United
States Congress. ^ Although it was acknowledged that the Island Trading
Company was effective, it had the 3erious connotation of "government in
business." For this reason, its base was unstable and, as a result,
numerous private Hicronesian firms took over.
Naval Administrators emphasise the inportance of health lad
sanitation measures in the Trust Territory, and dispensaries were estab-
lished in each District.
A mo3t important project started by the Navy was called the
Coordinated Investigation of Mi -rones ian Anthropology (CIHA). Known by
thi3 name from 1<?U7 to 19k9 when it changed to Scientific Investigations
of Micronesia (SIM), this continuing work has been an invaluable aid to
planners and students of Micronesia alike.
It would seem that the Navy had tackled vigorously the problem of
building a background of knowledge as a basis for the development of a
progressive system of government and social administration. This wouic
be difficult, in not impossible, to accomplish under an ,; interim
oert Trumbull, Paradise hi Trust (New Yorki Williaat Sloan
Associates, 1$>59), p. 92.
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arrangement" of indefinite duration. Flirthermore , forces were already
moving in Congress and elsewhere seeking to bring this arrangement to an
end.
I. THE CONTRDVSRJY CONTINUES
retary of the Interior Rrug led off the attack by stating on
March 15, \9hl» viat he woui :33 to grant charters to American
Samoa and Guam for their own civil governments which would change the
basis In theru Territories from that of Presidential executive Orders to
organic legislation by an Act of Congress. He added that he would seek
a similar charter for the Trust Territory.
On July 7, 191$, the civilian ana military agencies of the govern-
ment presented their arguments to a Joint Congressional Committee
concerned with the administration of Guam, American Samoa, ar Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands. Representatives of the Departments of
State and Interior upheld in open hearing (see below) the importance of
civilian administration; while the Navy, in closed session, very probably
emphasized the control of the Pacific Islands frou a strategic pcint of
view. v Perhaps the general line of the Navy's argument can be surmised
from the statement of the High Commissioner, about one week after the
hearing, to the effect that no other agency of the Federal Government
-The I*£W York Times , March 16, 19l±7.
klbid., July 6, ISUo.
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could handle the administration of the islands so well and only the Navy
could give the logistic support essential to successful administration.
In a prepared statement to the press after the hearing, Mr. Oscar
Chapman, Under Secretary of the Interior saidt
The emphasis in civil administration should be on the
political, social and economic aspects .... I suggest that
there is an inherent disability in naval or military circles to
so place the emphasis. Military considerations are bound to
e first. The system of rotation of officers makes it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for long range programs to be worked
out .... The unfortunate fact is that in the eyes of the
islands and of the United States an a whole, naval administra-
tion on a permanent or secii-permanent basis would be taken
as evidence that we have little concern with the civilian
population and regard them as merely appurtenances of military
establishments.
Presenting the view of the State Department, lir. Benjamin Gerig saidi
America's traditional role as protagonist of the interests
of non-i?e If- governing peoples, its good will among peoples who
are moving rapidly toward capacity for self-government or
inc. .ace and its profession before the world of lofty
principles of freedom and justice for peoples governed by-
others will be put to the test as America's own administration
of dependent areas is critically examined in the forum of the
United Nations.
Obviously the foregoing statements reflect careful preparation
and a sincere point of view of the governmental agencies represented.
It might be sa*d in passing that, at that Use, the United States had
not become a target of anti-colonialism in the United Nations.
The New York Times
,
obviously in reference to the Congressional
hearing, stated that:
^Rupert Emerson and others, America 's Pacific Dependencies
(New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 19^9), p. 125.
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The peoples of these islands are not numerous. The islands
themselves are not of great economic importance. But they are
our responsibility. The sooner they are placed under 3ome
civilian agency of the Government the better it will be, we
believe, for the island peoples.
6
In its iirst annual report to the United Nations on the Trust
Territory, The United States gave a detailed account of progress in the
political, economic, and social fields. The report made it clear that
the area, whil*; strategically important, was no island paradise. In the
subsequent deliberations in the Trusteeship Council on the report, Rear
Admiral Leon 5. Fiske, then Deputy High Commissioner of the Trust Ter-
ritory, performed, for the first time, the exacting and tiring role of
United States Special Representative whose task is to elaborate upon the
report and respond patiently to the questions of the Council in regard
to it. Admiral Fiske invited the attention of the Council to the reali-
ties of the Trust lerritoiy. Ife mentioned the vast distance?? involved,
eight distinct cultures, ten mutually unintelligible languages, scarcity
of natural resources, difficulties with logistic support, efforts toward
an indigenous governmental system, establishment of municipalities, and
reiterated the belief of the Administering Authority that the Territory
could not be made economically self-supporting in the foreseeable
P
future."
The Trusteeship Council commended the United States for the
o
progress in political, economic, social, and educational advancement.
ojhe Kev York Times
, July l„ T.
7U. U. Doc. T/329. 6Ibid. 9U. N. Doc. 3/1358.
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It did not feel constrained to voice even the mildest criticism of tru.
handling of the Trust Territory under Navy auspices nor even to touch
upon the contentious issue within the {failed Scates Goverroaerv", and the
relative fterttl of civil government by the military versus civil govern-
ment by a civilian arm of the government. As might be expected, however,
the application of what subsequently came to be the usual anti-colonial
Soviet tactics was experienced for the first tiue.
As noted above, the Trusteeship Council was the orgea of the
United Kat ions which considered the report of the United States adminis-
tration of the Trust Territory from the outset. Technically speak!
the United Stetee is not responsible to the Genercl Assembly and i
agency, the Trusteeship Council; but, rather, to the Security Council in
as much as the Pacific Islands are designated a strategic area. The
Qfclted States has agreed to accepting the review by the Trusteeship
Council as a practical solution to the problem. This arrangement was
formalized on March 7, I9h9, whereby the Security Council reserved to
itself full and ultimate responsibility for all actions concerning the
strategic itm while the Trusteeship Council would act, on its behalf, in
all matters not concerned with the question of security including consid-
eration of reports, exaninction of petitions, and sending of Visiting
Missions subject to the relevant terms of the trusteeship agreement.
<
H*. N. Chowdhuri, International Mandates and Trusteeship
Systems : A Comparative Study (The Hague? Kartlnus Nijhoff, 1955),
p. 167.
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On April 3, 1919, the President asked Congress for ana obtained
funds to shift the Island of Guam from Naval jurisdiction to that of the
Department of the Interior. Also, aiUr fifty-.!!*, years of rule in
American Samoa, the Navy was to shift M rative control to the
Department oi the Interior on July 1, 1951. The Department of the
Interioi M j to bt—«€ also the sciainistrator in the Trust Territory in
1951, but even in 19^9* it was quite clear that the Navy's position in
the Islands was weakening.
II. IB .LF-GOVEJaMEMT OR MDfiPcJUDa^
Late in lfk9 che General i dcrted a resolution /J2j (I\Q_7
pertaining to the submission of concrete plans for the attainment of
self- government or independence in the various trust territories. x
This Miter of a time limit continues to put American policy on the
defensive. However, it should be realized that the United Nations
Charter makes no mention of a time limit for the fulfillment of the
objectives of the Trusteeship System tad the past argument nas been
that, in the ansence of stipulations for such in the various trustee-
ship agreements, trust powers were not obligated to engage in specula-
tion of this sort, forecasting in advanc time limits required for
bringing Trust Territories across the threshold to self-government or
Tor other evidence of the 'General Asse-ubly's attitude in this
ree,'
. 3. Department of State, American Foreign Policy
, 1950-
1955 (Wa: n: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 257^261.
H irtj
i
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12independence. This posture ha: beceae more difficult to maint.
however.
Although respon.. {bit officials >elf-£overnme-nt
as an uxtLrate gMtt lor the future rather than an it. ... _ctive,
official stateiuents, party platfo^ to
self-yovernck the uitiaiat. for the Trust TV.nitory
senUo an iu.a In r.. .tc of ths Union
Message in January, , the President r.sked Congress to 'provide a
greater measure of self- government for our islano possessions." 1 -^ As an
idealistic go^i, one could have no quarrel vith it. Furthermore, it
voiced a preposition whi-h MM politically ace, ptai- .he notae froflA
ana calculated to reinforce a favorable the Up as an
ad.ainisU.-inj power with a commendable policy and record toward the
dependent peoples it administered. Sue. Ilam of il. 1 and
earnest desires, however, aid not serve tc change the practical situa-
tion and the conviction of those who were otli ..al with realities,
namely, that any abandonment of the poli:y of oradualne3S in toe advance-
ment of the Trust Territory would hinder rather than help the situation.
For its report on the administration of the Trust Territory for
the year ending June 30, I9k9$ the United States again received a series
of piauoits frosi the Trusteeship Council. The Council was concern-
12Char.dan Edwards Toussaint, The Trusteeship System of the
Unltoc Nation:, (lev Yoncj tzt ' "', 19S'6}, p. 6-0.
rhe 1*M /ork Tltae3, Jminmij $t 19$Q.
U, 8. Doc. T/17
.-F,
lev
however, about the amount of money the United States was spending on the
Territory which it considered as excessive. In responding to questions
on this situation, Rear Admiral Fiske noted that the islanders were
paying only about $300,000 of their expenses out of local revenues
whereas the Unitec States was spending $7,000,000 annually. It is not
surpr,: ing that some of the other administering powers raised the ques-
tion of whether an administration which called for the outlay of several
hundred dollars per capita annually could be viewed with anything but
alarm. Other administering powers, with their limited budgets, could
not envisage spending comparable per capita amounts in their trust ter-
ritories. Ambassador Francis B. iayre, United states Representative to
the Trusteeship Council, replied to this criticism at the li*th .meeting
on June 22, 1950, pointing out that trie ! sienaer economic resources of
the Trust Territory were limited to copra ana a few phosphate deposits."
He regarded it "es ential that the United -taoes Government should give
generous and substantial financial assistance to aid poiicitcal,
economic, social and educational development."
It is interesting to note in passing that, at a later date, when
the amounts of Federal appropriations were reduced, the United States
was subject tc criticism in the Trusteeship Council that it was spending
too little. One can only surmise, but it seems logical to assume, that
the current increase being proposed for fiscal year 1963 will result in
the charge of overspending again.
^U. N. Doc. T/SR. 297.
.r.scjs ;-:•
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Admiral Fiske replied to a number of questions po3ed by the
Council in regard to government in the Trust Territory. He indicated
that it was proposed to secure the enactment of organic legislation for
the Trust Territory and that such legislation, in draft form, had been
introduced into the 60th Congress (H.J.Res. 391 of April 29, 19U8). It
can be said that, aside from a brief enactment to provide a basis for
annual appropriations for the Territory, no such legislation has yet
bean acted upon by the Congress.
Admiral Fiske announced that the President intended to transfer
administration of the Trust Territory from the Department of the Navy to
the Department of the Interior on July 1, 1951, and that the Navy was
proceeding with plans to effect this transfer.
In response to a question based on the statement contained in the
annual report that a "territory-wide legislative body" was being con-
sidered in the future, Admiral Fiske emphasized that such an organization
would not be feasible for many years to come.
The report on the second year of United States administration
revealed sincere interest in the people of the Trust T3rritory and
progress toward the fulfillment of the undertakings of the Trust Power.
The Trusteeship Council, which was disposed to commend the United States
warmly for its administration, was obliged to reach the conclusion that
the Islanders were benefiting from Navy administration. Ytt, despite a
record of successful administration, the Navy was preparing to relinquish
its jurisdiction in the islands.
-
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III. ORGANIC ACT FOR GUAM
In commenting on the fact that draft organic legislation for Guaa
was being debated by the United states Congress, the Hew York Times of
June 2U, 1950, spoke in glowing terus of a complete new deal for the
Pacific Island Territories. The following clay the Times correspondent,
Tillman Durdin, extended his thoughts beyond Guam to other Islands of
the Northern riarianas suggesting that their 10,000 inhabitants might
ultimately be joined with Guam and, subsequently, become incorporated
within the United States. l Ideas of this sort are still very much with
us and occur to anyone who studies the map and speculates on the politi-
cal future of the Northern Marianas.
The Senate on July 26, 1950, approved by unanimous vote an
Organic Act for Guaa. The legislation passed the House on July 31> 1950,
and President Truman signed the Act on August 1, 1950. ' Under the
Organic Act (Public Law 630), the Guamanians became citizens of the
United States, although Guam did not become an incorporated territory.
Provision was made for the people to elect their own Legislature and the
establishment of a civil judiciary integrated with the Federal judiciary.
For the Guamanians, an era had ended and a new one was in the
offing. Although perhaps few of them realized it, the inhabitants of
1
^The New York Times
, June 25, 1950.
*
'Annual Report of the Governor of Guam to the Secretary of the
Interior (Washington; UT S. Government Printing OfTico, 1956), p. 2
and passim.
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the Trust Territory, who within the lifetime of some had witnessed
repeated changes in flags and administration, were also nearins the end
of an era*
IV. THiL FIRST UbTTSD NATIONS VISITING MISSION
Paralleling these developments in time was the dispatch of the
first regular United Nations Vis iting iiiss ion to the four Trust Terri-
tories in the Pacific Area. It visited the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands from April 15, 1950 to ^ay 2, 1950. During the course
of its tour of the Territory, as indicated in its subsequent report, iS
it received several petitions calling for the annexation of the Trust
Territory to the United states and the granting of United States citizen-
ship. One such request from the House of Council and the House of
Commias loners of Saipan stated that the people of the Northern Marianas
wished to be incorporated into the United States either as a possession
19
or a territory ana to attain United states citizenship. * This particu-
lar request presents an interesting problem with manifold ramifica-
tions. * If- government or independence, as has be^n brought out
earlier, are the only goals indicated in the United Nations Charter.
One needs to recall at this juncture that the principle of self-
determination is contained in Article 1 and Article 55 of the United
1%. N. Doc. T/789.
l%. N. Doc. T/PET 10/5.
2°For a more complete discussion of the following point, see
Toussaint, og. £it.. p. 59.
Kw* mC
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Nations Charter. What happens, one may ask, to this principle if the
people of a Trust Territory are denied the option of some alternatives
to independence as an ultimate status?
V. PRiPAJiATIONS FDR TRAKSF^
With the knowledge that the administration of the Trust Territory
would be transferred to the control of the Department of the Interior in
1951, the two departments concerned prepared for the next step in island
government. One major problem was the setting up of an effective
civilian air and sea transportation complex. With the stringent budg-
etary limitations of Interior, this was critical. Indicative of
Interior's concern about this problem was the survey conducted by a
group of experts to determine the best oean3 of establishing civilian
transportation services in the Trust Territory. Headed by £mil J. Sady,
then Chief, Pacific Branch, Division of Territories and presently a
member of the staff of the United Nations, the survey team made an
exhaustive 3tudy of the problem. Some iaea of the magnitude of the task
of providing transportation can be gained from the knowledge that the
estimated 19U9 cost of operating Trust Territory ships under naval
administration equaled $2,U58,960.U8. This figure does not even
reflect such expenses as original cost, depreciation, and hull insurance.
It is, therefore, not surprising that Secretary of the Interior Oscar L.
2*£mil J. Sady and others, Report of a Transportat ion Survey on
the Means of Establishing Sea and Air Transportation in th"e
"
"Trust
Territory "Under Civilian Control for the U. J. Department of the Interior
and the Department of theTFavy (Washington* U. S. Department of the
Interior, April i£507,~ WT
lev
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Chapman announced on November 2, 1950, that it was the intention of his
Department to establish adequate civilian transportation by the middle
of 1951, but that the transfer of jurisdiction would be contingent on
this. Such was, and certainly still is, the importance of transporta-
tion in the vast distances of the Trust Territory. It might be noted,
in summary, that the Navy gave certain equipment, planes, ships, and the
like, to Interior and the transfer of jurisdiction took place on
schedule.
Commenting, on February 16, 195i, about the annual report of the
Trust Territory for the period ending June 30, 1950, 22 Rear Admiral
Fiske assured the Council that United States authorities were moving
ahead in the economic, social, and political fields. Again, the two
main problems— the geographic factor and the cultural factor—were empha-
sized as contributing to the great difficulties in administering these
far- flung bastions. He announced to the Council chat, in anticipation
of a forthcoming Executive Order, Mr. Elbert £. Thomas had assumeu
office as prospective High Commissioner on January 8, 1951. In deeping
with the indicated desires of the President, the military stall was
gradually being replaced by a civilian staff.
The Soviet Union, as usual, felt that the United States was noc
fulfilling its obligations under Article ?6 of the United Nations
Charter. Its representative, Mr. Aleksander A. Soldatov, stated that,
"It was clear that the Trust Territory wa3 governed by a highly
22U. N. Doc. T/808.
. Jp Sfcfl <1 8 J i Ok 3»^1»t»G
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centralized system of military government which precluded the participa-
tion of the indigenous population in the Territory's administration. ^
In its report to the Security Council," the Trusteeship Council,
by implication, refuted the charges of the Soviet Representative when
it noted with approval the political progress made, the establishment of
Congresses and the advancements in economic stability.
txcept for Soviet protests, the United States, in the eyes of the
international community, had completed another year of effective adminis-
tration. The spirit of the Trusteeship Agreement which, according to
some critics, had been weakened by our insistence on a strategic concept,
had been strengthened. The United States had translated its ideals into
plans, and pi ins into action. Our rtcord, if not spectacular, was,
nevertheless, worthy of praise.
On June 29, 1951, President Truman signed Executive Order i02652^
transferring administrative responsibility for the Trust Territory from
the Department of the Navy to the Department of Interior effective
July 1, 1951. When authority in the Trust Territory passed to Interior
on July 1, 1951, the philosophy of civilian control, which had, as a
practical matter, been put in abeyance, at the outset, in at least all
of the non- contiguous territories of the United States, had become
applicable in all territories subject to the jurisdiction of the United
2>U. N. Doc. T/5R. 328.
2iKJ. li. Doc. 5/2069.
2
^Infra, Appendix D.
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States. However, as will be seen below, at least one step in the
opposite direction was to be taken by the restoration of Naval adminis-
tration in the Northern Marianas in 1953.
8J3 t T[
CHAPTER V
DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY
The late Elbert E. Thomas, who officially inherited the mantle of
High Commissioner on July 1, 1951, in a statement shortly after embarking
upon his new assignment , revealed his appreciation concerning the problem
of administering the Trust Territory. He emphasized the challenge of
government over a people who had known Spanish, German, Japanese, and,
finally, American control with the resultant confusion and uncertainty.
The strategic value was again mentioned noting that peace in the Pacific
was extremely vital to Americs and American interests and that the
central position of the islands would help insure this peace. Mr. Thomas
reiterated the basic problems of transportation, economics, education,
and health.
The Department of the Interior was now fully responsible for the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The Navy, although not respon-
sible in the Trust Territory for administration, retained its office in
the Pentagon in order to handle security reviews plus the administration
2
of the Bonin Islands. It appeared that the bitter bureaucratic struggle
in Washington for control of the Trust Territory had resulted in a fait
accompli for the Department of the Interior.
JThe New York Times , July 29, 1951.
2Infra, Appendix T.
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On March 20, 1952, at the Tenth Session li03rd meeting of the
Trusteeship Council, the examination of the annual report on the admin-
istration of the Trust Territory for the period ending June 30, 1951,
(T/950) commenced. Mr. Thomas, in his capacity as Special Representa-
tive of the Administering Authority, performed the role of advising the
Trusteeship Council anew of the realities of administration of the
territory. He commented on the 55,OOC inhabitants scattered over numer-
ous islands and island groups plus the differences in language, custom,
and social organization. The difficulty in transferring control from
naval to civil administration was emphasizes, especially in regard to
transportation. Copra production, the economic backbone of the Trust
Territory, it was noted, was being gradually reestablishes after the
severe war da.-age.
A. the UOlith meeting, Mr. K. A. C. '^.thieson, Representative of
the United Kingaoca, raised an issue which was to be emphasized more and
more, i.e., the possibility of developing a self-sustaining economy.**
Mr. Thomas conceded that the islands had experienced their greatest
prosperity during the Japanese occupation. Mr. Mathieson asked if it
would not be better to gear the economy of the Trust Territory to Japan
rather than the United States. In thi;; regtrd, one can note in passing
that it has been the policy of the United States in the Trust Territory
to prohibit any nation from investing in the Territory. Some selected
3U. N. Doc. T/SU Vd;.
kj. N. Doc. T/3R. UOJU.
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United States companies are currently entering the Territory; but this
has not been, by any means, the rule through the years. .icronesian
products can be exported to the United States but are subject to high
iaport duties. The whole idea of a self-sustaining economy is a com-
mendable one; but, as Mr. Ja auley has observed, there is often a
wide discrepancy between the simple view officially tatten and the great
reservations which experienced officials usually feel.
In contrast to the favorable response of other members of the
Trusteeship Council, Mr. Aleksander A. Soldatov, Representative of the
Soviet Union, at the J435th meeting, proved to be an aggressive dis-
7
senter. In part, he accus^c the United States of repression and
oppression of the native population. According to Mr. Soldatov, the
United State3 was attempting to perpetuate tribal society in the islands
o
in direct contradiction of the objectives of the United Nations Charter.
Obviously, the Soviet Representative's NOMtttfl were not intended to be
of assistance to the Trusteeship Council in dealing constructively with
its annual review of United States administration of the Trust Territory.
At this same time, the extent of public interest in the United
States abouc the territory and our responsibilities for promoting its
^Harold Karan Jacobson, "Our 'Colonial' Problem in the Pacific,"
Foreign Affairs
, October I960, p. 6lj and U. K. Doc. T/1I48I.
6jaiiies McAuley, "Paradoxes of Development in the South Pacific,"
Pacific Affairs
,
Vol. XXVII, June I9$h, pp. 138- 1U9 «$ passim .
7U. ». Doc. T/SR. U05.
Su. N. Doc. T/SR. J4O6.
-
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advancement was reflected in the 1952 Democratic Party platform which
o
called for increased self- government for the peoples of the islands.
1. JUlUSDICTCOIi OVER S&lfttl AND 'UNIAH mSSIiWTO TO THE NAVY
On ~er 1, 1952, Higft Commissi :>ner Thomas received instruc-
tions from President Truman to return >aipan and Tinian to Naval juris-
diction. 10 ixecutive Order 101 36, teU4 November 10, Mtft,** stipulated
that the transfer vr.s to be ctive on January 1, 19$3- No
reasons were given for this transfer of control other than the Mtdl of
national security. Mr. John Collier called it "an ova inous violation of
the democratic principle of civilian administration of dependent
12
peoples." Ke went on to compare the islands with the strategic island
of Malta which never had its civilians placed under military rule. He
did not hesitate to place responsibility or: the Navy Department for the
prospective transfer and went on to predict further the fell of the Guam
Organic Act under Navy pressure. Br, Collier evidently failed to con-
sider it at all possible that the Navy had been ordered to resume
responsibility in some of the islands as a Matter of over-all United
States policy. The obvious question which emerges is: Why did the Navy
resume responsibility for Mm United ; administration in Saipan and
Tinian?
^The New Yor* Times
, July Ik, 1?52.
l°Ibid., Efeesafltof 2, 1S>£2. 11Injf r5> Appendix S.
l2The jjew York Times, January 18, 1953.
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Only in recent months has any unclassified information concerning
a Navy Technical Training Unit on Saipan come to light. Suffice it to
say, there is no information in detail on this subject, and the author
has made no effort to seek out such information. As will be seen in a
subsequent chapter, the disestablishment of this Navy Unit on June 30,
1962, has led to the transfer of jurisdiction of the Saipan District
back to Interior. But this is getting ahead of the story: In 1952, it
would seem that the image drawn by some critics of the Navy straining to
gain control of the Northern Marianas was a false one. The decision to
reassign responsibility for the Saipan District to the Navy was quite
clearly taken at the highest level within the Government for compelling
and justifiable reasons of national interest. The Navy did not seek
jurisdiction, but, rather, wa3 ordered to resume control as a result of
a Department of Defense decision.
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR CONTROL
On December 22, 1952, High Commissioner Thomas signed the Code of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, thereby providing a set of
laws for its government and prescribing the relationship of the govern-
ment to outsiders. It should be noted that the High Commissioner has
the power to make or amend laws by executive decree without review by
higher authority. Although a separate judiciary system responsible to
the Secretary of the Interior has been established, the right of appeal
cad
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to higher authority for review of laws established by the High Commis-
sioner is limited. ^
hr. Frank &• hidkiff of Hawaii replaced Hr« Thomas as High
Commissioner following the latter «s death at his post on February 11,
1953* Thus, the new High Commissioner was called upon to serve as the
special Representative of the United states when the Trusteeship Council
considered the annual report on the Trust Territory for the year ending
June 30, 1952 (T/1CU7, T/1055, T/1062). Commenting upon the transfer of
administration of Saipan and Tinian from the Department of the Interior
to the Navy, Hr. hidkiff observed that the Navy was continuing the
policies of the government and administration established Isy the Depart-
ment of the Interior. As an indication of continuity of policy, it was
acknowledged that Interior had previously taken over basic policy as
developed in the period of administration by the Navy.
Frequent reference to the Report of the United Nations Visiting
hiss ion to Pacific Trust Territories carried out from February 16 to
May 16, 1953 (T/1077) was *acie. Attention was invited to the Visiting
Mission's emphasis on the comments of Admiral Radford, the Commander in
Chief of the Pacific Fleet, concerning cooperation with the High Com-
missioner on matters concerning Saipan and Tinian. Division of
responsibility was to become a constant source of comment and criticism
both within the Trusteeship Council and among various writers. One
l
^Audlt Report to the Congress of the United States on tt» Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands for"" the FTscaTTears grated" June 30,
1953 and l$5l~T$y the Comptroller General of the United States,"p. 21.
%. H. Doc. T/PV. ii67.
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critic, Mr. George A. Codding, Jr., contended that although the Depart-
aents of the Interior and Liavy were authorized to deal directly with
each other in coordinating programs, there was evidence of differing
standards of administration. *5
The Mission had noted that the Chamorros of the Saipan District
had little in common with other islanders and, as a result, special
attention would be required to preserve the unity of the Trust Territory.
The more advanced lev=:l of the people of Saipan seemed evident from
their Petition to the United Nations of March 11, 1953 (T/PET. 10/8).
This Petition requested consideration of the following*
1. Physical restoration of war-damaged property.
2. Compensation for the occupation of private property from
July 10, I9hk to June 30, 19U9.
3. An Organic Act for the Trust Territory.
From the annual report, the Visiting Mission's Report, the
deliberations of the Trusteeship Council, as well as the content of the
various petitions, it seemed evident that, in 1953, there was a sense of
growth in the Trust Territory. At the same time, a situation was
developing which was to cause representatives of the United States in
the Trusteeship Council much difficulty, the division of administrative
responsibility.
III. JOINT RESOLUTION 6
Recognizing that passage of organic legislation for the Trust
Territory was not probable in 1953, the Secretary of the Interior, in a
15George A. Codding, Jr., "The United States Trusteeship in the
Pacific," Current History
, Vol. XXIX, December 1955, p. 360.
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letter to the Congress dated May 7, 1953, requested a Joint Resolution
of Congress to give statutory authority on an interim basis for the
continuance of civil government in the Trust Territory. Except for
various appropriation acts, the Congress had taken little action on the
Trust Territory since it adopted House Joint Resolution 233 of July 1U,
19bl
,
(61 Stat. 397, Public Law 20U) authorising the President to approve
the Trusteeship Agreement negotiated between the Security Council and
the United States, thereby bringing the Agreement into force. It is
true that efforts had been made to fit an Organic Act to the huge fraae
of the Trust Territory. One recalls H. J. Resolution 391 of April 29,
19US-, S. 2992 of April 9, 1952$ and H. R. 538l of May 25, 1953. All
failed to receive the necessary support for implementation. As will be
discussed in a subsequent chapter, the fight for organic legislation
continues today as evidenced by H. R. 9278 of September 18, 1961.
There seems little reason to take an optimistic view with regard to this
latest effort. The reasons for delay in following through with organic
legislation for the Trust Territory have doubtless been quite involved.
Unlike the case in Guam, the position of the United States in the Trust
Territory is not absolutely sovereign. United States action regarding
the Territory is subject to review by the United Nations, including the
strategic classification of the Territory and its use as an area for
nuclear testing. The Territory figures very importantly in United
States national and global defense considerations. Whether an ultimate
i^Infra, Appendix Q.
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determination of the future status of the Trust Territory has been made,
it is difficult to say. Certainly, the Congress has not considered any
such status in open session. For this reason, as well as for the others
listed, It becomes quite obvious that th« Government deems it wise to
proceed cautiously and 3lowly in any elaboration of fundamental law for
the Territory. The lack of progress of H. R. 9276 appears to support
this thesis.
As £ basis for its appropriation for the Trust Territory, and to
facilitate thi3 annual process, Congress passed Joint Resolution 6 of
June 11, 1953* which placed all executive, legislative, and judicial
authority nece33ary for the civil administration of the Territory in
such persons as the President might direct or authorize, as well as
17providing the authorization for expenditures. ' This Act fell far short
of an Organic Act.
The Truman administration, having failed to secure such a
Congressional enactment, it seemed hopeful thac action in this regard
might be more successful during the Eisenhower administration. In his
Budget Message for the 195>i> fiscal year, President Eisenhower recommended
that "the Congress enact at an early date legislation establishing the
basic form of government for the Trust Territory to replace the present
temporary arrangements. 1 " On june 30, 195'U, Public Law U5l (3. 33J.6) to
provide for a continuance of civil government for the Trust Territory
**U. S. Congressional Record , 83rd Congress, 1st Session, p. 6i;l£.
l8The New York Times, January 22, 195U.
..
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of the Pacific Islands was passed (68 Stat. 330). Although this Act
established a ceiling of $7,500,000 for the administration of Micronesia,
it went no further in the matter of organic legislation than to continue
the authority of persons appointed by the President.
One can assume from the references to this subject by United
States spokesmen at the United Nations and elsewhere that organic legis-
lation has been a hope cherished by Micronesian3 for a very long time.
nonetheless, the conduct of government in our Inland Trust continues to
be based upon the Executive Order of the President or decree of the High
Commissioner.
IV. RESUMPTION OF NAVY JURISDICTION IN
THE NORTHERN MARIANAS, SINUS fiOTA
President Eisenhower on July 17, 1953, signed Executive Order
10l70*9 transferring administration of all the Northern Mariana Islands
of the Trust Territory except the Island of Rota to the Navy Department.
Circumstances were similar to the promulgation of Executive Order 10lj08
—
publicity was nil and one can only make suppositions as to the reasons
for the transfer. Implications of national security were contained in
the terse press reports about the transfer, however.
There is reason to suppose that the retention of Rota by the
Department of the Interior was the result of its desire to retain a
foothold in the Northern Marianas. The present writer has been advised
1
^Infra, Appendix F.
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by individuals in positions of responsibility for matters pertaining to
the territory that the retransfer to the Navy Department came as a
surprise and a shock to Interior. Its retention of Rota is the most it
could salvage from the situation, thereby retaining some basis for a
policy voice in the Northern Marianas. Interior could argue that it -was
contrary to established policy to relinquish responsibility for any areas
not essential for military purposes. There appears to have \x.^ii no other
explanation; for, ethnically, linguistically, culturally, and geographi-
cally, Rota is an integral part of the Northern Marianas.
It is understandable that the people of Rota should have found
onerous the division of jurisdiction which operated to deprive them of
their national ties with the people of Saipan. As Mr. Robert Trumbull
noted, at the time, in his book., paraaise in Trust , ,:A11 the Rota people
ask, I gathered, is to be able to travel freely to Guam and Saipan.
Under the present set-up, however, both these neighboring islands are
off limits to the Rotanese except by special permission." This situa-
tion, of course, has been changed by the transfer of the Saipan District
to the Department of the Interior.
V. SUBSEQUENT REPORTING TO THt TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL
The High Commissioner, Mr. Fra: dff again served as the
Special Representative of the United States when the Trusteeship Council
examined the annual report on the Trust Territory for the period ending
20Robert Trumbull, Paradise in Trust (New Yorki William Sloan
Associates, 1959), p. 15.
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June 30, 1953 (T/lll8, T/1112). In his opening statement, he referred
bo the plans to transfer the headquarters of the High Commissioner from
Honolulu to Guam, thereby bringing into the open a natter of interest
and concern to the Council— the locating of the headquarters in Hawaii
so far from the Territory. Although Guam is not de jur-A a part of the
Territory, it certainly is tied more closely to the area than Hawaii.
Mr. Midkiff demonstrated the difficulty and precariousness of
one's position when he attempts to anticipate and forecast action by the
United States Congress—he stated that organic legislation was to be
enacted by June 30, i960. As has been noted, no action has been taken
on this very important matter to date.
In what was to be another of a long series of queries and criti-
cisms relative to the division of responsibility in the Trust Territory,
the late Pierre Ryckmans, Representative of Belgium, voiced his concern
about the distinction drawn between the Territory a3 a whole and the
Saipan District. Mr. Midkiff explained that the United States Govern-
ment had the right for strategic reasons to place any part of the
Territory under military government. However, as he noted, the Saipan
government was not a military one, but, rather, a civil government under
the Mavy ana that the closest contact was maintained with the represen-
tatives of the Department of the Interior.
Quite obviously, the matter which outweighed all others during
l9Sh and for a considerable period thereafter was the problem arising
21U. N. Docs. T/SR. 550 and T/3R. 551.
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from nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands and the damage from fall-
out to eighty-tiro Micronesian inhabitants in the Rongelap and Uterik
atolls. Development of this important item would lead us far afield and
can be only touched on briefly. The issue aroused serious concern on
the part of all Members of the Council, and there were threats of a
resolution denouncing the United states.
Efforts to provide care for the parties involved have lessened
the impact of this unfortunate miscalculation. Compensation has been
paid to affected individuals and they have had extensive medical care
and treatment. The Atomic Energy Commission has built new houses, a
school, and a coiomunity building. The Department of Defense paid them
for loss of personal effects. Members of the House Subcommittee on
Interior and Insular Affairs visited Rongelap in 1959 and found the
inhabitants rapidly adjusting to the new changes of the old environment.
There are various bills now before Congress to provide payment along
the lines of "compassionate responsibility." 22 In view of the fact that
the United States made an ex gratia payment of $2,000,000 to the
Japanese Covernment on account of claims arising out of 195k fall-out on
a Japanese fishing boat and its crew, there is every reason to believe
that one of these bills will pass the Congress in the near future.
22Infra, Appendix L.
m
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VI. DEVELOPMENTS Df 1955-56
At the 6l5th meeting of the Trusteeship Council on June ik, 1955,
the Special Representative of the United States was Hr« Delmas H. Nueker.
Mr. Nueker had been appointed Deputy High Commissioner of the Trust
Territory on August 16, 195k, and had served as Acting High Commissioner
since September 1, I95h» In part, ;4r. Nueker emphasized economic condi-
tions. A contract had been entered into with a private firm to market
the copra of the entire territory under the jurisdiction of a Copra
Stabilization Board. Hining operations had ceased with the emphasis
being turned to the agricultural sphere. With the cessation of mining,
another facet of the Kicronesian economy was cut off. According to
Mr. Sucker, the problem of returning public oomain to the Micronesian3
had been considered more fully.
In a general debate at the 619th meeting of the Trusteeship
Council, while continuing the examination of the annual report of the
Territory (T/1173, T/ii79> T/ll8l), the by now often-heard question of
coordination between the representatives of the Navy and Interior was
again voiced.^
At its 709th meeting of the Eighteenth Session on June 19, 1956,
the Trusteeship Council began its annual examination of United states
administration of the Trust Territory (T/i2lL, T/l25i;). High Commis-
sioner Nueker again served as Special Representative on the United
2
^U. N. Doc. T/1179.
2[
'U. N. Doc. T/SR. 619.
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States Delegation, answering questions on the annual report and supply-
ing the Council with information on developments since those covered in
the annual report for the previous year. It was expected that he wot-
again be confronted with questions reflecting the Council's concern over
the situation of divided responsibility. To these he again replied
simply that the matter was ri one for the United States Government as
Administering Authority to determine in terms of total issues •" 25 j
This session of the Trusteeship Council had the benefit of the
report of its Visiting ftission to Pacific Trust Territories which toured
each of the four territories earlier that year. ° An examination of the
Mission's report on it3 visit to Saipan and Tinian in February, 1°56,
reveals, in part, the fol lowing? The people of Rota indicated to the
Mission that 'union'* was desired with Guam, Tinian, and Saipan.
Mr. William Reyes, Chairman of the Si ith Saipan Congress took occasion
in a letter to the Visiting Mission dated February 13, 1956, to commend
the United States for their assistance as Administering Authority. In
addition, he commented on the great advantages offered by the educa-
tional and health measures instituted by the United States.
In particular, the Aission noted the dissatisfaction ai*ong the
inhabitants of the Marianas with its division into separate Districts.
The fact that travel documents were required of citizens of the Trust
Territory desiring to enter Guam and the Saipan District was the cause
of some serious criticism.
2%. M. Doc. T/5R. 71 • 26U. N. Doc. T/lttf.
27Annex I to U. N. Doc. T/1255.
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Although recognizing that it did not possess sufficient informa-
tion to analyze administrative arrangements caused by strategic consid-
erations, the Mission, nevertheless, recommended in conclusion that the
Saipan District be transferred to the civil governnent of the Trust
Territory. The fact that nuclear testing in the liarshalls had not
necessitated the establishment of a District Naval Administration ap-
pears to have influenced their recommendation.
vti. wmjmmts in 1957-58
The Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on
the Trust Territory covering the per ioc from August 13, 1956, to July 12,
1957, noted that the annual report of the United States on the Admin-
istration of the Territory for the period ending June 30, 1956, 2° had
been commended by the Council. Id also made reference to the adminis-
tration of the Territory under a divided system. With the passage of
time, it becomes quite clear that there was growing dissatisfaction in
the United Nations with regard to this particular point.
At the 39k th meeting of the Trusteeship Council on June 16, 1958,
examination began on the annual report of the Administering Authority
for the period ending June 30, 1957.^° The veteran United jtates
Special Representative, Mr. Nucker, reported that during 1957 some
28
U. N. Doc. S/3852.
29U. N. Doc. T/1316.
30U. N. Doc. T/1383, T/L. 850.
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significant events had occurred. Three disastrous typhoons had
destroyed vast numbers of coconut palms in the copra-producing areas.
This disaster served to underscore the fact that the Micronesian economy,
with its slim margin of possible gain, was the more precarious because
it wa3 subject to all the vagaries of tropical weather.
It was noted that the Micronesian Title and Pay Plan had been
revised during the year. In this regard, one Bigfal be aware that I
Micronesian Title and Pay Plan aoes not apply in the Saipan District.
In this District the pay scale la so^twhat fei&hsrT Whether this will
remain so under the new administration of the Interior Department is
not known. It wouia seem unlikely that any radical changes wouid be
oade, however.
An event which Mr. Mucker considered 'outstanding" was the second
Inter-District Conference of Micronesian leaders. He expressed his
belief that development of the feeling of mutual understanding and a
community of interests essential for the emergence of the idea of unity
and common entity can best be promoted at events of this nature.
At the 895th meeting of the Trusteeship Council of June 15, 1958,
Mr. Nucker, in reply to a question posed by Mr. Urrutia Aparico,
Representative of Guatemala on the transfer of Tinian and Saipan to
civil authorities, for the first time, indicated that the United States
was "now considering whether all three islands ^ota, Saipan, and
Tinian/ should be placed under the control of the Secretary of the Navy
31U. 21. Doc. T/lU81i.
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or whether it woul transfer Tinian anc Saipan froa the
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control of the Navy to that of Interior."
Indicative of the interest in Kicronesia was the visit to the
Islands ir. . of veteran n ft Trumbull oi The New York
Times . His dispatch to the Tiaes (April 11, 1958) and his subsequent
book, Paradise in Trust , constitute valuable reporting on this lit
Known part of the wor.
As an indication of public senti las jablan, member of
the Uni Ion to the Trusteeship Council in June, 1955,
noted to Mr. Trumbull that, "If a plebiscite were taken, ninety-nine per
cent of t vote to ^ - itory of the United Sta
p.acio I , the mayor of Saipan, was out-
spoken in his praise of Naval administration.
orter Trucibull considered the Navy hospital, for both the
Am.. rones ians, the best in the Trust Territory,
consider^ Navy's physical set up as being "far better maintained
In contrasting the Navy's maintenance of its establishment on Saipan
with the rest of the Territory, Kr« Trumbull observed that, "the only
extenuation /%7 could bring to mind for the inoecent neglc:t tverywh
in the civilian- administered areas was the frugality of the 1
allotted to the Trust Territory by Congrea v^re is some reason to
32o\ N. Doc. T/ .
""Trumbull, op_. c_it., p. 22.
3^Ibid., 35ibid., p. 102.
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believe that this criticism misses the Murk* Although Congress has
questioned the budget of the Trust Territory on numerous occasions, it
has rarely failed to approve requested funds. The fault, if there be
one, would seem to be found in the policy under which the Territory was
run. Gradualisa was the policy in the Trust Territory (indeed one could
contend that it still is the policy). However, this is not an exact
term— depending upon how one interprets it, the differences in expendi-
tures can be enormous. This appears to have been the case in fticronesiai
It was not deemed prudent, evidently, to request sort funds because of
the danger of over- subsidizing the indigenous population. Whether thi3
policy was "correct 11 can be argued at length; the point remains that
responsibility for the 'frugality of the budget" should not, it would
appear, rest on the shoulders of Congress.
Several chiefs on Paiau manifested considerable insight and
appreciation of the magnitude of the problem of developing territorial
consciousness when they noted Trumbull: "Me certainly want an
independent government of our own in the future, but it's going to be
quite a problem to get the peoples of all the islands together to form
one natio:
. In view of the economic difficulties alone, not to men-
tion the problems of distance, linguistic and cultural differences, this
pessimistic viewpoint seeus irrefutable.
36
•*Ibli., p. 153.
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VIII. 1959 AND THE FOURTH VISITING rtlSSIOfc
The fourth United Wat ions Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands set out from New York on February U, 1959. Its
extensive report to the Trusteeship Council, upon its return on April 25,
15 59, to the United Nations, as in the case of previous reports, con-
tains a good deal of valuable information bearing upon the Trust
Territory. '
In the field of political advancement, the establighment of the
Inter-District Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner was particu-
larly noted. As might be expected, in the area of administration, the
Mission pointed out the advisability of associating the people of Rota
with t: it of the harianas. Also, as tuicht be expected, the division
of responsibility between civil and naval authorities within the Trust
Territory was subject to some critici^.d. flu High Commissi oner acknowl-
edged that "considerable thought had been given to the suggestion of
placing the entire Trust Territory inter die civilian authority of the
High Corliss ioner, but that this was a matter requiring a decision by
the United ;,tate Department of tte Interior and of Defense .
Tht examination of the annual report of the United States for the
year ending June JO, 1958 (T/lU53, T/lU70, T/L. 912) commenced on
June 29, 1959. In an interesting reply to a question from Mr. Raffle
Asha, Representative of the United Arab Republic, on the future of an
Inter-District Advisory Comuittee, Mr. NucKer, again Special
37U. I. Docs. T/lU;7 and T/1U81*.

Representative of the United States, replied that the Advisory Committee
was considered to be the forerunner of an i d body for all districts
of the Trust Territory and that, in his opinion, there should be an
elected body within five to ten years. Considering that the present
High Commissioner M. Wilfred Goding now speaks oi the newly-created
Council of Micronesia as the nucleus of a territorial legislature not
later than 1965, the prescience of Mr. Nucker is worthy of note.
;«e indication that Rota would be joined with the rest of the
Northern aarianas could be surmised from the Special Representative's
subsequent statement that, "there was every possibility that in the near
future there would ^e one administrator for the Marianas, with the
exception of Guam, which was owned ay tne United States Government.'
Aspirations for unity were voiced in the petition forwarded to
the United Nations by the Twelfth saipan Legislature on September 25,
195? (T/PET. 10/31). It requested that the United Nations take un
serious consideration the incorporation of the »:ariana Islands within
the framework of the Territory of Guam. The petition went on to in
cate that the Legislature had received response froa the people of
Saipan favorable to such a union. That the people of Guaai were also
amenable to the idea of integration is evidenced by Resolution 367 of
the Fourth 'Hiaia Legislature to the Congress of the United States
requesting the political reintegration of the Northern Marianas with the
39Territory of Guam. Bearing on both the petition from Saipan and the
38u. Mm Doc. T/SR. 9S>U. 3%. I. Doc. T/lUBU and T/PET. 10/31.
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resolution of the Guam Legislature were the remarks of . Rasgotra,
first Secretary of Incia's Permanent mission and Kf« Nucker, Special
Representative of the United States at the 995th meeting of the Trustee-
ship Council in 1959 » In reply to a question posed by Mr. Rasgotra on
the possible int ion of Guam and the Northern harianas, Mr. Mucker
stated chat, "the dainistering Authority was under no obligation to
take into cons iot rat ion resolutions passed by the legislature of Gu.
which was not I part of the Trust Territory. The situation would,
however, be different if the people of Rota or saipan should at any
time clearly express a wish for unification with Otttl
Having come to appreciate the taxing role of the Special Repre-
sentative, his ot ligation to respond promptly, patiently, and authori-
tatively to random anc, sometimes, very complex questions, criticism of
his perfo; reluctantly. But the proposition that the Unit-
States need not take into consideration the views of the Guam Legisla-
ture, though supportable juridically, is too debatable politically tc
warrant injecting it into the debate and trying to rally valid arguments
to support it. Certainly if the United States were prepared to apply
the principle of self-determination to Guam as wen M thl islands of
the Trust Territory and abide by the outcome of tht fieeiy- expressed
wishes of the people, one could expect that such expressions of views as
these by the Guam Legislature and the Saipan petition would require due
coiuideration by the United States Government. Furthermore, it is
k°U. I. Doc. T/SR. 995.
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difficult to believe that Mr* Nucker was oblivious to the wide-spread
nature of sentiment in Saipan in regard to reunification as expressed
several months later by its legislature.
Should the United States decide in the future to follow the
course advocated by the two local legislatures and adopt a policy of
unification, either by sectors or territory wide, it is obvious from the
discussion provoked by Mr. Sucker's observations that the United States
could scarcely expect that local insular and United States national
considerations alone would be weighed. The Indian Representative,
Mr. Rasgotra, was quick to point out that neither the United Nations
Charter nor the Trusteeship Agreement Bade any provision for detaching
part of the Trust Territory and uniting it with a neighboring non-self-
governing territory (an administration union is permitted). The
Indian's reaction brings to the fore the long-standing suspicion within
the United Nations of administrative unions between trust territories
and adjacent non- self- governing territories, as provided for in a number
of trusteeship agreements, and fears that they may lead to political
unions.
The above is not to say, of course, that the United States could
not or should not take such action as deemed necessary to support the
desires of the Mcronesians. If an administrative unioft. or even annexa-
tion of the entire territory were considered desirable as a result of a
United Nat ions- supervised plebiscite, it would be incumbent upon appro-
priate authorities to take 3uch action as necessary to satisfy such
demands.
It ;.:-.v
"'CpCS •£
. -
-
—
" ":-'•- -' ; J r
.
'^-'V
:
- Jill*] : 3 1 J u ci -.-'.r:.: t nc i J£r ii lau
.
I
. .
.
91
The matter of closer ties, quite manifestly, is tied very closely
to Guam, Full self- government with regard to Guam has not yet been
achieved. It seems certain, however, that for the foreseeable future,
the United states will remain sovereign there. It having been held by
many that failure to fortify Guam prior to World War II was imprudent,
policy in this regard has been reversed since 19U5. Moreover, the sub-
sequent provision of an Organic Act for Guam and accordance of United
States citizenship to its peoples point to the Island^ remaining
American. Furthermore, this idea has the whole-hearted support of
Guamanian Americans.
The idea of unification with the United States is also shared by
many of the Trust Territory's citizens. Some observers even hold that
a plebiscite held today throughout the Trust Territory would indicate
an overwhelming desire to remain with or even join the United States.
If such a plebiscite were held and the results indicated a strong desire
to move into a closer relationship with the United States, a strong case
could be presented and justifications provided by application of the
vaunted principle of self-determination. Conjecturing 3uch as this
leads one to the tentative conclusion that the ironclad goal of inde-
pendence, in spite of the temper of the times, may not be the only path
down which a dependent area must inexorably go. small (land wise), non-
viable remnants of the colonial era may be well advised to retain their
ties or even cement them with their sponsoring country.
In the case of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, there
is more than mere conjecture upon which to base such a conclusion. For
,0VT3V-'
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instan • United Nations Visiting mission to the Trust Territory in
i96l received Jtany communications indicate ire on the part
of various groups to join with the United State* « Two such communica-
tions arc; included as APPENDIXES I an ; J to afford the reader some id
of the intensity of feeling ana line of argument proponents of
integration. Gther coauaunications from the Democratic Party, the Y uth
Association of the Saipan District, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Guam Legislatures follow th. iine. This is not to say that all
other Districts share the view of the Saipan District. The Yapese, for
.iple, have indicated that they do not desire to join with GftfM at
this tisie. Their view is that more tia;e is required to train people for
responsible governmental positions. After such training, there evidently
would be no objection to a single government.
Perhaps all one should say at this juncture i3 that t: •> a
growing awareness of the futur. -s of choice. . this
awareness will blossom into a territory-wide vote of confidence foi
closer ties with the Uni s or will branch off in other
tions such as full independence or nt with another country is
impossible to say. Nor would one . , <ptuou3 as to opt unequivo-
cally for any one course; this will be, in the final analysis, the
decision of the peoples of Micronesia.
rJ3
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IX. DEVELOPMENTS IN I960
Some further insight into opinions held in the Trusteeship
Council in regard to United States stewardship of the Trust Territory
can be found in the Trusteeship Council's I960 Summary Report . This
report shows that certain members were concerned about the future of the
Inter-District Advisory Committee as a deliberative body. As alight be
expected, the division of responsibility between the Saipan District and
the other Districts of the Trust Territory wa3 the subject of much
adverse comment. The integration of Rota with the Saipan District con-
tinued to command the attention of the Council. It also appeared that
many representatives were no*: satisfied with the economic progress of
the Trust Territory as a whole. The policy of excluding non-fticronesian
investment from the area was believed to be detrimental to the economy
of the Trust Territory. Financial assistance to the Trust Territory was
not considered sufficient by many representatives. The fact that the
fishing potential of the area was not being utilised was ju3t cause for
concern. The steady improvement in communication, in particular, sur-
face transportation, was observed with satisfaction. Expansion of
chartered trading companies indicated a healthy growth tc . iur
tatives. Advancements across-the-board in the fields of medical-health
services and education were notably well received by a majority of the
Counc i 1
.
UiU. N. Doc. T/L. 982.
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On balance, one could detect a general acceptance in I960 by the
Trusteeship Council of the basic practices of the United States in re-
gard to her island trust with some serious reservations: economic prog-
ress, division of responsibility, and the gradualness of political
advancement were areas in which the United States did experience embar-
rassing inquiries in the forum of the Trusteeship Council. Still, the
Trust Territory had come a long way since 1950 when Profestor Douglas
Oliver had felt compelled to note that "cast off dungarees, a smattering
of English and a mission handshake are not to be regarded as evidence
thorough Americanization."
^2Douglas L. Oliver (ed,), Planning Micronesia's Future (Cambridge
j
Harvard University Press, 193'3), p« 6.
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CHAPTER VI
MEM DEVELOPMENTS Hi THE TWiT TERRIT
C
OF THc PACIFIC ISLAfc
"The sociological museum approach" is finished according to
officials of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Henceforth,
there will be a "new frontier" in the Pacific.
It is still foraing and the exact pattern is less than clear, but
there doe 3 seea to be a new feeling of hope for a more expansive future
for the islanders of the Pacific. Firm indications that this feeling is
oased on more than aere lofty declarations of intent can be noted in
aany quarters* the willingness of officials concerned to admit that
•ore oust and will be done; the request of the present High Commissioner,
Mr. H. Wilfred Goding, for a $10,000,00C (appropriation for fiscal 1963
(an increase of $3,696,000); the passage of S. 2775 to provide for a new
ceiling of $17, $00,000 instead of the old one of $7,$00,OOQ; 2 the foraa-
tion of the Council of Micronesia; the gradual replacement of United
States officials with Mcronesians; the submission of a new Organic Act
for Congressional consideration;-5 the chartering of new municipalities;
and, perhaps of greatest significance, the transfer of jurisdiction of
the Saipan District back to the Secretary of the Interior, and the
xThe Hew York Times, February 12, 1962.
^Infra , Appendixes H and .;.
^Infra, Appendix Q.
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designation of Saipan as the first provisional capital of the Trust
Territory.*4
As the divided administrative structure has been a constant
source of United Nations criticise through the years, it oust have been
with a great deal of pleasure that the High Commissioner announc
impending consolidation to the Trusteeship Council on Kay 31, 1962.
The proposed transfer was first announced jointly on January 13, 1962,
by Mr. 3oding and Rear Admiral John 5. Coye, Jr., Coaaander Naval Forces,
Marianas. Before the official announcement had been made, however, an
article concerning the transfer of administration was published in
Mewswee n -magazine on November 20, 1961. As might be expected, this
article caused some concern in the Trust Territory. The article was
noteworthy both for its lack of clearance and lack of tolerance of Navy
efforts in the Saipan District.
The above-mentioned events, plus a ho3t of other events, lead one
to believe that more attention now will be devoted to the problems of
the Trust Territory than has been the case in previous years. This is
not to say that the millenium has been reached; there are still many
deficiencies to correct. While the men and women who actually work in
the islands look hopefully toward Headquarters for much-needed a
there is the realization that promises have been made before. Tin lean-
to schools still exist; many teachers have never been beyond the sixth
grade. Hospitals exist but their facilities, on the average, are less
%. N. Doc. T/SR. Il8l; and infra , Appendix K, executive Order
11021.
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than satisfactory. The population has steadily increased} the budget in
recent years has not. economically, the territory has aoved at a mo*.:
ate rate. Outside investment has oeen allowed only under very special
circumstances. It needs to be emphasized, however, that an entrepreneur
class has developed through experience gained in such private corpora-
tions as the Western Carolines Trading Company, the Yap Trading Company,
the Saipan Shipping Company, ana some twenty other companies.
Perhaps the underlying doubt was best expressed recently by a
village chief on the island of Moen in the Truk District. According to
The Mew York Times reporter, A, M. Rosenthal, this particular dignitary
"listened silently while an American from Guam spoke glowingly of the
better days to come. Then the chief . . . rose and said: 'We have a
bird called the kuling. All day long it flies around singing its own
name. Where it comes from and where it goes ve do not know. Y hi remind
me of the Kuling. , "-> So there are some doubts in the minds of the
Kicronesians which can only oe dispelled by more positive efforts. It
now appears, however, that these efforts will be forthcoming under the
planning of the new administration.
The 1961 Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the
Trust Territory cailea for just this. The United States, charged the
Mission, had (1) done little to encourage economic development} (2)
failed to maintain properly built and serviced schools} and (3) proved
^The New York Times
,
February 12, 1962.
6U. N. Doc. T/1582.
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reluctant to place flicronesians in top positions. In 3um, the Mission
called for the United States to increase its efforts to prepare the
Trust Territory for self- government or independence across-the-board.
The Soviet Union, recognizing a propaganda advantage, attempted to force
a General Assembly debate on conditions in the Tni3t Territory. The
Trusteeship Council, by a 6-to-l vote with ostentions threw out the
proposal.'
Again, one can see how vulnerable the United States has become as
its administering role has been subjected to increasing scrutiny due to
the decline in the number of Trust Territories and the ant i- colonial
strategy of the Soviet Union. If one takes an overview of the entire
period of Pacific trusteeship, it is quite evident that pressures from
the United nations, particularly on the part of the Soviet Union, have
increasea considerably through the years. Although United States policy
certainly is not made by the United Nations, it would be less than
prudent to claim that United nations criticism has not had a marked
effect on our policy response toward the Trust Territory.
One might consider three diverse pressures that influence our
Microne^ian policyj First, there can be little doubt that tht; United
States, throughout its history, has taken a stand which today would put
it in the camp of the anti-colonialists. Fre3ident Wilson's attitude
tu—iil self-determination could justly be called a symbol of our belief
in the affording of the option of choice to dependent peoples. Our
'The Washington Post
,
June 3, 1961.
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record in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Alaska, and Hawaii is posit-
proof of the substance of our declarations of intent. Although each
area's path took different turns and some arrived at different destina-
tions, one common element was their freedom to choose. In spite of the
diatribes of the ioviet Union, this procedure appears to have been
foilowL ,uam, American Samoa, the Virgin Isiand3, and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands.
A second pressure which is largely external and one which has
increased in intensity in recent years is that coming from the United
Nations. Courses of action, tiae tables, and other recommendations fY
the United Nations have had a mar. feet on our administration oi the
Northern Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands.
Finally, one needs to consider the advent of a new national
administration which, on balance, has shown some predilection for In-
creased support of federal projects. Areas like the Trust Territory
which have operated on smaller budgets now find a more favorable climate
existing in w'nich to present their requests for increased appropriations.
The recent favorable response of the House Subcommittee on Territorial
and Insular Affairs to the High Commissioner's budget request of $10
millior. is only one case in point.
Mew developments then will be affected by these three pressures
as well as others. It is difficult to analyze the first. All one feels
compelled to say about it is that everything that is done in the Trust
Territory is colored by it. Our emotional and idealistic beliefs in the
right of peoples to guide their own destinies permeates every action
--
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•taken. Perhaps Mr. Strike Yoma of Ponape, Fellowship Student at East-
West Center, University of Hawaii, in an article entitled "A Matter of
Ideals - A liicronesian Viewpoint," expressed it best when he noted:"
Since the United States stands to gain neither economic nor
political advantage from the dollars spent annually in aiding
the development of Micronesia, what other reasons bind the
United States to hang on to . . . Micronesia? The fact that
there are neither economic nor political reasons, s imply
indicates the sincerity and devotion of the American people
toward, not only their moral but their noble traditions and
ideals i the sense of brotherly love and the willingness to
help.
By way of contrast, It is less difficult to analyze the pressures
from the United Nations or the new policies of the current administra-
tion. To this task we might now turn.
I, "THE UNITED NATIONS RECOMMENDS ...»
In this rapiuly changing world of newly emerging states, it I
.
difficult to maintain any posture which does not appear completely
dedicated to the idea of full independence for dependent peoples.
Particularly is thia so in the councils of the United Nations. There,
the principle tends to become a fundamental right overshadowing all
other considerations. It is in this milieu that American policy-makers
are forced to operate. This is not to say that these officials are
opposed to independence^ quite the contrary is the case, but the. concept
has generally been applied only to major colonial holdings. It takes on
quite a different light when focused on such tiny or scattered areas as
Nauru or the Trust Territory of the pacific Islands, irfhat is to be done
8
Micronesian Reporter
, March-April 1?62, p. 20.
'-a..-.:'.
to these fragments of a past era? There, of course, is no one answer to
this question, and it would be an unwise individual who would claim that
decision-aakers are not striving with every effort possible to fin.
satisfactory solutions to the probleas of outposts "too saall to be
viable yet large enough to constitute a political problem."' But,
regardless of the logic of sane degree of continuing dependency, the
United Rations has tended to view any such interpretation with a
Jaundiced, if not hostile, «y*« Unitea States representatives, in
particular, have been sorely pressed in this regard in presentations
before the Trusteeship Council.
Mr. Jonathan Bingham, adviser on dependent territories to United
States' chief delegate Adlai £. Stevenson and, since January 10, 1962,
President of the Trusteeship Council, has had numerous opportunities to
present the United States position on the future status of the Trust
Territory. For example, in reply to a challenge from the Soviet dele-
gate at the 1961 examination of conditions in lot Trust Territory,
i-ir. Binghaa stated that "the obligations of the United States were
governed by the provisions of the United nations Charter, including
those of Article 76 (b). The concept of independence also embraced
self-government in various types of association with another Power. 1* 10
The High Coaaissioner spoke In generally the sane vein at the
same meeting of the Trusteeship Council, noting that "the question of
?The Washington Post , fiarch 5> 1962.
10U. a*. Ooc. T/SR. Illi9.
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the target date would have to be deferred until there had been a suf-
ficient development of the political institutions and the people had had
an opportunity to express their desire for a referendum."
This posture is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain,
particularly in light of two Resolutions of the General Assembly which
are referred to constantly in debates before the Trusteeship Council.
Resolution llU3 (XV), il adopted at the 81±6th plenary meeting on
December 5, 1959, calls for time-tables and target dates so as to create
"favourable conditions for the attainment of self-government or inde-
pendence."* 2 Armed with this declaration of the full Assembly, some
members of the Trusteeship Council (in particular the Soviet member)
question vociferously the American failure to present the Council with a
firm date for Micronesian independence. Resolution 15>lh (XV), * adopted
at the 9U7th plenary meeting on December lu, I960, states quite unequivo-
cally that "ail peoples have the right to self-determination."
"Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness,'
it goes on, "should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
The practicability of this concept of Independence may be ques-
tioned; its use as a weapon in the trusteeship debates cannot. Time and
time again, United States representatives find their presentations marred
by deprecation of their efforts as not in keeping with these two
nInfra
,
Appendix G. 12U. N. Doc. k/h3$k.
13lnfra, Appendix H. lk). H. Doc. k/U6Qh.
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Resolutions. Even though resolutions have no binding legal effect on
Administering Authorities, they, nevertheless, exert a considerable
amount of pressure; and it would be less than prudent to ignore these
influential expressions of anti-colonialism.
One issue has made the United States position in the Trust Terri-
tory particularly vulnerable in the United nations: the issu- of
nuclear testing. As will be recalled, in 19U6, inhabitants of Bikini
were moved to another atollj another group was moved from Enlwetok. In
19$h the indigenous people of Uterik and Rongelap were moved because of
atomic testing. The Rongelap islanders still complain of general
malaise and have submitted a $8,500,000 suit for radiation and fall-out
damage. To date this claim has not been settled, but H. R. 120U6 ^ was
introduced on June 7, 1962, by Congressman Wayne N. Aspinali (D-
Colorado), able Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, to provide "the sum of $1,000,000 to remain available until
expended under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior . . .
for the general benefit of the affected inhabitants of Rongelap."
Identical bills were also introduced as follows: H. R. 12051 on June 7,
1962, by Mr. Kylj H. R. 12052 on June 7, 1^62, by Mr. Saylorj H. R.
12078 on June 12, 1962, by K: . O'Brien. At an Open Hearing on June 21,
1962, the Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs considered
H. R. 120U3 and evidenced much sympathy for the plight of Rongelese. It
was pointed out by Mr. Edwin E. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel of
l^Infra, Appendix L.
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the Atomic Energy Commission that, although substantial relief had
already been afforded the islanders, the Commission supported the legis-
lation. In order to expedite the passage of the bill through Congress,
an amendment of the amount to read $950,000 instead of $1,000,000 was
introduced and approved. The bill was then reported, favorably to the
full Committee. There seems every reason to believe that this bill, or
one closely modeled to it, will gain passage in the near future.
Prior to the decision on the current testing on British-controlled
Christmas Island, a vigorous debate went on within the Administration as
to the use of the Marshall Islands again as a testing 3ite. As an indi-
cation of the power of pressure from the United Nations, the Department
of State and the United States delegation to the United Nations are said
have strongly objected to use of the Pacific trust islands on the
grounds that unfavorable world reaction would result, not to mention the
16
opening afforded the Soviet Union for a propaganda holiday. Whether
the decision not to use the Harshalls as a testing area was based solely
on this pressure is certainly debatable; that it had no influence on the
decision is questionable. In any event, regardless of whether the Trust
Territory is used for testing in the future or not, the fact that prior
testing has occurred plus the existence of a missile range in the
Kwajalein area, provides opponents of United States policies in
ronesia with ample ammunition for a cor.tinuing debate.
16tJ*£ *£* York Times , December 3, l?6l.
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As might be expected, the Soviet Union takes full advantage of
this issue, as veil as others, to further its own motives and strategy.
Throughout tne history of the Trusteeship Council this has bean the case.
Regardless of the position one tak«3 on the Cold War, an objective
reading of the Official Records of the Trusteeship Council since its
inception will almost inevitably lead one to the conclusion that the
Soviet Union has consistently attempted to make political capital out of
the status of dependent peoples. Mr. Bingham, on a recent television
interview with Ambassador Stevenson, described the result of this empha-
sis as follows! "The Soviet Union has no influence at all in the
17
Trusteeship Council. When they speak, nobody listens."
There are indications that the U.S.S.R. is not as influential as
it might be in the Trusteeship Council. For example, in fifteen years a
Soviet representative has never been elected to a Visiting Mission.
Kr. Bingham contends that other representatives do not ''trust" thea to
do the Job. It is significant that it is the only member that has not
b€%n so elected. On the other hand, one is less certain that the Soviet
Union has Mno influence" on trusteeship affairs. In the general debate
on Resolution l5lii (XV), for instance, the Soviet representative tied in
nicely the broad question of colonialism with specific reference to the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands claiming that the United ;tates
was doing "everything in its power to ensure the virtual annexation of
the Trust Territory either directly to the l&etropolitan territory or to
^'Interview, American Broadcasting Company, February 18, 1962.
...';>•-
u
.
j. | '. c ; . ,
.
v.'
..
-
.
•-
-
1.4 v
Mi ,
106
the colony of Guam . . . , ttl In addition to casting doubt on our
adherence to the General Assembly declaration on trie granting of inde-
pendence, this attack on United states policy in all likelihood severely
circumscribed the area of possible alternatives open to our planners. A
case, for example, could certainly be made for an administrative union
in the Northern Marianas. Ethnically and geographically this makes
sense. But when one considers the effect such a proposal would have in
the Trusteeship Council, conditioned as they are from years of Soviet
diatribes, prudence alone would dictate some other course. To claim
that the Soviet Union has ''no influence" is to overstate the case in the
opinion of this observer.
II. A "NEW LOOK" FOR THE TRUST TERRITORY
OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
In addition to the various pressures from the United Nations,
domestic pressures have been no less significant. Small groups such as
anthropologists, political scientists, and the like have always had an
abiding interest in the Trust Territory. But by far th* greatest dis-
play of interest to date has come about as a. result of the change of
administrations. Whereas before, officials would speak of the "pla-
teau" concept of gradualness speeding up the progress to different
levels as the people developed in understanding and capability, today,
officials speak of vast improvements in the very near future. Secretary
l8U. N. Doc. A/18 18.
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of the Interior Stewart Udall recently commented, "The Federal Govern-
ment's responsibility in the territories and Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands requires greater attention than has been given in the
past."^ Although one not privy to the policy decisions of the Govern-
ment cannot state with any authority, it does appear from reports
available to the observer that a massive effort is being undertaken to
bring the Trust Territory up to a level which will brook little, if any,
valid criticism. The Mew York Times states that High Commissioner
Goding and his deputy, Kr. Jose Antonio Benites, have in common one
strong bond— "the belief that the time has come for more progress
,
20faster progress in the trust territory." Reporter William H. Blair
indicates that the "Kennedy Administration i3 seeking to speed the
development of the trust territories, mindful of past neglect of the
Western Pacific islands . . . ." 21 Kr. A. M. Rosenthal reports that
"there is a plain feeling among officials on Guam that the Department of
the Interior is now ready to pay considerably more attention to the
territory." 22 These reflections of belief that the timing is now right
for more extensive change in the Trust Territory take on added weight
when one recalls the past history of some other United States
1
^u. 3. Congress, House of Representatives, Department of the
Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1963 , 57th Cong
.
, 2nd
.
Sess., (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 5.
2QThe Sew York Times , February 12, 1962.
2iIbid., February 25, 1962.
22Ibid., February 12, 1962.
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possessions* 1950—Guam—Organic Act; 1952—Puerto Rico— Commonwealth
Act; 1959—Alaska— Statehood; i960—Hawaii— statehood. Congress has
been, in a word, "busy" with other areas; the timing now does seem more
appropriate for increased emphasis on the Trust Territory as well as
American Samoa and the Virgin Islands.
Commissioner Qoding, in his opening remarks before the current
meeting of the Trusteeship Council on May 31, 1962, speaking of his 196l
statement befcre the same body to the effect that a reassessment of
policy was underway, indicated that he was "pleased to be able to report
that this reassessment had resulted in significant policy changes and in
the adoption of new procedures, many of them along the lines recommended
by the 196l Visiting Mission." 2-*
Some discussion of these changes is required but first, it might
be noted in passing that there are divergent views on the ultimate status
of the Trust Territory. Whereas the Administration appears to be taking
a tack which will speed Micronesia toward a "show-place" harbor, some
members of Congress are less than enthusiastic about this routing.
Congressman John P. Say lor (R- Pennsylvania), for example, a member of
the influential Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs, in Open
Hearing on February 8, 1962, considering H. R. 9958, a bill to remove
the ceiling on the authorization for appropriations for the government
of the Trust Territory (later considered as 5. 2775), stated quite emphat-
ically that he did not believe that the Trust Territory was moving in
23U. H. Doc. T/SR. li
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the direction that it should go but rather was moving in the direction
of "more dependency."
So, one could expect to find some opposition to the Administra-
tions efforts to build up its Pacific trust. On the other hand, Con-
gress has seldom, if ever, failed to approve requested funds for the
Territory. The fault, if there be one, would seem to lie not with
Congress, but rather with past planners who felt that either the status
quo should be rigorously maintained or, if changed, changed in a down-
ward direction. In any event, there appears on balance to be enough
drive behind the current efforts to bolster the Trust Territory to per-
mit an optimistic viewpoint to be taken. Discussion of some of the new
policies mentioned by Commissioner Goding before the Trusteeship Council
follows.
III. AN INCREASED BUDGET
If any of the ambitious projects proposed by the new administra-
tion are to bear fruit, it is stating the obvious to note that increased
funds will be required. Recognising this, Commissioner Goding has
presented Congress with a $10 million budget for fiscal 1963. The cur-
rent budget is $6,30l±,000. It might be noted that the appropriation for
the islands has remained close to $6,000,000 a year for a cons iucr able
period. Therefore, the increase to $10,000,000 is quite significant if
only as an index of the seriousness of purpose of the current adminis-
tration. Consider, if you will, that as recently as October, I960, a
serious student of the Trust Territory, in reference to a recommendation
.«,. ; ••, .,:.. r:J ,:.:',:. tt.- •:^---'. 31 •' t-£ ;. :.o.;* ;; „£-•. •'..... -wi.
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of a Visiting Mission for increased appropriations felt compelled to
say: "This recommencation is unlikely to be met. 1 ilosophy gov-
erning American policy is that our subsidy should not be increased
beyond a point which eventually the Microne3ians themselves might r
sonably be expected to affor This pre « contrast to current
thinking which, in philosophy I cal policy, is almost diametrically
opposec to the old concept of ^raaualness. It would appear that a new
is, ll in the islands of the Pacific.
Commissioner Ck las approached the problem of increased
appropriations in two steps. First, the ceiling on the authorization
law for appropriations for the Trust Territory ( ad to
raised from the »f $7,500,000 per year to a realis.
. Congressman Leo W. O'Brien (D->Jew York) introduced H. R. 9
on January 30, 1962, to remove this ceiling completely. Coiamissioner
Goo \ February 8, 1962, in his opening statement before the: iub-
iittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs consideri; , bill
emphasized the requirements for schools, elementary teacher traini:
aedical equipment, iiaproveraent of communi cat ions and a host of other
projects and of- I figure of , JO as a more realisti
Mention of a ceiling wa3 prudent as the Cong; . proved in the
Hearing to be reluctant to consider any "open-ended" bill, but rath
Harold Karan Jacobson, "Our 'Colonial' Prot I .- orci^n
Affairs, Vol. . .c-ber I960, p,

Ill
On May 2k , 1962, 3. 2775 (the Senate version of H. R. 9958) was
considered by the Subcommittee. Indicative of the interest in this bill
was the appearance before the Subcommittee of B. Raymond Wilson,
Executive Secretary, Friends Committee on National Legislation, who made
25
a humanitarian plea for passage, stating*
In a world where colonialism has been challenged so much and
where colonial empires are crumbling so fast, the United States
has a unique opportunity to demonstrate its enlarged interest in
the education and economic development of the people under its
jurisdiction.
Chairman Aspinall, with much experience in matters of dependent
territories, wisely cautioned the Subcommittee saying that "this is an
area where we can do too much at the wrong time if we are not care-
ful .. . .«*
S. 2775, subsequently, was reported favorably to the Full
Committee. Interestingly enough, the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, after taking notice of a justification prepared by its
extremely competent Consultant, Dr. John L. Taylor, in collaboration
with the High Commissioner increased the proposed ceiling to
$17,500,000 with the provision that not more than $15,000,000 be appro-
priated for fiscal 1963 and forwarded the bill to the floor of the House
where it was approved on July 2, 1962 by a vote of 28l-lU with 111 Con-
27gressmen not voting. After favorable Senate consideration, the Bill
25^
Hearing before Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs,
May 21*, 1962.
2
^Infra , Appendix Mj and U. 3. Congress, House of Representatives,
Report to Accompany 5. 2775 , 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Report No. 1936, p. 3.
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became Public Law 87-5U1 on July 19, 1962. When one considers that
the new ceiling is a very substantial increase over the old ceiling,
some idea of the support behind current efforts to build up the Trust
Territory can be gained.
The second step in the High Commissioner ' 3 efforts to obtain more
funds for the Tru3t Territory centers around his budget request of
$10,000,000. Of course, as was pointed out to the Coaaissioner by
Congressman Michael J. Kirwan (D-Ohio), Chairman of the House Sub-
coaaittee of the Committee on Appropriations, no official action could
be taken until 5. 2775, or a modified version thereof, was passed and
the ceiling of $7,500,000 was actually lifted. 25>
However, the High Commissioner proceeded almost as if the ceiling
had already been lifted. Promises were made in the Territory^ extensive
plans were formulated by the Administration; and the High Commissioner
mentioned the budget request before the Trusteeship Council.
One can only surmise, but it does appear as if a dynamic was
consciously being built up so that pressure of a sort was brought to
bear on Congress to pass the desired legislation. It was an interesting
exercise to watch, particularly in light of the magnitude of change
desired. For example, one might consider H. R. 10802, the appropriation
bill for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the
*
"lnfra , Appendix S.
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fiscal year ending June 30, 1963. It provides for only $6,600,000 for
the Trust Territory. Obviously, the additional $3,1*00,000 desired by
the High Co-uJiissioner will have to come from supplemental appropriations.
So one may suppose that the stage, as it were, is now being set in the
already favorable Congressional climate to insure that approval for such
supplemental appropriations will be forthcoming. If the climate is as
favorable as the increase of the ceiling to $17*500,000 would seem to
indicate, this should present no insurmountable problem.
I?. LAND CLAIMS Oil KHAJALEIN AND DALAP ISLANDS
To one brought up in the fluid, ever-moving society of the United
States, it is perhaps difficult to understand the absolute priority of
land to the peoples of Micronesia. This is pointed up on Kwajalein and
Dalap Islands where the only unresolved major land claims in the Terri-
tory exist. Although negotiations have continued with the Marshallese
for a considerable period and nonlitigious settlements of up to $500 per
acre have been offered, there has been no agreement to date. Senator
Henry Jackson, a member of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
In a hearing on February 2, 1962, expressed his deep concern about the
non- settlement of these claims. In testimony before the House Tub-
committee of the Committee on Appropriations on February 5, 1962, the
High Commissioner outlined the offers made and rejected and indicated
that condemnation action might have to be taken.
•^Infra, Appendix 0.
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Considering the lack of settlement thus far, even at a figure of
$500 per acre, it seems reasonable to predict that non- Judicial negotia-
tions have little chance of success. Evidently with this in mind,
Congressman Aspinall introduced H. R. 11932 on Hay 31, 1962, "to assure
payment of just compensation for the use and occupancy of certain lands
on Kwajalein and Dalap Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
and for other purposes.** Identical bills were introduced as followsi
Mr. O'Brien, H. R. 11952, Kay 31, 1962; Mr. Kyi, H. R. 119U2, May 31,
1962 j Mr. Saylor, H. R. 11957, May 31, 1962.
To clear up any question of jurisdiction, H. R. 11932 would
permit access to the United States Court of Claims and subsequent pos-
sible review by the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of
certiorari. This is significant if only to demonstrate how far the
United States is prepared to go to provide fair and equitable treatment
for the people under its trust.
V. B0LSTERE8G EDUCATIGB IH THE TRUST TERRITORY
High Commissioner Goding, in his appearance before the House
Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs on February 8, 1962,
spoke of education as the "most important" aspect of his new program.
Before the Trusteeship Council on Hay 31, 1962, he emphasized the
"reassessment of educational needs in the Territory" and the modifica-
tion or change of "basic policies formerly underlying our educational
' *Infra , Appendix P.
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system. 1 '-* 2 Judging from the figures contained in APPENDIX N, education
will indeed receive great emphasis in the months to come. Priority has
been quite clearly given to a massive effort to step up education in the
Trust Territory. Figures for fiscal 1?63 would double and for 1961i
would almost quadruple. -^ When one considers that there are 16,000
children of school age in the Territory, out of which k,900 attend the
iil non-public or mission schools operated by Congregationaiists, Jesuits,
and Seventh Day Advent ists, the magnitude of the proposed effort can be
appreciated.
When one recalls that nine languages exist in the Territory, the
adoj Ion of English as the medium of instruction at the elementary
school level takes on added importance. Not only will this ultimately
ease the teaching load, but one only needs to project its effect into
the future as a key factor for developing the sense of unity so neces-
sary for the emergence of a nation. The difficulty of such an under-
taking should not be underrated, however. On the average, perhaps two
to three per cent of the Hicronesians now speak English. In order to
train Kicronesian teachers in English, a program of special sessions has
been instituted in the various Districts and a linguist has been added
to the Headquarters staff.
Of added Interest is the plan to provide full secondary school
programs in all Districts commencing in September, 1962. Advanced
32U. N. Doc. T/SR. 1181.
^A cross check of other
regards proposed appropriations for education. APPENDIX N (the
JJk sources reveals some differences as
•I
an* m
'/'-. ij
•- ••
116
studies have not been neglected in the new push forward in education.
At present, 133 students are studying on the college level at Guam and
abroad.
If the funds desired are appropriated, there 3eems every reason
to believe that such descriptions of territory schools as a "damned
disgrace" will be a thing of the past. 3**
VI. R£PUC£?'iafT3 WANT£D
Although it is not a new development, having been a policy for
years, the program of training Mlcronesians for positions in the govern-
aent has gained speed. After July 1, 1962, for instance, forty-seven
positions now held by United States citizens will be filled by Kicro-
nesians. As the American staff is replaced by qualified iUcronesians,
the reality of a self-governing territory will become more evident.
Mr. Tosiwo Nakayama, President of the Truk District Congress and Advisor
to the Special Representative at the llV7th meeting of the Trusteeship
Council on June 13, 19oi, displayed an awareness of the meaning of the
term "qualified" when he observed that United States personnel should be
replaced by Micronesians only when the latter were capable of assuming
it
their responsibilities. J Such an attitude, if not rare in the "inde-
pendence at any cost" milieu of today, at least demonstrates the
justification for $17,500,000) lists $1,295,000 for FY 1963 and
$1,150,000 for FY 196U. Senate Report No. 1223 to accompany S. 2775
lists $975,000 for FY 1963 and $2,500,000 for FY 196ii.
fhe New York Times , February 12, 1962.
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maturity of some of the more politically astute fticronesians. It also
points out the very real danger of lowering the level of expertise lay
moving out qualified Americans too rapidly. There is some merit in
considering a permanent civil service of United states experts to pro-
vide stability and advice on a continuing basis. Micronesians, of course,
would occupy key political positions, as is their right.
The point at which a Micronesian moves into the ''qualifit
column is difficult to pinpoint exactly. The High Commissioner is
making every effort to bring each aian with the potential to this plateau.
It may be an indication of the proper climate to note that American
clubs can no longer close membership to aliens (meaning Micronesians)
.
Equality on all levels including the all- important social level cannot
help but open other doors to Micronesians with the desire to advance
in the government of the Territory.
consider the different situation ^hich obtained in 1950 when
Mr. G. M. Taggart, then Fishing ana Skipping Commissioner and now
Supervisory Economist in the Saipan District, described the atmosphere:
The native working for or with us lives in two worlds. When
he leaves the office, ship or warehouse he leaves our worici and
enters his own traditional one, circumscribed by native custom
and the rigid patterns of family, clan and tribal fealty with the
fierce hates and jealousies of island politics. He must live in
that world whether he wants to be loyal to us or not. To be an
outcast on a small island is indeed worse than death. 3°
3"Emil j. sady and others, Report of a Transportation Survey on
the Means of Establishing Sea and Air Transportation in the"Tru3t Ter-
ritory Under Civilian Aomin i strati or. for the U. 3. Department of the
Interior and the Department of the Kavy (Washington! U. 5. Department
of the Interior, April 19&), p. iOTTT"^
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Although one certainly cannot say that this situation has changed com-
pletely, enough progress has been made to warrant the claim that a
substantial degree of "Territory feeling" has now developed. This is
perhaps best reflected in the body which some observers claim to be the
precursor of a true Territorial Legislatui .
VII. THE COUNCIL OF MICROKcSIA
The Sixth Annual Conference of the Inter- District Advisory
Committee convened on September 11, 196l, at the Headquarters Compoun~
on Guam. Among other important events, one in particular took pla
which, according to one observer, was ''perhaps the greatest phenomenon
that has occurred in the political history of the Trust Territory," the
election of Kr« Dwight Heine, a .Hi crone sian and graduate of the Univer-
sity of Hawaii, to preside over the entire conference. At previous
conferences, either the High Commissioner or a member of his staff had
acted as presiding officer. As the High Commissioner presented the
gavel to Mr. Heine, he noted that it symbolized the Advisory Committee
as an entity of its own. It is worthy of note that even this signifi-
cant event was quickly overshadowed by the adoption and approval of a
resolution to designate the Advisory Committee as the Council of iicro-
nesia with Mr. Heine as the first Chairman. The High Commissioner
characterised this as a step of "major importance" before the
•3'Hicronesian Reporter , Kovetaber-December l<?6l, p. 9.
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Trusteeship Council on I*ay 31, 1962.3" It will be recalled that the
Inter-District Advisory Committee had been established in 1956 and
served the purpose of bringing together representatives of the far-flung
islands and fostering a sense of oneness which heretofore had not
existed.
£ven though the Committee was the first effort at joint action,
and, admittedly, a rudimentary one, almost from its inception it was
looked upon by meaibers of the Trusteeship Council and others as the core
unit for a territorial legislature. In the early years of the Inter-
Districc Council, this was recognized to be a "shore dimly seen" and the
moderate amount of criticism of lack of progress toward a true legisla-
ture reflected this belief. However, criticism has increased in both
amount and intensity; and although one is not prepared to substantiate
the claim that progress toward a legislature has been due solely to
United Nations pressure, it might be interesting to note that a target
date of "1965 or earlier" has now been officially voiced by the High
Commissioner to the Trusteeship Council for the establishment of a
Territorial Legislative Council. ^° So, it is highly significant that
the name of the Inter-District Advisory Committee has been changed to
"Council of licronesia." The latter implies more independence, more
indigenous power and more unity. Also, it will not pass without notice
that, for the first time, popular election of delegates will take place
3%. N. Doc. T/3R. 1181.
^Ibid.
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thereby bolstering the concept of a representative body. It might be
noted in passing that symbolism has not bean tifrgoHoa in the Movement
toward unity and a Trust Territory Flag is currently under consideration.
The venerable argument so close to the heart of any political
scientist of whether to adopt a policy of centralisation or decentralisa-
tion has relevanct to the Council of Micronesia. It would appear that
this body will move the territorial government farther down the path to
increased centralisation. This can be a good thing if your yoal is the
concentration of power in the central government. On the other hand,
there are those who argue to an entirely different conclusion. For
example, a former District Administrator has stated that "it would have
been better ... to progress through the development of community
councils, starting st the village level and leading to ultimate island
federation.'
Whether decentralization would have been more effective in
developing a ^roup awareness is a moot point. Certainly, development
around traditional groupings would have been more logical if separate
units t»f* desired with ultimate federation as the goal, but it is not
at all clear that this was (or is) the desire of informed Micronesians*
Nor is it at all certain that the fast-moving tides of change would have
permitted 3uch a gradual process.
^Quoted in John Sandelmann, special Consultant to the High
Commissioner, "Some Observations on the Problems of « :te If-Government'
in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands" ( Honolulu, Hawaii, 1?53),
p. 12ii.
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It docs appear that the Council of Micronesia is a step in the
right direction. Whether its potential will be realized is open to
question; but if a Territorial Legislature is to develop, it is almost
certain that it will develop froia this Council. In governmental affairs
as in all other effairs of men, there is a time that is most propitious
for change. It does appear that such a time will soon arrive for the
Trust Territory and, within the near future, a representative Territorial
Legislature will come into being.
VTII. AN ORGANIC ACT
Although not a new development per se, the matter of an Organic
Act for the Trusc Territory is now under consideration again, rfany
efforts have been made through the years to obtain passage of such an
Act, but thus far, all have failed to gain approval of Congress. The
most recent effort centers around H. R. 927Q, a bill introduced by
Congressmen John Kyi (R-Iowa) en September 16, i?6l, "to provide a
government for the Trust Territory of Id c rones i a and for other purposes. "^1
As in other attempts to provide organic legislation, this bill is de-
signed to advance the Territory beyond rule by Executive Order and to
provide for a Territorial Legislature, a Bill of Rights, a judiciary
integrated with the Federal judiciary, as tmll as other appurtenances
a modern government.
k*Infra, Appendix Q.
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Mote that the Act provides for a ceiling of $20,000,000 (page 2h,
line 8), a figure not too far from the ceiling of $17,500,000 recently
authorized under Public Law 87-5kl.
Many people believe that the absence of action by the Congress to
provide organic legislation for the Territory is not in keeping with our
posture of enlightened response to the needs of dependent peopL .
Although the parallel is not exact, President Truman, as has been noted
earlier, signed an Organic Act for Guam (Public Law 630) on July 26,
1950. Even though Guam is United states territory and the Trust Terri-
tory is not, the time gap appears open to question. Congressman Kyi
evidently believed that this was the case. And yet, even he may not be
confident that the timing is right for passage. At a Hearing of the
Subcoamittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs on February 8, 1962, he
stated that he had been Ill-advised* about his Organic Act. Although
his efforts on behalf of the Ki crone sians will be appreciated in the
Territory, it is not at all certain that H. R. 9278 will receive any
appreciable attention in thi3 Congress or, indeed, in the foreseeable
future. This is regrettable, bat it does point up the difficulties
involved in providing such legislation.
IX. AM ADMINISTRATIVE UNION
Geographic, historic, and ethnic ties, plus the expressed wishes
of the peoples concerned, point to a closer relationship of Guam and the
other islands of the Marianas.
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Some indication of the mood of separateness of the Northern
Marianas can be gathered from the results of a plebiscite conducted by a
United Nations Mission on February 5, 196i, in response to a petition
from the islanders (f/PcT. 10/31). Voting went as folloxjs:
Saipan Tinian
1. Do you desire to becotae U, 5. citizens
within the political framework of the
Government of Guaa? 1,557 85
2. Do you desire to become U. 5. citizens
by becoming a separate Territory of the
United States? 8l8 57
Do you desire to remain in the same status? 21 6
Written communications received by the Visiting Mission during its visit
to the Trust Territory also were heavily in favor of some form of inte-
gration.
Although there does not appear to be any definite consideration
being given to an administrative union at this time- it is a possibility
for the future. However, such an administrative union would be most
difficult to obtain in the United Nations as presently constituted.
This i3 borne out in meetings of the Trusteeship Council. For instance,
the representative of New Zealand (hardly a biased observer) recently
spoke of the "disturbing realization that the people of Saipan were
contemplating the possibility of splitting away from the Trust
**2
3ee Annexes I, II, and III of U. N. Doc. T/1582.
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Territory . . . ."^ Mr, Jonathan Bingham, United States Representative
on the Trusteeship Council, is on record a3 supporting the idea that the
United Nations would not approve any partial termination of the Trustee-
ship Agreement.
Actually, by Article 9 of the Trusteeship Agreement, the United
States could lsgally establish an administrative union between Guam and
the other islands of the Marianas Group.
There is a paradox in the idea of integration of the Northern
Marianas. In the first place, the United Nations (and, in particular,
the anti-colonial bloc) bases many of its objectives on the vaunted
principle of self-determination. And yet, in spite of rather conclusive
proof that the majority of the people of the Northern Karianas desire a
certain governmental structure, there is wide- spread disapproval in the
United Nations of any such move.
It is not without significance that the Trusteeship Council at
it3 llU6th meeting dissolved the Standing Coaiaittee on Administrative
Unions which had been established by its resolution 293 (VII) of July 17,
1950. One could argue that the existence of only one administrative
union (the Trust Territory of New Guinea and Papua) led to this move.
On the other hand, it seems legitimate to speculate at least that the
United Nations by such an action served notice that no further
k\f. N. Doc. T/SR. ID48.
**%. N. Doc. T/SR. 1150.
k%. N. Doc. A/U8l8j U. N. Doc. T/l56l.
1i
nil
.
•
.
125
administrative unions would be approved. This is not to say that the
United States as Administering Authority couid not implement the ex-
pressed desires of the peoples of the Saipan District and Guam, One
would think, uowever, that this course would be balanced against the
needs of the entire Trust Territory before any judgment would be made.
In any event, if such action were taken, it would be with the full
awareness that strong condemnation would be forthcoming from the United
Nations.
X. INTERIOR RL .1CTIGN
OVER THE NORTHERN liARIANAS
Aj has been noted, on January 13, 1962, the Hign Commissioner
announced ttet jurisdiction over the Saipan District would be trans
-
on July 1, 1962, from the Navy Department to the Department of
the Interior. In addition, he indicated that Saipan would be the first
provisional capital of the Trust Territory.
To the student of hicronesia this came as something of a surprise
Not that It was considered undesirable^ as must be quite clear to the
reader by now, the divided administration has been a constant source of
embarrassment in the United Nations and elsewhere. But the choice of
Saipan as the headquarters seemed out of keeping with previous plans to
situate the Headquarters centrally on Dublon Island in the Truk atoll,
plans which had been under consideration since 1950. Subsequent inves-
tigation was to show that both of the changes announced by the High
Commissioner were in the best interests of the Micronesian3 and the
United States.
t-
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«ay 7, 1962, President Ivs Order Uu21
placing the Saipan Distr ain under the .Jurisdiction of the Depart-
, of the Interior. b On July 1, 1962, the R»U District I
amalgamated with the Saipan District to form the new riariana Islands
District. In spect, it is open to question whether prudence ever
dictated a separate District for an area of 32.90 squa s with s
population of only 1,.-
ing the criti. > onsibility wnich had
become so vocal in recent years, one can Ittgiw that the stfiali cadr* of
Navy administrators must have felt some swall measure of relief when
turning otrer control to Interior representatives. Perhaps it would
an interest i; rcise to L.o into MTl -stail on the tranoicr of the
Headquarters and the idea of a provisional capital.
An interview with Dr. John L. Taylor, able Consultant on Terri-
torial anu Inoian Affairs of the Hou c*.e on Interior and Insular
Affairs on February 7, 1962, revt . hat the purpose for which the
Davy he i Technical Training Unit on saipan haa been serv
and it was sche .obe deactivated on June 'j'j, 1962. This presented
Interior with an opportunity bo establish a Heaaquarters in the Terri-
tory even though not centrally located as originally planned. Hi
Coaaissioner . i outlined the facilities to the Housi; Appropriations
in the following t iryt
M Infra, Appenaix R.
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Included are about 90- some family houses of permanent
concrete construction, a small BOQ, or apartment building, a
permanent concrete office or administration building and
substantial appurtenant plant, more than we would think of
asking if , we were designing or building a headquarters
facility.**
«
Although the advantages of such a move seemed manifest, there was
some opposition voiced. Congressman Kyi on February 8, 1962, at a
Hearing of the Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs was
"disturbec about the move to Saipan." Congressman Saylor voiced his
objections as follows:
I was disturbed when I understood that you weri joing to move
your headquarters to Saipan. Finding out that the Havy has
departed, I can understand why. But you might as well stay
where you are. Saipan is not getting you further in the Trust
Territory .... It is just like trying to run our government
from away out in Key West or Miami or Ifewaii. You are not in
the heart of the Trust Territory.
Faced with contrary statements such as these, one cannot be com-
pletely optimistic about the future success of the aove to Saipan.
Domestic as well as international criticism will be voiced with regard
to the peripheral location of the headquarters.
On balance, however, the move has many advantages for all con-
cerned. For example, estimates for the development of headquarters
facilities have ranged from $2,000,00-3 to $k,000,000. This was one of
the primary reasons for establishing the Compound on Guam in 19
Facilities were already available and, of course, logistic support was
convenient. On a larger scale, the same situation now applies to Saipan
k'U. 5. Congress, House of Representatives, Department of the
Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1963 , b7th Congress,
2nd. Session (Washington: \}~. S. Government Printing Offie 2),
p. 1006.
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with the quite significant exception that Saipan is not a transportation
hub as is Guam. The value of the Navy complex offered on largely a non-
reimbursable basis to Interior is in the neighborhood of $10,000,000 to
$12,000,000.
Although this move offers a "solution" to the much- repeated
criticism in the United Nations with regard to divided responsibility
and headquarters location, and buildings and equipment are available at
practically no cost, there are other facets of the move. The Head-
quarters Compound on Guam was located under the approach to the airport
runway. Recognizing this undesirable situation, Congress appropriated
!
,000 for fiscal year 1962 to build houses in less hazardous areas.
None of these funds has been used to date. Plans were in progress for
a completely new headquarters on Guam at an estimated cost of $2,000,000,
It seems clear that a substantial amount of capital investment will be
saved in the move to Saipan.
As in the transfer of jurisdiction to the Department of t
Interior in 195>1> the problem of transportation, both surface and air,
will require extensive study. As Guam is a junction point for trans-
portation, the Trust Territory aircraft headquarters will remain on Guam.
Although iiicronesian3 in general will probably look with favor on
a headquarters and capital in the Territory, there is some doubt that
approval will be unanimous. The sense of territorial consciousness is
in its embryonic stage, and the more advanced (and* some say, more
favored) laipanese are not always regarded with the greatest esteoa by
other . The people of Rota might be expected to be happy with
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the move, easing, as it does, any restrictions on access or cummunica-
tions with Saipan.
with regard to the designation of Saipan as the capital, one
notes that care is taken always to append the adjective "provision*
This is prudent if only to demonstrate that pressures new he low the norm
could build up in future years to the point that a change of 3ite would
appear desirabl
.
.
If one could offer a suutaary analysis of the ««ove to Saipan, it
appears that, for the United States, the balance swings to c "mtage
side. The contemplated changes will fleet with approval in the Uni
Nations. There will, of course, be continued objection to the lack of a
pivotal geographical position. In the Trust Territory itself, there
will be mixed response and continueu agitation for a centralized head-
quarters, but the reasonableness of Micronesians of influence should
prevail with acceptance of and pride in their new Headquarters and
capital. As aight be expected, the Saipanese will welcome the move,
realizing that, as the Navy moves out, their advantageous position might
diminish unless bolstered by just such a move. As hag been noted, the
Navy may well be happy to relinguish a most difficult and somewhat less
than rewarding task.
Tliere does, indeed, seem to be a new era opening up for the Trust
Territory. The movement to Saipan, if somewhat fortuitous, is, never-
theU ;3. UBtbtr indication of the intention of the United .Itates to
meet the desires and aspirations of the peoples of its "paradise in
trust."
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CHAPTER VII
>fiARY AND CC!
When one st-rts a project such as this study of the Trust Terri-
tory of thfc Pacific Islands, it is stating the olviuj tc note th=tt the
initial stage is not, coomenced in a vacuums there are certain ideas that
color the lens through which the subject is viewed. For instance, the
author woul- be less than candid were he to claiai no prior belief that
any i tents w*re needed in , icronesia. During the course of
researching and writing the paper, he has been in the unusual position
of seeing soae of his prospective recoacaemictions implemented. Mtteh
iBort is being planneu now in the Trust Territory Inan ever befo;
These facts may have changed the nuaber of final recommendations; t
aid not change the central thesis of this paper, the examination of
alternatives for Kicronesia including the possibility of closer til
with the United -tates.
At the outset, it Slight be appropriate to reraind ourselves that
the Trust Territory of the Pacific lalttdfl is not an isolate i case in
the world arena. There are ttany s«tall and remote territories too weak
to stanc alone. In the neighborhood of thirty are under Eritish admin-
istration alone. The future of these remaining dependent, small
territories now occupies the hearts and Binds of many dedicated people.
One aspect in particular is common to ail such areas j the
"aspirations'" ana "freely expressed wishes of the peoplts concerned" are
all- important. While this truism is frequently ignored by those who
•Ao9
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would grind the desires of dependent peoples in the grist-mills of
propaganda, it is the core of traditional United States response to the
affairs of dependent areas.
One should also recall that the evolutions of United States ter-
ritories have followed no set pattern. No theory of "assimilation" or
the like has been followed. Each case has been considered on its own
merits, pragmatically, and in accordance with the desires of the inhabi-
tants of the area concerned. It is reasonable to assume that this
procedure will be followed in the case of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands. Whether stated or not, the existence of this firm
United States belief in self-determination will be implicit in every-
thing that follows in this summary.
I. A SUMMARY ANALYSIS
World War II placed the islands of the Pacific in the lap of the
United States in an age when it wa3 no longer fashionable in the West to
establish new colonial dominion over alien peoples. In spite of a mod-
erate policy on colonial questions, the United States discovered in due
coarse that it was becoming increasingly the target of anti-colonial
criticise. Particularly was this so at the discussion of the new
Commonwealth status of Puerto Rico in 1953 and the petition of the
Marshall Islanders complaining of the damage suffered from fall-out in
195k. The increase in amount and intensity of criticism of our policy
in the Trust Territory could almost be plotted as it rose each year to
its present level (a level which some say may not be necessary and,
indeed, unwarranted).
-*:
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This is the backdrop against which the United States performs its
role as administrator of the Trust Territory including its obligation to
report annually to the United Nations. It would be difficult to argue
that this obligation has not been a good thing for the United States and
the Pacific Islanders. It has caused us to weigh our policies and
actions carefully. We have acted more promptly and with greater sensi-
tivity in certain instances than we might have in the absence of United
Nations scrutiny as in the case of the settlement of war claims and
assistance to the Marshallese for damages from nuclear testing. There
can be no doubt that the United Nations factor has been of some help to
the Executive Branch of the Government in compelling elements within it
to play down departmental quarrrels, compose their differences, and
present a united front. Finally, the provisions of the International
Trusteeship System—Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter—provides
the objectives and guidelines from which both the indigenous peoples
and dedicated, responsible administrators can derive strength. When the
District officer far down the line assists the local inhabitants to
understand the purpose and content of Chapter XII and the body of regu-
lations supplied to provide progressive development toward stated goals,
he i3 increasing the means by which they may determine their own affairs.
Although the United States administration of the Trust Territory
has revealed shortcomings, it has, on the whole, been most commendable.
The satisfaction expressed by the Trusteeship Council in reviewing
United States administration is adequate testimony to support such
assertion. Nonetheless the United nations is prone to push the United
tm arid
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States further and faster with regard to its administration of the
Pacific Islands than perhaps it believes circumstances warrant or permit.
Strongly persuaded by the validity of the "time table idea" for the
achievement of self-government or independence, the United Nations , as
has been noted, has resolved on this subject to the extent that Adminis-
tering Authorities are expected to project a time table for the ultimate
fulfillment of the aims of trusteeship or to provide, progressively,
target dates for the attainment of successive 3tages which will hasten
development.
While the United Nations would stoutly deny that it did not
recognize that territories are of varying stages of development, or
failed to give consideration to local circumstances such as geographic
distances, ethnic differences and economic limitations, many Members are
not beyond minimizing the importance of such factors and justifying
their own conclusions on the basis of "principle." (For example, see
Appendix H). As a result, in order to assuage the feelings of the non-
administering members of the Council, the United States High Commissioner
is obliged to try to show that the development toward self-government or
independence is progressing in accordance with a series of target dates
established in succession. By thus imposing its judgment upon that of
the Hlfib Commissioner, the Trusteeship Council makes his task more
difficult.
Despite much progress along the road to self-government or inde-
pendence, as indicated above, that goal would still seem to be a
considerable distance away for the Trust Territory, and the ultimate
• *t r .1 j
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form it might take has scarcely been envisaged. At the time the
Trusteeship Agreement was negotiated, the United Nations drew a sharp
distinction between self-government and independence and failed to see
how the latter status could possibly be achieved within any foreseeable
future in this case. While the United States still draws the distinc-
tion and considers self-government as a most important preliminary step
to independence, a considerable number of the United Nations Members,
some of whose people have never known self-government, regard both terms
as one and the same thing.
In view of the fact that the granting of independence to Ruanda-
Urundi on July 1, 1962, leaves only Australia and the United States as
Administering Authorities, there seems little reason to doubt that both
will become more subject to scrutiny than heretofore, operating, as they
must, in the ailieu described above. In the light of such changed cir-
cumstances, the nature of which can be clearly envisaged upon the anti-
colonial stage, cannot it be expected that United States policies toward
the Trust Territory will encounter some storms and be submitted to
buffeting by the international political winds which can gather and
develop momentum over a colonial dependency? What could and should the
United States do in preparation for or to avoid the storms which it will
encounter regarding the nature of political development and ultimate
status of the trust territory?
It would 3eem that there are five considerations for the Terri-
tory upon which the policy-maker must reflect? (l) the need to meet our
obligations to Pacific Island peoples as fully and wisely as possible;
5>i.
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(2) national defense requirements; (3) the ultimate status of Guam; (U)
the ultimate status of the Trust Territory; and (5>) the need to get out
of the business of colonial administration at the earliest possible
date. Any "solution" for Micronesia would have to meet these criteria.
Before considering final answers, however, it would seem less
presumptuous to state some conclusions which apply to the situation as
it is today. Any ultimate status will, after all, be reached through an
inevitable piece-meal process; a new Micronesia will not spring up full-
blown by decree or desire. The hundreds of dedicated men and women who
have worked and are working to find a just solution for the Trust Terri-
tory know this only too well. Hr* Calab Udui of Palau showed an
awareness of this point in a discussion on July 2f>, 1962, when he noted
that the requirement was for "time, :e and a lot of people."
One might first consider the Trusteeship System as a whole.
Although eight of the original eleven trust territories have gained
self-government or independence, on balance, the record has been a
mixed success. One does not see states offering their "non-self-
governing" territories to the United Nations for trusteeship. Further-
more, it is less than clear whether the Trusteeship System, as
constituted, can bring the remaining territories across the threshold
to the stated goals of the United Nations Charter. Not beyond the realm
of possibility is a change in the structure of the Trusteeship Council.
A Committee of Experts might prove of more value to these remaining
fragile bits of land.
«$ir naaow bttst n*&
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Despite the intent of the drafters of the Charter, with regard to
the Trusteeship Council, that it should operate more or le33 autonomously
under broad supervision of the General Assembly, there has been a con-
stant trend, ay anti-colonia; postures have developed, to transfer
questions of trusteeship to the full body. This has only increased the
magnitude of the pressures placed on administering authorities and
perhaps reduced the expertise focused on questions of substance.
In retrospect, our offering of the ex-Japanese Mandated Islands
for trusteeship in 19U6 may not have worked out to the exact satisfac-
tion of all concerned. Although annexation at that time would have been
difficult to obtain in light of United States hope and, indeed, faith in
the efficacy of the United Nations, there is some merit in considering
why these strategic islands were not included under the Declaration
Regarding Non- Se If- Govem i ng Territories rather than the Trusteeship
System at that time.
II. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Narrowing the focus to more specific matters, one might speculate
on some recommendations in the economic field. Certainly, one of I
overriding problems which will continue to plague the Trust Territory
will be transportation. As the Navy turned over its jurisdiction in the
Northern i.arianas to Interior, there must have been many officials in
Interior pondering the additional transportation requirements now
evident
.
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Another consideration that mu3t occupy the time of planners for
ronesia is the extent to which the islands will be subsidized.
Internal capital has averaged $1.5 million per year} the pro-
is $10 million with every prospect that this figure will not remain
static. There i3 some question in the winds of some knot .
pie as to whether this much money can actually be spent in the Territory
at present. Just Yljj many bulluazers can be used for construction today}
can the economy absorb such a quantum jump? Can the Administration
actually use the $10-15 million contemplated for the very near future
without completely upsetting the structure of the Trust Territory? Has
the pendulum 3wun;
;
too far so that too much support will be given?
These are questions which will have to be answered eventually. Th
does appear to be some danger that the current emphasis on raising the
budget (some might refer to thi -; action as fallh '.-.he category of
a "crash" program) will over- subsidize the Trust Territory to a
which will prove more detrimental to tae ;nesia than
beneficial. Doing too much too fast can be just as harmful in the long
run as not doing enoi
In the development of tne island economy, it would app-ssr tnat
fishing should be emphasized to a greater degree. Deep sea experience
should be provided. If the land area is small, the sea area is not.
Subsistence requirements could better be met by increased fishing. In
this regard, administrators should insure that an adequate number of
lines and hooks are supplied to the is lance rt. Thii My t«ca litu a
mundane matter to mention even, but it takes on I significance to an
islander whose coconut crop has been destroyed by typh-..
[ wl
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The possibility of development loans may present advantages to
the Trust Territory. Perhaps the facilities of the Export- Import Bank,
the World Bank or others could be advantageously extended to Micronesia.
This would depend, of course, upon the ability of the islands to absorb
such assistance.
The need for outside investment appears manifest. As will be
recalled, this is prohibited at the present time except for some moderate
efforts by selected United States companies. Provided the rights and
privileges of the Micronesians can be protected, there seems little
reason to deny other United States companies or even companies of other
States access to Micronesia. Japan comes to mind as one of the latter.
Visitors to the Caribbean area cannot help but be impressed by
their well- developed native craft industries. Could it not be contended
that similar industries could be built up to a greater extent than at
present in the Trust Territory? To aid this project, some revision of
United States tariff regulations that treat the Territory as completely
"foreign" would have to be made.
If security regulations could be relaxed, it is not inconceivable
that a moderate tourist trade could be developed. Hotels, aircraft
facilities and the other aspects of tourism could bolster the indigenous
economy to a healthy degree. Security aspects place this idea in the
speculative category, however.
To increase copra production and to relieve population pressures,
current efforts to encourage homesteading in outer islands should be
continued. Although such an exodus would make the political problems of
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developing territorial consciousness more difficult, economic considera-
tions would appear to govern in this case.
III. EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The school building program now in progress bodes well for the
future maturity of the Territory. There is a need, however, to improve
the system whereby the villages are held largely responsible for build-
ing elementary schools and paying teachers. Standardization and progress
are unlikely under such a process. Also, the programs of the mission
and district schools should be coordinated. Separate procedures can
scarcely be defended when placed beside the glaring need for improved
educational facilities.
The figure of 2-3 per cent come3 to mind when considering the
percentage of Micronesians with a working knowledge of English. This is
an area where an enormous effort is required. Although unity could come
about without territory-wide facility in English, its possession by the
majority of islanders would greatly aid such progress.
IV. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The future of Micronesia has, more often than not, been tied in
closely with political considerations. Although one hesitates to use
the word "pawn," this is the term which most readily comes to mind when
surveying the history of the Trust Territory. Although the charge of
"culture-bound" may be cast against the student by some observers, it
would appear that this situation no longer appliest the people of the
Trust Territory can now make a determination of their own future. The
or.
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United States must still, of course, for the foreseeable future, act as
Administering Authority in what can only be described as a volatii
changing political milieu. With this in mind, some discussion of steps
to improve both the position of the Micronesians and that of the United
States may now be appropriate.
There are those who argue for decentralization in the Territory.
Strengthen the District Congresses, they say, and unification will
eventually come about. Considering the diversity of the cultures, this
may be what will actually come about prior to unification although there
are many people who feel that the District Congresses are already too
big for the number of people involved. A case can be made that the new
Council of licronesia may well be the legislature for a federation. If
this be the direction in which the Territory is moving, few could voice
an objection. But why emphasize diversity when it is not known whether
centralization will work or not? The Council of Micronesia has its
past, ju3t as the District organizations have theirs. A community of
interests is being developed; a sense of nationality is growing. Why
concentrate on the traditional ways to the exclusion of the new? A new
culture is being superimposed on the myriad other cultures. This
process takes time— some authorities speak in terms of three generations.
In view of the time factor alone, the elements that would add to a group
awareness should be emphasized, not those that tend to divide the
Territory into separate camps. In this regard, one should be aware of
the excellent Trust Territory scholarship program which provides advanced
education to deserving students and assures that many changes will come
..
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from within rather than through super imposition. The Importance of this
type of program cannot be overemphasize .
If the Council of Micronesia is to be the territorial legislature
by 1965 as outlined by the High Commissioner, it goes without saying
that its powers should be substantially increased. This line of thiii
ing leads rather directly to the need for organic legislation for .
Trust Territory. Draft legislation, such as H. R. 9278, should be taken
out of the drawer, dusted off, and cast in a way which brings together
the best ideas that officials (both Mlcronesian and non- Micronesi an) can
bring to bear on the subject of the Trust Territory. An Organic Act for
the Islands has been delayed for far too long a period. It does not
pass unnoticed on the international scene that in 195U the High Coa-
missioner promised the United Nations that such an Act would be forth-
inc in I960.
If only to dispel the idea that the area of the Trust Territory
is less strategic now than in 19^6, it would appear that a reevaluation
of Micronesia's role in current strategy should be undertaken. This
judgment should be made known to the Department of the Interior so that
proper programs can be implemented to further the interests of both the
peoples of the Trust Territory and the United States. Certainly in this
nuclear age when one considers that another nation could use the area as
a missile base, tracking area, or for many other military purposes were
the United jcates to move out, its strategic value is not likely to be
underrated. If anything, the strategic value today would seem to be
greater than after World War II.
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Assuming the latter is true, some consideration of alternative
courses of action may now be appropriate. The United States could con-
tinue Its pretest policies with alriiost certain prospects of increasing
criticism frc Jnited Nations and even froiu factions within the
Trust Territory who might see some short-term profit in embarrassing the
United States. It is conceivable that the ideology of revolt could find
some advocates in Micronesia. However, perhaps a continuation of present
policies is the only prudent course at this time. If so, the evidence
brought forward this year by the High Commissioner concerning increased
expenditures will help to lessen the almost inevitable criticism in the
years to cea
Independence is an alternate course of action. To those who
would proclaim the Trust Territory now ready for this solitary position,
the author directs attention to the remarks of Kr. Anaon Aaaraich of
Truk on this rauch-debatec subject (see APPENDIX R). There seems little
reason to believe that independence at this time is desirable from any
rational standpoint for the Trust Territory. The Hicronesians have
evidenced little enthusiasm for this elevated status but, rather, have
indicated that support should be a continuing process at least for the
foreseeable future.
On the other hand, Micronesia could become the territory of some
other power. The complete lack of evidence of any desire on the part
of Micronesians for such an arrangement, coupled with the strategic
value of the Territory dictates the answer to this proposition. In this
day of advanced armament technology, it is too dangerous to consider
.01*ft
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another power in Micronesia. One need only reflect for a moment before
a map of the Pacific to become convinced that a country such as, for
example, the People's Republic of China in the Trust Territory would be
unthinkable in terms of national defense not only for this country but
for others as well.
Ety Article 9 of the Trusteeship Agreement, the United States
could establish, without valid legal objection, an administrative union
between Guam and the other islands of the Marianas Group. This course
has been supported on many occasions by the peoples of the Northern
Marianas. However, with the Headquarters now on Saipan, the "provisional"
capital, it is difficult to see how such an administrative union woula
help the Territory as a whole. Furthermore, there is ample proof (as
witness the abolishment of the Committee on Administrative Unions) that
the United Nations would heap criticism upon the shoulders of officials
tons lble for such a move.
There is the possibility of bringing about some form of Common-
wealth status such as Puerto Rico and the United States enjoy. When the
principle of self-determination is applied to this proposition, there
appears to be some support for it among Micronesians.
Perhaps statehood would be an appropriate future step for the
Trust Territory. Congressman Hugh L. Carey (D-New York), able member of
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, extended his thoughts
into the future in a debate on the floor of the House on July 2, 1962,
when he noted:
U. S. Congressional Record , 87th Congress, 2d. Sess., p. 11669.
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These islands contain 7^,003 fine people and they can make a
real contribution to our country and the free world defense. I
look ahead to the time when this area will have a State of the
Unitec states rather than just a U. S. Trust Territory*
It goes without saying that many Hicronesians as well as many other
observers, considering the future of the Trust Territory, have reached
the same conclusion.
An interesting proposal, which has gained many advocates, centers
around a joining of Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands as a "county" of Hawaii. This idea has considerat.
merit, but it is not at all clear whether either Hawaii or the terri-
tories concerned would desire such an arrangement.
There are those who favor the granting of United States citizen-
ship to the people of the Trust Territory. Congressman John P. Saylor
(R-Pennsylvania), for example, influential member of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, stated to the author on July 26, 1962s
M I feel that we must open the door to them /the people of the Trust
Territory/ for American citizenship." This, of course, would afford the
Hicronesians substantial advantages in the economic, political, and
prestige- sense.
In the final analysis* what ultimate form the Trust Territory will
take will, of course, depend on developments in Micronesia within per-
haps the next ten to fifteen years. No one can really envision the
final status. The United States can only continue to work on its
responsibilities toward Micronesia in order to insure that the people
of the Trust Territory will be prepared for and fully capable of making
a choice when the proper time comes. Every effort should be made in the
* ' >:.
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Kant ia*£ to Insure that friendly relations are maintained with the
Micronesians so that their ultimate choice will reflect mutual trust and
understandIk
All of the above-mentioned courses of action (with the obvious
exception of immediate independence) would be subject to a great swell
of criticism in the United Nations. On the other hand, if a United
Kitions- supervised plebiscite in the Trust Territory were to demonstrate
that one of these courses was the expressed desire of the people
directly concerned, it is difficult to 3ee how such criticism could
continue in juxtaposition to clear evidence of the application of the
principle of self-determination, a principle which has been vigorously
supported across-the-board in the United Nations. Would it not be, one
might ask, better to accept initial criticism which could be answered
by the votes of the Micronesians rather than to accept inevitable
criticism on a continuing basis?
Answers to the foregoing problems cannot be arrived at easily.
Obviously, many diverse factors and interests fmist be weighed. It would
be wrong to presume that this weighing process has not been a continuing
one carried on at the headquarters of operations in the field, by small
numbers of conscientious peoples within the Office of the Chief of
Baval Operations, the Office of Territories in the Department of the
Interior, the Office of Politic©! and Security Affairs (WP) in the
Department of state and in the Committees on Interior and Insular
Affairs of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Through the
years the responsibilities outlined in Article 6 of the Trusteeship
M t «**!©.} . UtM
NMdhflli ill- ' .'.'•?! nctiM !• ; .»t'!v< '.
^ (tat
j
*M 1© nol-'. rt is
XImotoqIv n*ad i !h tic
aidsJlvMri Jqtoas oi *»
lt«» Jc bwrlrifi »d ,'orin.
MiaaMnt * mmI mi Mi hwi^ wir;
• '
«1 aw
el H «»;
»M0tM
•MSlMl
mAJmm
7-iScrr -m\z \?.
j
.
?3 fi
.
|ij|a hj ?• ••: _ . : ;_ •_. . _,;• jf. jg
*>;
qlric*
It mmM mM taM
:
e eiwfaMt
1© JnaoJiaqifi
1 , » tdi MMM
litf
Agreement (see APPENDIX C) have been taken most seriously by United
States officials concerned with the Trust Territory. With this, there
can be little quarrel; the whole framework of our response to the needs
of the Territory has been based on these accepted responsibilities.
However, it would seem that there is now need for steps to crystallize
thinking more and to translate it into action programs. A start has
been made; more needs to be done. It is believed that the small segment
of the total colonial problem considered here calls for the immediate if
only brief attention of the President. He should be encouraged to di-
rect the State, Defense, and Interior Departments to come up with 3ome
joint answers to insure that the administration of the Trust Territory
will not become a source of further embarrassment to the United States
which might be avoided. Whatever the nature of steps that might be
taken, one can only hope that those concerned will ao their .
appreciate the feelings and aspirations of the peoples of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands in their movement toward greater know-
ledge In all fields of free human endeavor.
>_
•
_J _ _t , . ... V 1 qvC
BIBLIQGmPH*

BIBLIOuKAPHY
A. PRIMARY 30UI.
i • United state s Congress Official Documents , Reports , Hearings ,
aad Pub1lot Lona
Audi t Report to the Congress of the United 3tate3 on the Trust Territory
oil the PacifTc Is land3 . Washington: U. 5. General Accounting
Office, 1955.
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs. Open Hearing . 87th Cong., 2d Sess., June 6, 1962.
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs. Report to Accompany 3. 2775 * 97th Cong., , .
Sess., Report No. 1936. Washington: U. 5. Government Printing
Office, 1962.
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Public Lands.
Report on the Pacific Islands . 8jLat Cong., 2d Sess. Washington:
U. 5. Government Printing Office, 1950.
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives. Department of the Inter
i
and Related Agencies Appropriations for 19637 ""WEE Cong., 2d §
VihTngton: U. 3. Government Printing Office, 1962.
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee on
Territorial and Insular Affairs. Report on Guam . 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. Washington: U. S. Government PrinTingOTf ice , 1955.
U. 3. Congress, of Representatives, Special Subcommittee on
Territorial and Insular Affairs. Report on the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands . 83d Cong., 2d Sess. Washington: U. ' .
Government Printing Office, 1955.
U. 3. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Territorial
and Insular Affairs. Open Hearings . Jth Cong., 2d Sess.,
February 8, 1962; February 9, 1962; Kay 2k, 1962; June 21, 1962.
U. 3. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. A Decade of
American Foreign Policy . 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., Sen" Doc. 1237
Washington: U. 3. Government Printing Office, 1950.
U. S. Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing on S. J.
Resolution 1U3. 80th Cong., 1st ^ess. Washincton: U.~3.~Govern-
«ent Printing Office, 19^7.
.no *s
Hgp
-
.u
..... on Fort; ign Relations. The United
Nc Itories . 67th Cong., Is . , Staff
7o. 9." Washington: U. S. Government Printing Offi-
U. S« Congress, ;enat> .ee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
n Hearing. S7thCong., 2d Sess., February 2, IS
U. S. Congress, Senate, Coumattee on Interior anc Insular Affai-
22Ft SH *£? Trust Territory of the pac ific Islands. 8.
1st sess. Washington: U. 5« Government Printing Office, I
U. S. Congress, Senate, Coiu.aitt.-e on Interior and Insular Affair
Report to Accompany S. 2775 » 27th Con^.., 2d .Sess., Repo:.
1223. 'Washington: Tj. "s. Government Printin Office, i9o2.
Report to Accompany 5* J» Res. ll.j . 60th
Cong., 1st Sess., import No. CTT. Washington: U. ',. ftt
Printing Office, I9U7.
U. 3. Congressional Record . Washington: U. 3. Government Print in
~ "" Office, 1915-195?.
H* :j * ^t>atutgs g^ L3r^e . Vol. LXI. Parts 1 and 3. Washington: U.
" Government Printing Office, ...
.
2. United -States Cxecut j .f icial Documents , Reports , Hearings ,
arv^ Put' ligations
Annual Reports of the Governor of Guam to the retary of the Inter ior.
Washington: U. "rmaent Printing Office, 19>l-19oT7
Annual Reports of the Hi gh Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands ' t o the -.Secretary of the Interior" Washington:
U. T. Government Printing Office, l<j%T-iyol.
Handbook of Information , Trust Territory of the Pacific Is lanes . Guam:
Tice of" the"" High Commissioner of the Trust Territory oT"the
Pacific Islands, January, 196l.
Reesing, Fell; ... . , Handbook on the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. Washington: U. S. Navy Department, 191$.
[I J. and othc : . .^port of a Transportation purvey on
bus of establishing .Sea and Air Transportation in the Tru.
frtrritory Undei
:
J!vTi Ri'vT
''*~4:J.-v-
,?
'
-
*"-"
-
-'^ ~
•
•"
• Depart— it
of the interior and he***Department of the Navy . "Washington: U.
ht of the Interior, 19^0.
Sandei^ann, Johr; unsultant to ;sioner.
jservations on the Problem of 'St If Government* in the Trust
Territory of the pacific Islands. ,f Honolulu, Hawaii,
.lA
n/aak
150
U. 3. Department of State. American Foreign Policy , 1950-1955 *
Publication 6hh6. Washington} U. S. Government Printing Off it
1957.
U. 3. Department of State. Annual Reports to the United Nations on the
Administration of the j"rus t""ferr itory of the Pacific Is lands .
Washington: 0. 3. Government Printing Office, 195>1-1961.
U. 3. Department of State. Bulletins . Washington: U. i« Government
Printing Office, 19U5- 19^2^
U. S. Department of State. Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese
Mandated Is lands . Publication 278ii. Washington: U. 3. Government
Printing Office, 19U7.
U. S. Department of State. Foreign Affairs Background Summary.
Washington: Office of Public Affairs, 19U7.
U. S. Department of State. Postwar Foreign Policy Preparations , 1939-
19U5 . Publication 3580~ Washington: U. S. Government Printing
OfTice, 19:-
.
U. S. Department of State. The Inaugutati on of the Trusteeship Jystem
of the United Nations . Publication 2f9^T Washington: U. 3.
Government Printing Office, 19U7.
U. S. Department of State. Treaties and Other Act3 Series. Washington:
U. 3. Government Printing Office, 1917*.
U. 3. Department of State. Two Aspects of Trusteeship . Publication
2850. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 19l7.
U. S. Departs^;:;, of the Interior. Management Survey of the Government
of l!l2 Tfust Territory of the Pacific Islands . "ngton: Office
o? Territories, 1951.
U. S. National Archives. Federal Register . Vols. 12, 16, 17, 18, 27.
Washington: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and
Records Service, July, 19U7; July, 1951; November, 1952: July, 19
M«y, 1962.
U. S. Navy Department. Quarterly Reports. Saipan: U. S. Naval Admin-
istration Unit, 1 July-30 September; 1 October-31 December 196l.
!• Un *ted Nations Official Documents , Reports , Hearings , and Publications
Repertory of United Nations Practice
, Vol. IV. New York: United
tTons, 195T.
.'
151
United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly , 19U6-1962.
United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council , 1916-1962.
United Nations, Official Records of the Trusteeship Council , 1917-1962.
The Yearbooks of the United Nations . New Yorki United Nations, 19U6-
im:
B. SECONDARY SOURCES
1. Books and Monographs
Burdick, cugene. The Blue of Capricorn . Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1961.
Byrnes, James F. Speaking Frankly . New York: Harper and Brothers,
1917.
Chowdhuri, Ramendra Nabh. International Mandates and Trusteeship
Systems : A Comparative Study"! IS. Hague: ft. Nijhoff, 191-
Claude, Inis L., Jr. Swords into Plowshares . Second Edition. New
York: Random House, 1961.
Clyde, Paul H. Japan* s Pacific Mandate . New York: Tfc ian
Company, 19W,
Coulter, John Wesley. The Pacific Dependencies of the United States.
New York: The MacMlTlan Company, 1957.
Dean, Arthur L. (ed.). "Issues in Ilicronesia." Maeographed. New
York: American Institute of Pacific Rela:. 19U7.
Dulles, Foster Rhea. America Jn the Pacifi c. Boston and New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938. ~
Emerson, Rupert and others. "America's Pacific Dependencies.'1 New
York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 19k9.
Evans, Luther Harris. "The Mandates System and the Administration of
Territories under C Mandate." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford University, 1927. Washington: Library of Congress
.
Finkelstein, Lawrence. "Soaaliland Under Italian Administration: A
Case Study in United Nations Trusteeship." New York: Woodrow
•ilson Foundation, 1955.
itfj
•
ji » ci^ n
i
152
Goodrich, Leland and Edvard Hambro. Charter of the United Nations .
Second Edition. Boston: World Peace FoundaTIon, 19U9.
Gray, John A. Amerika Samoa . Annapolis: United States Naval Institute,
I960.
Hall, Hessel Duncan. Mandate s, Dependencies and Trusteeship . Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 191+8.
Ickes, Harola L. The Secret Diary of Harold L. Icke s. 3 Vols. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 19*&
"
Kwsing, Felix M, The .South ^eas in the Modern World. New York: The
Johi. Day Company, 191U.
"
Leahy, William D. I Was There . New York: Whittles ley House, 1950.
MMider, Linden A. Some Dependent Peoples of the South Pacific . New
York: The MacMillan Company, 195k.
Millis, Walter (ed.). The Forrestal Diaries . New York: The Viking
Press, 1951.
Murray, James N., Jr. The United Nat ions Trusteeship System . Urbana:
The University of Illinois Press, 195T
Oliver, Douglas L. (ed.). Planning Mi crones ials Future . Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1953.
Oliver, Douglas L. The Pacific Is lands . Third Edition. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 19! ;8j also Revised Edition. New York:
Double*ay and Company, 1961.
Political Handbook of the World * New York: Harper Brothers, 1961.
Pomeroy, Earl S. Pacific Outpost : American Strategy in Guam and
rones ia . Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951.
Richard, Dorothy E. United States Naval Administration of the Trust
Terri tory of the Pacific Islands . 2 Vols. Washington: U. :.
Government Printing Office, 1957.
Rivlin, Benjamin. "Self- Determination and Dependent Areas," Inter-
national Conciliation
, No. 501, January 1955.
Sady, Emil J. The United Nations and Dependent Peoples . Washington:
The Erookings Institution, 19*557
Snyder, Richard C. and Edgar S. Fumiss, Jr. American Foreign Policy .
New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 195UT"^
..
•
'
•
..
traV
•
•
;
is
« C";
The Mew Internationa l Yearbook. New York* Funk and Wagnails Coapany,
Toussalnt, Charaian cdwards. The Trusteeship System of the United Na-
tions. New Yorkt Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 056.
Trumbull, Robert. Paradise in Trust . New Yorkt W. Sloane Associates,
1959.
West, Francis J. Political Advancement In the South Pacific .
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, l55I.
Yanaihara, Tadao. Pacific Islands Under Japanese Mandate . London and
New Yorkj Oxford University Press, 19li0.
2. Articles
Codding, George A. 5!The United States Trusteeship in the Pacifl
Current History , Vol. XXIX (December 1955), pp. 358-363.
Dennett, Raymond. ,!U. S. Navy and Dependent Areas," Far eastern Survey,
Vol. XIV (April 25, 19U5), pp. 9>>
Gilchrist, Huntington. "The Japanese Is lands t Annexation or Trustee-
ship?* ForgiQR Affairs , Vol. XXII (July 19UU), pp. 635-61*2.
Hart, Thomas. "The United States and the Pacific Islands," Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social sciences, Vol. CCLV
TJanuary 1&6)7». 1T5-T5II
Huang, Thomas. "Trust Territories and Customs and Administrative
Unions," American Journal of International Law, Vol. XLIII
(October l&M r pp77IOT#:
Ickes, Harold L. "The Navy at its Worst, « Co lliers , Vol. CXVIII
(August 31, 19U6), pp. 22-23, 67.
Jacttbson, Harold Karan. "Our 'Colonial' Problea in the Pacific,"
Foreign Affairs , Vol. XXXIX (October I960), pp. 56-66.
Maki, John M. "U. 3. Strategic Area or UN Trusteeship," Far Eastern
.Survey, Vol. XVI (August 13, I9kl) § pp. 175-178.
Mander, Linden A. "New Trends in South Pacific Administration," Far
Eastern Survey
, Vol. XXII (October n.d. 1953), pp. lll~lU5.
"
Mason, Leonard. "Trusteeship in Micronesia,
»
: Far Eastern Survey, Vol.
XVII (Kay 5, 191*8), pp. 105-106.
*
.;.' tier
•&-'-, c&>n.L.. . -
-.
Ukm
•ix>i'4
15U
McAuley, James. "Paradoxes of Development in the South Pacific,"
Pacific Affairs
, Vol. XXVII (June 195U), pp. 13&- lltf.
Weigert, Hans ¥. HU. S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security,"
Foreign Affairs , Vol. XXV (January 19^7), pp. 2$Q-262.
Wright, Carleton H. "Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,"
u * s * Kaval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 7U (November 19U8), pp.
l33>l3Hir
3. Newsmagazines and Newspapers
Army and Navy Journal.
H icrones ian Reporter .
Newsweek.
The New York Times . Late City Edition, Microfilm.
The Washington Post .
Time.
I tffll
: S~-
| HIT
»taft1
APPENDIXES

156
APPENDIX A
Statement by the President*
November 6, 191*6
The United States is prepared to place under trusteeship, with
the United States as the administering authority, the Japanese
Mandated Islands for which it assumed responsibilities as a
result of the Second World War. Insofar as the Japanese Mandated
Islands are concerned, this Government i3 transmitting for in-
formation to the other members of the Security Council (Australia,
Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom) and
to New Zealand and the Philippines a draft of a strategic area
trusteeship agreement which sets forth the terms upon which this
Government is prepared to place those islands under trusteeship.
At an early date we plan to submit this draft agreement formally
to the Security Council for its approval.
*U.TJ S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Background Summary .
(Washington: Office of Public Affairs, 19147), p" 11.
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APPENDIX B
Executive Order 9675*
Whereas the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (herein-
after referred to as the trust territory) has been placed under
the ttmsteeship system established in the Charter of the United
Nations by means of a trusteeship agreement (hereinafter
referred to as the agreement), approved by the Security Council
of the United Nations on April 2, 19hl , and by the United States
government on July 18, 1917, after due constitutional process? and
Whereas the United States of America under the terms of the
agreement, is designated as the administering authority of the
trust territory and has assumed obligations for the government
thereof? and
Whereas it is necessary to establish an interim administration
of the trust territory pending the enactment of appropriate legis-
lation by the Congress of the United States providing for the
future government thereof:
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
1. The military government in the former Japanese Mandated
Islands is hereby terminated, and the authority and respon-
sibility for the civil administration of the trust territory,
on an interim basis, is hereby delegated to the Secretary of the
Mavy.
2. The Secretary of the Navy shall, subject to such policies
as the President may from time to time prescribe, and, when appro-
priate, in collaboration with other departments or agencies of
the Federal Government, carry out the obligations which the
United States, as the administering authority of the trust terri-
tory has assumed under the terms of the agreement and the Charter
of the United Nations: Provided , however , that the authority
granted to the United States under Article 13 of the agreement to
close any areas for security reasons and to determine the extent
to which Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations
shall be applicable to such closed areas shall be exercised
jointly by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of state:
And Provided further
, that all relations between departments or
agencies of the Federal Government and appropriate organs of the
United Nations with respect to the trust territory shall be con-
ducted through the Secretary of State.
3. This order, subject to subsequent modification, shall be
effective as of this date and shall remain effective until a
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designation is made of the civilian department or agency which is
to have permanent responsibility for the government of the trust
territory.
Harry S. Truman
The White House
July 18, 19U7
*Federal Register, Vol. XII (July 22, 191*7), pp. h837-U838.
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APPENDIX C
Trusteeship Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands*
PREUOLB
Whereas article 75 of the Charter of the United Nations provides
for the establishment of an international trusteeship system for
the administration and supervision of such territories as may be
placed thereunder by subsequent agreements; and
Whereas under article 77 of the said Charter the trusteeship
system may be applied to territories now held under mandate; and
Whereas on 17 December 1920. the Council of the League of Nations
confirmed a mandate for the former German islands north of the
equator to Japan, to be administered in accordance with article 22
of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and
Whereas Japan, as a result of the Second World War, has ceased
to exercise any authority in these islands;
Now, therefore the Security Council oi the United Nations having
satisfied itself that the relevant articles of the Charter have
been complied with, hereby reaeives to approve the following
terms of trusteeship for the Pacific Islands formerly under man-
date to Japan.
ARTICLE 1
The Territory of the Pacific Islands, consisting of the islands
formerly held by Japan under mandate in accordance with article 22
of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is hereby designated as
a strategic area and placed under the trusteeship system established
in the Charter of the United Nations. The Territory of the Pacific
Islands is hereafter referred to as the trust territory.
AKTICL£ 2
The United States of America is designated as the administering
authority of the trust territory.
ARTICLE 3
The administering authority shall have full powers of adminis-
tration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory subject
to the provisions of this agreement, and may apply to the trust
territory, subject to any modifications which the administering
authority may consider desirable, such of the laws of the United
States as it may deem appropriate to local conditions and require-
ments.
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ARTICLE U
The administering authority, in discharging the obligations of
trusteeship in the trust territory, shall act in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, and the provisions of this
reement, and shall, as specified in Article 83 (2) of the Charter,
the objectives of the international trusteeship system, as
set forth in article 76 of the Charter, to the people of the trust
ter.r
ARTICLE 5
In discharging lis obligations under article 76 (2) and article
8L, of the Charter, the administering authority 3hall ensure that
the trust territory shall play its part, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, in the maintenance of international
peace and security. To this end the administering authority
shall be entitled)
1. to establish naval, military, and air bases and to erect
fortifications in the trust territory.
2. to station and employ armed forces in the territory; and
3. to make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance
from the trust territory i: .it the obligations towards
the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering
authority, as well as for the local defense and the maintenance
of law and order within the trust territory.
ARTICLE 6
In discharging its obligations under article 76 (b) of the
Cnarter, the administering authority shall:
1. Foster the development of such political institutions as
are suited to the trust territory and shall promote the develop-
ment of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular
circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples and the
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; and to this end
shall give to the inhabitants of the trust territory a progressively
increasing share in the administrative services in the territory;
shall develop their participation in government; shall give due
recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a
system of law for the territory; and shall take other appropriate
measures toward these ends;
2. Promote the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of
the inhabitants, and to this end shall regulate the use of natural
resources; encourage the development of fisheries, agriculture,
and industries; protect the inhabitants against the loss of their
lands and resources; and improve the means of transportation M
communication;
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3. Promote the social advancement of the inhabitants and to
this end shall protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all
elements of the population without discrimination; protect the
health of the inhabitants; control the traffic in arms and am-
munition, opium and other dangerous drugs, and alcohol and other
spiritous beverages} and institute such other regulations as may
be necessary to protect the inhabitants gainst social abuses} and
h. Promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants,
and to this end shall take steps toward the establishment of a
general system of elementary education; facilitate the vocational
and cultural advancement of the population; and shall encourage
quali; to pursue higher education, including training
on the profc 1 level.
ARTICL
In discharging its obligations under a: 76 (c), of the
Charter, the administering authority shall guarantee to the
inhabitants of the trust territory freedom of conscience, and,
subject only to the requirements of public order and security,
freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly; freedom of
worship, and of religious teaching; and freedom of migration
and movement.
ARTICLE 8
1. In discharging its obligations under article 76 (d) of
the Charter, as defined by article Q'3 (2) of the Charter, the
administering authority, subject to the requirements of security,
and the obligation to promote the advancement of the inhabitants,
shall accord to nationals of each . _r of the United Nations and
to companies and associations or;.. in conformity with the
laws of such Member, treatment in the trust territory no less
favourable than that accorded therein to nationals, companies and
associations of any other United Nation except the administering
authority.
2. The administering authority shall ensure equal treatment
to the Members of the United Nations and their nationals in the
administration of justice.
3. Nothing in this Article shall be so construed as to accord
traffic rights to aircraft flying into and out of the trust
territory. Such rights shall be subject to agreement between the
administering authority and the state whose nationality such air-
craft possesses.
ii. The administering authority may negotiate and conclude
commercial and other treaties and agreements with Members of the
United Nations and other states, designed to attain for the
inhabitants of the trust territory treatment by the Members of
the United Nations and other states no less favourable than that
granted by them to the nationals of other states. The Security
ioJnaour
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Council aay recommend, or lnvlt< 9 of the United
Bat ions to • ^ inhabitants
of the tru.
.
at ion of the
rights obtained by ttemoers 01 tne unitec watxons in the trust
territory.
ARTICLE 9
The administering authority sh I entitled to constitute the
trust territory into a customs, fiscal, or administrative union
or federation with other territories under United States juris-
diction and to establish common services between 3uch territories
and the trust territory where such measures are not inconsistent
with the basic objectives of the international Trusteeship Systea
with the terms of this agreement.
The administering authority, acting under the provisions of
article 3 of this agreement, may accept membership in any
regional advisory commission, regional authority, or technical
organisation, or other voluntary association of states; may
cooperate with specialized international bodies, public or
private, and may engage in other forms of international
cooperation.
ARTICLE 11
1. The administering authority 3hall take the necessary steps
to previa^ che status of citisjimsbio of the trust territory for
the inhabitants of the -rust t
2. The administering author it aford diplomatic and
consular protection to inhabitants of the trust territory when
outside the territorial limits of the tru3t territory or of the
territory of the administering authority.
A*. 12
The administering authority shall enact such legislation as may
be necessary to place th~ provisions of this agreement in effect
in the trust territory.
ARTICLE 13
The provisions of articles 87 and 88 of the Charter, shall be
applicable to the trust territory, provided that the administering
authority may determine the extent of their applicability to a
areas which may from time to time be specified by it as closed for
security reasons.
hi
{-:. tu
~i
-
163
ARTICLE III
The administering authority undertakes to apply in the trust
territory the provisions of any international conventions and
recommendations which may be appropriate to the particular
circumstances of the trust territory and which would be conducive
to the achievement of the basic objectives of Article 6 of this
agr-.
ARTICLE 15
The terms c'. the present agreement shall not be altered,
aatended or terminated without the consent of the administering
authority.
ARTICLE 16
The present agreement shall come into force when approved by
the Security Council of the United Nations and by the Government
of the United States after due constitutional process.
ft
See U. S. Treaties—Treaties and Other International Acts Series
(TIAS 1665) | also U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. LXI, Part 3,
PP. 3301-3305.
'.
I6li
APPENDIX D
Executive Order 10265*
Whereas the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (herein-
after referred to as the trust territory) was placed under the
trusteeship system established by the Charter of the United
Nations by means of a trusteeship agreement approved by the
Security Council of the United Nations on April 2, 19; 7, after due
constitutional process; and
Whereas the United States, under the terms of the trusteeship
agreement was designated as the administering authority of the
trust territory, and ha3 assumed obligations for the government
thereof; and
Whereas Executive Order No. 9875 of July 18, 19L7 delegated
authority and responsibility for the civil administration of the
trust territory to the Secretary of the Navy on an interim basis;
and
Whereas a committee of the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy
and the Interior recommended on July 16, 19ii7, that administrative
responsibility for the trust territory be transferred to a
civilian agency of the government at the earliest practicable date;
and
Whereas plans for the orderly transfer of administrative
responsibility for trust territory from the Secretary of the Navy
to the Secretary of the Interior and embodied in a memorandum of
understanding between the Department of the Navy and the Depart-
ment of the Interior, approved by me on September 22 , 19^9, and
it is the view of the two departments, as expressed in that
memorandum, that such transfer should take effect on July 1, 1951;
Md
Whereas the transfer of administration of the trust territory
from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior,
effective July 1, 1951, appears to be in the public interest:
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
1. The administration of the trust territory is hereby
transferred from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of
the Interior, such transfer to become effective on July 1, 1951.
2. The Department of the Navy and the Department of the
Interior 3hall proceed with the plans for the transfer of admin-
istration of the trust territory as embodied in the above
aentioned memorandum of understanding between the two depart-
ments*
3. When the transfer of administration made by this order
becomes effective, the Secretary of the Interior shall take such
action as may be necessary and appropriate, and in harmony with
applicable law, for the administration of civil government in the
trust territory and shall, subject to such policies as the
President may from time to time prescribe and when appropriate,
I Ml
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in collaboration with other departments or agendas of the
Government, carry out the obligations assumed by the United
States as the administering authority of the trust territory
under the terms of the trusteeship agreement approved by the
United States on July 18, 19U7, and under the Charter of the
United Nations: Provided , however , that the authority to
specify parts or all of the trust territory as closed for
security reasons and to determine the extent to which Articles
87 and 68 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be
applicable to 3uch closed areas in accordance with Article 13
of the Trusteeship Agreement, shall be exercised by the
President: and provided further, that the Secretary of the
Interior shall keep the Secretary of State currently informed
of activities in the trust territory affecting the foreign
policy of the United States and shall consult the Secretary
in questions of policy concerning the trust territory
which relate to the foreign policy of the United States, and
that all relations between departments or agencies f the
Government and appropriate organs of the United Nations with
respect to the trust territory shall be conducted through the
Secretary of State.
lu The executive departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment are authorized and directed to cooperate with the
Departments of the Navy and Interior in the effectuation of
the provisions of this order.
Harry S. Truman
The White House
June 29, 1951
"Federal Register, Vol. 16 (July 3, 1951), pp. 6Ul9-6i;20.
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APPENDIX E
Executive Order 1QU8Q
Whereas the administration of the Trust Territory of the
Pacifi; Islands (hereinafter referred to as the trust territory)
was transferred to the Secretary of the Interior by Executive
Order Ho. 10265 of June 29, 1951, and
Whereas the purpose of the trusteeship agreement approved by
the Security Council of the United Nations of April 2, 19^7, and
by the United states Government on July 16, 19U7, can better be
effectuated by placing in the Secretary of the Navy the authority
and responsibility for the administration of that portion of the
trust territory which includes TINIAN and SAIPAN:
Now, therefore by virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States, it is ordered a3 follows*
1. The administration of that portion of the trust territory
which includes the islands of TINIAN and SAIPAN is hereby trans-
ferred fro.ii the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the
Navy, such transfer to become effective on Jnucry 1, 1953.
2. When the transfer of administration made by this order
becomes effective, the Secretary of the Navy shall take such action
as may be necessary and appropriate and in harmony with applicable
law, for the administration of civil government in that portion
of the trust territory which includes the islands of TINIAN and
SAIPAN and shall, subject to such policies as the President may
from time to time prescribe and, when appropriate, in collaboration
with other departments or agencies of the Government, carry out
the obligation assumed by the United States as the administering
authority of the trust territory under the terms of the trustee-
ship agreement approved by the United States on July 18, 19U7, and
under the Charter of the United Nations: Provided, however, that
the authority to specify parts or all of either of such islands
as closed for security reasons and to determine the extent to
which Articles 87 and 68 of the Charter of the United Nations
shall be applicable to such closed areas, in accordance with
Article 13 of the trusteeship agreement, shall be exercised by
the President: And provided further , that the Secretary of the
Navy shall keep the Secretary of State currently informed of
activities on such islands affecting the foreign policy of the
United spates and shall consult the Secretary of State on questions
of policy concerning such islands which relate to the foreign
policy of the United States, and that all relations between depart-
ments or agencies of the Government and appropriate organs of the
United Nations with respect to such islands shall be conducted
through the Secretary of State.
-*0 &fvX K-i. 1
167
3. The executive departments and agencies of the Government
are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Departments of
the Navy and Interior to the effectuation of the provisions of
this order.
it. To the extent that they pertain to the islands of TINIAN
and 3AIP&N, the provisions of Executive Order No. 10265 of
June 29, 1951 , shall be superseded by the provisions of this
order as of the date set out in the paragraph numbered 1, above.
Harry S. Truman
The White House
November 10, 1952
*Federal Register, Vol. 17 (November 13, 1952), p. 10277.
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APPENDIX F
iixecutive Order 10170*
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the
United states, it is ordered as follows:
1, Executive Order No. 10U08 of November 10, 1952, trans-
ferrin^ the administration of that portion of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands which includes the islands of TINIAN and
SAIPAN from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of th
Navy is hereby amended to provide that that portion of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands over which administration is
transferred frotn the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary
of the Navy shall include all of the Northern Kariana Islands of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands except the Island of
Rota.
2. Nothing contained in Executive Order No. 101+08, as amended
by this order, shall be construed to modify the rights or obliga-
tions of the United States under provision of the Trusteeship
Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands approved
by the President on July 18, 19^7, or to affect or modify the
responsibility of the Secretary 01 State to interpret the rights
and obligation of the United States arising out of international
agreements
.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
The White House
July 17, 1953
^Federal Register, Vol. 18 (July 21, 1953), p. U231.
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APPENDIX G
General Assembly Resolution 1^13 (XIV)"1
Attainment of Self-Government or Independence
by Trust Territories
The General Assembly
,
Considering that the basic objective of tfcf rnational
Trusteeship System under the Charter of the United Nations is the
progressive development of the innabitants of Trust Territories
toward self-government or independence,
Recalling its resolutions 55§ (VI) of January 1952, 106k
(XI) of 26 February 1957, 1207 (XII) of U 1957 and
127k (XIII) of 5 December 1958,
Noting with satisfaction that the dates for the attainment
of independence of Togoland under French administration, the
Caaeroons under French administration and Somali land ur,
Italian administration have already been set,
Noting further that the time-table proposed by the Adminis-
tering Authority provides for the attainment of independence by
Western Samoa under New Zealand administration in the course of
1961, and that processes leading to the termination of trustee-
ship over the Cameroons under British administration in 1961
have already been set in motion,
Believing that the formulation of plans and targets in advance
can assist "in thTT acceleration -he inhabitants
of Trust Territories towards il
Considering therefore that at this stage it is both necessary
and desirable to foresee the coarse of developments leading to
the attainment of independence by the Trust Territories of
Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi in tfae near future,
Having examined part I, chapter V, of the report of the
Trusteeship Council
,
1. Requests the Administering Authorities concerned to pro-
pose, after consultation with the representatives of the inhabitants,
for the consideration of the General Assembly at its fifteenth
session, time- tables and targets for the attainment of independence
by the Trust Territories of Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi in the
near future;
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2. Invites the Administering Authorities concerned to
formulate, in respect of the remaining Trust Territories,
early successive intermediate targets and dates in the fields
of political, economic, social and educational development so
as to create, as soon as possible, favourable conditions for
the attainment of self-government or independence;
3. Requests the Trusteeship Council, in its examination of
the annual reports submitted by the Administering Authorities
and in formulating the terms of reference of the I960 visiting
aission to Trust Territories in Africa, to keep in view the
provisions of the present resolution.
8U6th plenary meeting
5 December 1959
linited Nations, Resolutions a£opted b^ the General Assembly
its Fourteenth Session", 15 September - 13 December 1959.
U. K. Doc. A/h35ii.
•
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APPENDIX H
General Assembly Resolution l5l!i (XV)'
Declaration on the Granting of Independence
To Colonial Countries and Peon
The General Assembly
,
i aination pre a by the peoples of c
world in the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in
fundamental huaan rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations la:
and small and to promote social progress and better standards of
life in larger fre t
Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of
stability and well-being and peaceful and frdeadly relations based
on respect for the principles of equal rights and self- determination
of all peoples, and of ur. for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental i or all without distinction
as to race, sex, language or religion,
Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all
dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the
attainment of their in ience,
Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial
of or imp, in the way of fcl f such peoples,
which constitute a 3erious threat to worlc; peace,
Considering rtant role of the United Nations in
assisting the movement for independence in Trust and ©on- Self-
Governing Territories,
Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire th*,
of colonialism in all its manifestatici .
Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents
the
.
;pment of international economic cooperation, impedes t
Lai, cultural and eco.
-lopment of dependent peoples I
-itates against the United 1 «al of ui i peace,
Affirming that peopl. ,.r own ends, freely disp •
of their natural wealth and j without prejudice to any op-
tions arising out of international economic co-operation,
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law,
.
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Believing that the process of lib .1 is irresistible and
irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end
must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation :
discrimination associated therewith,
Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of
dependent territories into freedom an .pendence, and rect
nizing the increasingly powerful trends towards freedom in such
1 titer ies which have not yet attained independent
Convinced that all peoples have an inalienabl t to com-
,, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity
of their national territory,
Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations
3
And to thi3 M
Declares that:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination
and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights,
is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impe
ment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determinationj by virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying inde-
pendence .
h* All armed action or repressive measures of ail kinas
direct ndent peoples sh&ll cease in order to enable
them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete
independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall
be respect .
. Immediate stepri shall ce taken, in Trust and Son-
Gove niing Territories or all territories which have not yet
attained I idence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of
those territories, without an; ns or reservations, in
accordance with their .ill and desire, without
any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enr.
them to enjoy complete independence and freed.

6. Any att it the partial or total disruption of
the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country
is incompatible with the purposes and pprtcipies of the Charter
of the United Nations.
Ail States shall observe faithfully and strictly the
provisions of the Charter of the Unitea Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the
basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of
all States, spect for the sovereign rights of all peop
I
and their territorial integrity.
9U7th plenary meeting
lk December I960
United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly
,
U. N. Doc. A/'U68t~

APPENDIX I
Letter Dated March ?, l?6l From The
Popular Party of Saipan To The
United Nations Vis it i ;3ion#
Argument in Favour of Re-In .ion
THE MARIANA ISLA&
It The Mariana Islands are historically, eacially, culturally,
and geographically one entity and the artificial barriers now
separating them should be removed in line with the desires of
the people of these islands
It should be first noted that the Mariana Islands are a squall
chain of islands in I .ific, each practically in the sight
of the other, which have, since their discovery L. lian, and
considerably prior thereto;, been inhabited by substantially the
same people, speaking the same language, having the same religion
and culture, sharing common ways of lii . „am has traditionally
been the centre of Mariana life since it is the largest, and oost
heavily populated islands of the chain have always been occupied
by those havi _uon ancestry with the people of Guam, and the
culture running up and down the chain is for all practical pur-
poses the same
.
When a people apeak the same language, arc culturally related,
have the same religion, follow the same customs, geographical
link, and are only divided by artificial barriers constructed
from no choice of their own, it is only natural in this day of
nationalism and self-determination that they have an emotional and
fervent desire to be reunited in one governmental entity.
It must be remembered that Spain, the long time suzerain of the
Marianas, considered the islands as an indivisible entity, as, of
course did the early Chamorros prior to Spain's occupation. The
division of the Marianas into three differently administered groups
has no connexion whatsoever with any cultural difference between
the peoples of the Territory. In line with the principles outli.
in the United Nations Charter, the peoples of the Marianas who are
united in one culture and race should be permitted to be reunit
into one political entity.
II. The economic division of tl . lanas into the Saipan Disti
Rata, and the Territory of Guam is completely impracticable and
creates a hardship in the three part of the Marianas
Mat
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Very "hortly after Spain lost Guam, following thi Treaty of
Paris, sht the reiaaining Mariana Islands to Germany ther
tnstral . tat it considered a . ing to maintain and sup-
port - iana Islands separate and apart from Guam was a foolish
an un*.eor j i rtaking. The islanu3 at r that
it is unnatural for any trade or other barrier to exist between
them. The tconoay of Guau is presently dependent on the military
•fttfldingj the economy of Li dependent on the generosity of
the Interior administration of the Trust Territory. In the futu
it is more likely that the military expenditures on Gua»a will
slacken, and it cannot L & that the Navy wiil perpetually
wish to si M the sconony of iaipan, nor the Trust Territory
that , fewev*r f U the satire chain was politically unit-
men, materiel, an. 1 trade flowed freely and without harassment
l, it i3 entirely possible that a viable ^co;.
could be ped independent of any outside assistance. The
Japanese were successful on Tinian ana saipan in raising a It
sugar crop, while before the war Guam was nearly self-sustair,
agriculturally. i is no reason to bfl that if the
Marianas were again a single economic unit they could not work
out a functional division of their economy among the different
islands in such a way as to create jobs for all and prosperity
for the entire chain.
III. The reunion of the i-iarianas Islands into one political
entity would not violate the spirit of the United Nations
Charter
we understand it I . .arter of the United Natiaas provi
that all people everywhere have the right of self-determination
and of the choice of government under which they live. As this
applies to the Marianas, it might be argued that this means that
we the people of the Karianas must aspire to 0003 political
independence, since this has been the traditional aspiration of
all r colonial peoples. However, this is not the goal Which
we seek. What we desire, first of all, is the reunion of the
people under on. of government. We have been -separated by
historical accidents for the last sixty years, over which we had
absolutely no control, nor were we in any way consulted. Mm
our principal at this point is that of being reunited with
our kinsmen* When you can stand on one island and see the next
and realize that your cousin on the nearby island is a citizen
of a different country than you, that you cannot visit hi
without a considerable waiting period, and filling out of for
that it wo i.apo3sible for he and you to go into
business together, and that neither of you have any control r
your common oestiny, your principal political aim bscoaei that
of joining your cousin under the saak vernment. As a
matter of practical fact, the government of the Territory of Guaa
is the appropriate government of the remaining riarianas, since
ft
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Guam is by far the largest and jopulated of the chain and
has been traditionally and is logically the capital. Furthe
at this stage, its form of government is considerably more ad-
vanced than that of the others. It has a locally-elecl
.re with the control over the expenditures of locaily-
funds. Its citizens are citizens of the United States
who can t-ravel freely back and forth between Guam and the United
States, and although it has been characterized as a non-self-
governing dependency of the United States in point of fact it
has a considerable degree of self-government, and has touch
greater political freedom than the surrounding islands. This
being the case, the logical next step in the development of both
the Territory of Guam and the reaaini. iana3 would be the
reunion politically of the Northern Marianas within the Territory
of Gua .
i 5 February 1961, a plebiscite was held in the Saipan
District revealing the fact that out of the total qualified voters
of 2,887 who cast their votes, 1,557 ballots were in support of
the reintegration of the entire Mariana Islands. Opposition to
the intention of unification totalled 8l8 of which voters in the
number of 676 are of Carolinian descendants who have entirely no
relation whatsoever in Guam, and the rest are composed of local
businessman and top U. 3. Wavy employees. However, quite a few
of the Carolinian descendants favour the unification of the
Marianas with Guam. It is pro]:. ., the United Nations, the
United states, the Territory of Guam and the rest of the Marianas
work out a method whereby this aspiration of the people of Saipan
can be obtained.
Saipan, 7 March 1961
(Signed) Francisco T. Palacios
Legislator and Chairman, Popular Party
*United Nations, Official Records of the Trusteeship Counc
i
1
Report of the United Nations Vis i ission to the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, ly6i, U. N. Doc. T/1582.
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APPENDIX J
Petition to the United Nations Visit 3sion relative to
respectfully requesting and memoralizing the United Na'
and the United States Congress to take under serious considera-
tion the future annexation of the Saipan District to the United
States as a separate and distinct United states Territory*
Be it petitioned by the following members of the Legislature
of Saipan:
Whereas, the following petitioners represent a majority of
the Thirteenth Saipan Legislature in which this petition was
submitted on behalf of the people of Saipan, Mariana Islands: a
Whereas , as a result of the conflict attendant upon the
Second World War, the United Nations was born, which organiza-
tion one of its primary purposes the self-government, Ml
self-determination of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
and to that end instituted a Trusteeship Agreement to assure
such self-determination to the peopL r their trust; '
Whereas , under Chapter XII, Article 76, Sub-paragraph b of
the Charter of the United Nations provides that one of the basic
objectives of the Trusteeship System shall be: To promote t
political, economic, social and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of the Trust Territories, and their progressive
development towards self-government or independence as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each Territory and
its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned,
and of may be provided by the terms of each Trusteeship Agreement;
and
Whereas , the Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XI, declara-
tion regarding I. - .rning Territories in the Article 73,
sub-paragraph b, provides in part as follows: "to develop self-
government, to take due account of the political aspirations of
the pe and to assist them in the progressive development of
their free political institutions, according to the particular
circumstances of each Territory and its peoples and their varying
stages of advancement
. .
." and
Whereas, trie poeple of Saipan District have determined almost
unanimously that they strongly desire to become a part of the
Uniteci States and to be granted Un izenship, which
said desire has been evidenced by the last plebiscite conducted
on the £th day of Bebruary l<?6l, an official copy of the results
of i v.re attached hereto and made a part of this petition; and
', I
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Whereas , the people of Saipan strongly desire all of tfee
islands inhabited or uninhabited of the Saipan District be a
part of the Uni ates of America in order to acquire national
status and become either a possession or a territory upon
determination by the United States that the inhabitants are
ready, able, and willing to assume suci- -^risibility; and
Whereas , if the Saipan District is anni the United
States of America, the inhabitants will advance even further
politically, economically, educationally and socially and be
ored of national status;
Wher it is respectfully petit ion
1. That the following members of the Thirteenth Saipan Legis-
lature do hereby on behalf of the of all the Saipan District
including Rota Island, respectfully request and petition the
United Nations and the Unit tes Congress to cause the Saipan
District including Rota Island to be incorporated into the United
States of America as a possession or a separate territory of the
Uni~ tes inclt. the granting of United States Citizenship.
2. That this petition does also serve as a sine. pression
and deep gratitude of all the people of iaipan, Mariana Islands,
to the United States, the Adminis Authority, for their
protection and their keen interest in promoting the advancement
of the people, which made possible this pet it
i
. That these copies of the petition be thereafter trans-
mitted to His Excellency Carle ;a, Chairman of the Unit
Nations Visiting Mission, to t. at of the United states,
to the President of t .ate, to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to the Chairman of thu Committees on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Senate and House, to the Secretary of the
Interior, to the Secretary of bhe Navy, to the Chief of Naval
Operations, to the Commander-in-Chief, U. 3. Pacific Fleet, to
the Commander Naval For. ianas, to the High Commissioner of
the Trust Territory, to the Naval Administrator of the Saipan
strict, to the Chairman of the Tinian and to the
Chairman of the Rota Congress
«
Dated this 7th day of >iarch
Various signatories
^ini itions, Officii of the Trusteeship Council
,
Report of the United Nations Visiting" Hiss ion to The Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islanc . |, Doc. T/1582.

APPENDIX K
jcutive Order 1102.
LUSTRATION OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC
,; THE BiTERI
Trust Territory of t ific Islands was placed
under the trusteeship system establ: Is the Charter of the
United Nations by meari.of a trusteeship agree.-aent approved by thv
Security Council of the United Nations on April 2, 19hl , and by
.overnment on July 16, 19hl , after onsti-
tutional process (hereafter referred to as the trusteeship
agreement); and
ihe United States of America v. ignated under the
terms of the trusteeship agree .inistering authority
of the Trust Territory referre einafter referred to
as the trust territory) $ M
.he United States has fore assumed obligations
for the civil administration of the trust territory and has c
out such civil administration u -he provisions of Execute
Orders Nos. 9<375 of July 13, 19h7, 10265 of June 29, 1951, l%0&
of November 10, 1952, and I f July 17, 1953 J and
WHEREAS thereunder the Secretary of the Navy is now respon-
sible for the civil administration o\ forthem Mariana Islands
except the Island of Rota and the .ary of Interior is respon-
sible for the civil administration of all the remainder of the
trust territory ; and
WR-LRBAS It ap ears that the purposes of the trusteeship agree-
ment can best be effectuated a;, this time by placing in the
-etary of the Interior responsibility for the civil aa.. <~a-
tion of all of the trust territory;
NOW 3 THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Act of Ju: 195i4 (68 Stat. 320: ho U„ 8l) and as Pre
it of the United States it is o as follows:
ACTION 1. Responsibility of feteteretary of the Interior . The
onsibility for Ihe administration of civil government in all
of the trust territory, and all executr
,
and
judicial authority necessary for that administration, are hereby
vested in the Secretary of the Interior. Subject to such policies
-esident may from time to time prescribe, and in harmony
with applicable law, and, where advantc
. in collaboration
with other departments and agencies of the Government, the
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retary of the Interior shall take such actions as way be
necessary and appropriate to carry out the obligations assumed
by the United States as t . • liy of the tni3t
territory under the ement and under
the Charter of the United Nations: Provided however , That the
authority to specify parts or all of the trust territory as
closed for security reasons ai determine the extent to which
7 and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be
applic -uch closed areas, in accordance with Article 13 of
the trusteeship agreement, shall be exercised by the. President:
J^ provided further , That the Secretary of the Interior shall
) the Secretary of currently informed of activities in
the tr rritor reign policy of the United
States and shall consult with the Secretary of State on questions
of policy concerning the trust territory which related to the
foreign policy of the United states, and that all relations
between the departments jpftcies of the Government and appro-
pris ans of the United Nations Wi spect to the trust
territory shall be condu. -y of State.
legation of authority . The executive, legislat:
'.al authority provided for in section 1 of this order may
be sed through such officers a of the Department
of the Interior, or through such other persons under t. is-
diction of the Secretary of the Interior, as the Secretary may
designate, and shall be exercised in such manner as the Secretary,
or any person or persons acting under the authority of th e-
tanTj , may direct or authorize.
• Cooperation with Depart Interior ,
departments and agenc ies of the Government shall cooperate
with the Department of the Interior in the effectuation of the
provisions of this ore .
• Prior orders . Ti ttae it not heretofor.
-red inapplicable, the following are hereby
(1) Executive Order No. 10265 of June 20, 1951.
r No. 10ii08 of iv 10, 1952.
(3) Executive Order No. 10it7G of July 17, 1953.
* £• ^viftg provisions , (a) Existing laws, regulations,
orders, appointment, or other acts promulgated, made, or taken by
the Interior or I tes under the authority
ve Order No. 10265, as ame: i in lately
prior to the effective date of thi> ,: remain in effect
until they are superseded in pursuance of the provisions of this
r.
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(b) Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as
ifying the rights or obligations of the Unite a itates under
the provisions of the trusteeship agreement or as affecting or
modifying the responsibility of the Secretary of State to inter-
pret the rights and obligations of the United States arising out
of that agreement.
SBC. 6. ..:-i^Liye date . The provisions of this order shall
bee: ective July 1, 1962.
JOiftf F. KENNEDY
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Kay 7, 1962 .
^Federal Register, Vol 27 (May 9, -962), pp. UEOlMi- .
Ml
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APPENDIX L
H. R. i

87th congress f f O 1 O f\ A O
m THE H0U8E 0E REPRESENTATIVES
June 7, 1962
Mr. Aspihall introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs
A BILL
To provide for the settlement of claims of certain residents of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That the Congress hereby assumes compassionate responsi-
4 bility to compensate inhabitants of the Rongelap Atoll, in
5 the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for radiation ex-
6 posures sustained by them as a result of a thermonuclear
7 detonation at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands on March
8 1, 1954.
9 Sec. 2. There is authorized to be appropriated for such
10 purpose out of the Treasury of the United States the sum
H of $1,000,000 to remain available until expended under the
I
21 supervision of the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter re-
2 ferred to as the "Secretary") for the general benefit of the
3 affected inhabitants of Bongelap. The Secretary may segre-
4 gate a portion of the sum for each affected individual, and
5 hold it in trust for the individual or his heirs or legatees
6 (hereinafter referred to as the "beneficiary" or "beneficiar-
7 ies"), subject to the provisions of this Act. The amounts
8 segregated and held by the Secretary in trust for individual
9 beneficiaries, and the unsegregated balance, shall, if invested
10 by him, be invested in a manner that in his judgment is
11 prudent.
12 Sec. 3. (a) The interest or dividends earned from each
13 trust held for an individual beneficiary shall be paid at least
14 annually by the Secretary to such beneficiary. When, in the
15 opinion of the Secretary, there appears to be a substantial
1^ benefit to be derived therefrom by any beneficiary, the Sec-
17 retary may, upon request of the beneficiary, and under such
18 conditions as he may deem appropriate, make the principal
1^ sum, or any part thereof, available for expenditure by such
20 beneficiary. Any payment under this subsection may be
21 made directly to a beneficiary who is twenty-one years of
22 age or older. In the case of a beneficiary who is less than
23 twenty-one years of age or who is, in the opinion of the
24 Secretary, mentally incompetent, payment may be made in
31 the discretion of the Secretary to the beneficiary, a parent,
2 relative, other person, or institution for his benefit.
3 (b) The principal, interest, and dividends from funds
4 held for the general benefit of the affected inhabitants of
5 Rongelap shall be used for such purposes as the Secretary
6 deems appropriate.
^ Sec. 4. A trust for an individual beneficiary created
8 pursuant to this Act may be terminated by the Secretary at
9 any time, and if after reasonable search the beneficiary can-
10 not be located, the principal and accumulated interest and
11 dividends may be added to the unsegregated balance of the
12 funds held for the general benefit of the affected inhabitants
-***
of Rongelap.
Sec. 5. The Secretary is authorized to pay reasonable
attorney fees for legal services rendered on behalf of a bene-
16
ficiary, or beneficiaries, prior to the date of enactment of this
Act. Such fees shall be paid out of the funds authorized to
18
be appropriated in section 2 of this Act, but the total of such
fees paid shall not exceed 5 per centum of the appropriated
20
funds.
O-l
Sec. 6. The decisions of the Secretary in carrying out
22
the provisions of this Act shall be final and not subject to
23
review.
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87th CONGRESS
2d Session
Union Calendar No. 797
S. 2775
[Report No. 1936]
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 6,1962
Referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
June 27, 1962
Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed
[Omit the part struck through and insert the part printed in italic]
AN ACT
To amend the Act of June 30, 1954, providing for a continuance
of civil government for the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That the appropriation authorization in section 2 of the Act
4 of June 305 1954 (68 Stat. 330), is hereby amended by
5 increasing it from $7,500,000 to $15,000,000 $17,500,000:
6 Provided, That not more than $15,000,000 is authorized to
7 be appropriated for the fiscal year 1963.
Passed the Senate March 5, 1962.
Attest: EELTON M. JOHNSTON,
Secretary.
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APP3JDIX
:irpt froffi H. R. 10802
An Act Making Appropriations for The Department of The Interior
and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending June '30, 1963,
and for Other Purpos.
. .
186
-£PFl FROM H. R. 10802
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLAK
For expenses necessary for the Department of the Interior in
inistration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
pursuant to the Trusteeship Agreement approved by joint resolution
July lG, 19U7 (61 Stat. 397), air*, the Act of June 30, 195U
(68 Stat. 330), including the expenses of the Hf ioner
Lhe Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; compensation
>f the Judiciary of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands,; grants to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in
addition to local revenues, for support of governmental functions)
Provided , That the revolving fund for loans to
locally owned private trading enterprises shall continue to be
available during the fiscal year 1963: Provided farther, That
all financial transactions of the Trust Territory, including such
transactions of all agencies or instrumentalities established or
utilize- by such Trust Territory, shall be audited hy the General
Accounting Office in accordance with the provisions of the Budget
and Accounting Act, 1921 (U2 Stat. 23), a3 amended, and the
count ii Auditing Act of 195>0 (6h Stat. 8&U): Provide
further . That the government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Island's is authorized to make purchases through the General
vices Administration: Provided further, That appropriations
available for the administration of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands may be expended for the purchase, charter, main-
tenance
,
and operation of aircraft and surface vessels for
official purposes and for commercial transportation purpo:.
found by the Secretary to be necessary in carrying out the pro-
visions of arti.. (2) of the Trusteeship Agreement approved
by C s: Pgpvidet ter , That notwithstanding the pro-
visions of any law, the Trust Territory of the Pac. ric Islands
is authorized to receive, during the current fiscal year, from
the Department of Agriculture for distribution on the |
basis oestic distribution in any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States, without exchange of funds,
such surplus food commodities /ailable pursuant to
.2 of the Act of August 2k, 1935, a3 amended (7 1. .
6l2c) ana section iil6 of the Agricultural Act of I9h9, as
amended (7 U.S.C. lltfl).
- B
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APPENDIX P
H. R. 11932

87th CONGRESS ¥ ¥ ¥5 1 1 CkOO2dSson H. K. 1 lyoZ
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 31, 1962
Mr. Aspinall introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs
A BILL
To assure payment of just compensation for the use and oc-
cupancy of certain lands on Kwajalein and Dalap Islands,
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That any person from whom the United States or the gov-
4 eminent of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands has
5 taken rights of possession, use, and occupancy of lands on
6 Kwajalein and Dalap Islands within the said Trust Territory
7 to which he was entitled under the traditions and customs of
8 the Marshallese people and who or whose iroij elab has not
9 accepted compensation in full satisfaction for all of his claims
10 and demands against the United States and the government
I
21 of said Trust Territory arising out of said taking may, within
2 one year from the date of this Aet, file a petition for the deter-
3 initiation by the United States Court of Claims of his claim
4 for just compensation. Upon the timely filing of such peti-
5 tion, the said court shall have jurisdiction to hear and deter-
6 mine the value of the rights taken in the same manner and
7 under the same rules as any other cause before it and in the
8 light of such principles of equity, justice, and fair dealings as
9 are pertinent to the cause. Any such claim may be heard
ln and determined notwithstanding laches or the expiration of
H any period of limitations which would be applicable thereto
12 in the absence of this Act. The judgment of the Court of
13 Claims may provide either for payment of a lump sum for
14 the indefinite possession, use, and occupancy by the United
5 States and the government of the Trust Territory of the lands
subject thereto or for the payment of an annual sum for such
possession, use, and occupancy. Any judgment of the Court
° of Claims shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court
of the United States on writ of certiorari and shall, whether
against the United States or against the government of the
Trust Territory, or both, be paid in accordance with the pro-
22
visions of title 28, United States Code, section 2517, and of
23
section 1302 of the Act of July 27, 1956 (70 Stat, 694) , as
24 amended (31 U.S.C. 724a). The payment of any claim,
after its determination in accordance with this section, shall
31 be a full discharge of the United States and the government
2 of the Trust Territory of all claims and demands touching
3 any of the matters involved in the controversy and the fail-
4 ure to prosecute a claim as hereinbefore provided shall for-
5 ever bar such claim.
6 Sec. 2. The iroij elab of any wato shall be a necessary
7 party to any suit instituted under this Act. The alab and
8 rijerbal of such wato shall be proper but not necessary parties
9 to any such suit. The iroij elab shall be responsible for
10 proper distribution among himself, the alab, the rijerbal,
11 and any others interested in such wato of any payment made
12 to him. Any dispute among them with respect to such dis-
13 tribution which cannot be resolved otherwise than by litiga-
14 tion shall be determined by the courts of the Trust Territory
15 in accordance with the laws of the Trust Territory and the
16 traditions and customs of the Marshallese people.
17 Sec. 3. The Attorney General of the United States or
18 his assistants shall represent the United States and the gov-
19 ernment of the Trust Territory in all cases arising under this
20 Act and may call upon the attorney general of the Trust Ter-
21 ritory for such assistance as he is able to render, and shall
22 have authority, with the approval of the Court of Claims, to
23 compromise any such case. Any such compromise settle-
24 ment shall be reported to the Congress by the Attorney Gen-
1 eral, stating the name of each claimant, the amount claimed.
2 and the amount awarded.
3 Sec. 4. The fees of any attorney or attorneys represent-
or ing Marshallese claimants in any action brought pursuant to
5 this section shall he fixed hy the Court of Claims at such
6 amount as the court, in accordance with standards obtaining
7 for prosecuting similar contingent claims, finds to he adequate
8 compensation for services rendered and results ohtained. plus
9 reasonable expenses incurred in the prosecution of the claim.
10 In fixing such fees, the court may give due weight to the fact
11 that appropriated funds in the amount of approximately $500
12 per acre have heretofore been made available and are now
13 available for a nonlitigious settlement of the claims referred
14 to in section 1 of this Act, but the appropriation and avail-
15 ability of such amount shall not be construed as an admis-
1^ sion by the United States or the government of the Trust
17 Territory that this is the value of the rights of possession,
1^ use, and occupancy taken by them or be admitted as evidence
19 to prove the same.
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87tii congress f f 15 ffcOTQ
1st Session |^|# |^# \j£ ( Q
IN THE HOUSE OE REPRESENTATIVES
September 18, 1961
Mr. Kyl introduced the following bill ; which was referred to the Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs
A BILL
To provide a government for the Trust Territory of Micronesia,
and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SHORT TITLE
4 (This Act may be cited as the "Organic Act of the Trust
5 Territory of Micronesia".
6 GENEEAL PROVISIONS
7 Section 1. The Trust Territory of Micronesia (here-
8 inafter referred to as Micronesia) comprises the Marianna
9 Islands (other than Guam), the Marshall Islands and the
10 Caroline Islands and are those islands formerly held by
11 Japan under mandate from article 22 of the Covenant of the
I
21 League of Nations and which were placed under the trustee-
2 ship of the United Nations, and which by agreement between
3 the United States and the Security Council of the United
4 Nations, the United States is the administering authority.
^ Sec. 2. The government of Micronesia shall be under
" the general supervision of the Secretary of the Interior and
'
shall have jurisdiction in all parts of Micronesia except that,
° in reservations designated by the President of the United
9 States pursuant to section 34 of this Act.
*® Sec. 3. (a) The Congress reserves to the United States
11 the conduct of the foreign affairs and defense of Micronesia.
12 The Secretary of Interior shall keep the Secretary of State
lc5
currently informed of activities in Micronesia affecting the
" foreign policy of the United States and Micronesia and shall
***
consult the Secretary of State on questions of policy con-
-*-" cerning Micronesia which relate to the foreign policy of the
-^ United States.
18 (b) The Secretary of State may, upon notification to
19 the Secretary of the Interior, station personnel of the Depart-
20 ment of State or of the Foreign Service at posts in Micro-
21 nesia for the purpose of perfonning functions hi connection
22 with the foreign relations of the United States and of Micro-
^°
nesia.
24 Sec. 4. The President shall appoint, by and with the
25 advice and consent of the Senate, a High Commissioner of
61 Micronesia, who shall hold office at the pleasure of the
2 President. The High Commissioner shall be a citizen of
3 the United States and shall not be an officer on active duty
4 in the Armed Forces of the United States. The basic com-
5 pensation of the High Commissioner shall be at the basic
6 rate of $20,000 per annum to be paid by the United States.
7 The High Commissioner's residence, to be provided by the
8 United States, shall be at the seat of the government of
9 Micronesia.
10 Sec. 5. The executive power of government in Micro-
11 nesia shall be vested in the High Commissioner and shall be
12 exercised under the supervision of the Secretary of Interior.
13 The High Commissioner may grant pardons, commutations,
14 paroles, and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures for
1^ offenses against the laws of Micronesia, and may grant re-
16 spites for all offenses against the applicable laws of the
17 United States until the decision of the President can be ascer-
18 tained. He shall commission all officers that he may be
19 authorized to appoint. The High Commissioner may call
20 upon the commanders of the military forces of the United
21 States in Micronesia or Guam when necessary to prevent
22 or suppress violence, insurrection, or rebellion, natural dis-
23 aster, or to enforce the laws of Micronesia. The High Com-
21 missioner may, in case of rebellion or invasion or imminent
25 danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend
41 the right of habeas corpus, or place Micronesia or any part
2 thereof under martial law, until the decision of the President
3 is communicated to the High Commissioner. The High
4 Commissioner shall have general supervision and control of
5 all executive agencies and instrumentalities of the Govem-
6 ment of Micronesia. He shall faithfully execute the laws of
7 Micronesia. He shall coordinate and have general cognizance
8 over all activities of the departments, bureaus, and offices
9 of the Government of the United States in Micronesia. The
10 President may, however, provide by Executive order that for
11 security purposes any such department, bureau, or office shall
12 not be subject to the coordination of the High Commissioner.
13 Sec. 6. The Secretary of Interior shall appoint a Deputy
14 High Commissioner of Micronesia, in accordance with the
15 Federal civil service laws, who shall have all of the powers
16 of the High Commissioner dining a vacancy in the office
17 of the High Commissioner or the disability or temporary
18 absence of the High Commissioner. He shall promulgate
19 all laws and regulations of the High Commissioner, and he
20 shall have such executive powers and perform such other
21 duties as may be prescribed by law or assigned to him by
22 the High Commissioner. He shall receive an annual salary
23 at a rate established by the Secretary of the Interior in
24 accordance with the standards provided in the Classification
25 Act of 1949.
51 Sec. 7. The Secretary of Interior may from time to
2 time designate the head of an executive department of the
3 government of Micronesia or other person to act as High
4 Commissioner and to exercise his powers in case of a vacancy
5 in the office, or the disability or temporary absence of both
6 the High Commissioner and the Deputy High Commissioner.
7 Sec. 8. The permanent seat of government of Micro-
8 nesia shall be located within the territorial boundaries of
9 Micronesia within one year of the effective date of this Act
10 at a site to be determined by the President.
11 Sec. 9. (a) All officers and employees of the govem-
12 ment of Micronesia shall be appointed by the High Com-
13 missioner under terms of employment prescribed by the
14 High Commissioner, except as otherwise prescribed by this
15 Act. When a position vacancy occurs and a citizen of Micro-
16 nesia possesses the same qualifications for that position for
17 which an American would ordinarily be employed, the
18 Micronesian shall be given preference in filling the position.
19 (b) The High Commissioner, with the approval of the
20 Secretary of Interior, is authorized to establish departments
21 and other agencies and instrumentalities of Micronesia:
22 Provided, That there shall be within the governmental struc-
23 ture a department of justice, the head of which shall bear the
24 title of attorney general.
25 (c) In all legal proceeding to which the government of
61 Micronesia is a party it shall be represented by the attorney
2 general of Micronesia, personally or by assistant, except as
3 the High Commissioner shall otherwise determine and except
4 that, in any proceeding under a law or treaty of the United
5 States of general application, the Attorney General of the
6 United States, personally or by assistant, may as he deter-
7 mines, represent the government of Micronesia in association
8 with or instead of the attorney general of Micronesia and may
9 direct the attorney general of Micronesia therein.
1° Sec. 10. (a) The High Commissioner, with the ap-
H proval of the Secretary of Interior, and the concurrence of
12 the legislature, shall from time to time establish such admin-
13 istrative political districts within Micronesia as may be ap-
propriate.
(b) The High Commissioner shall appoint a district
commissioner for each district who shall be the senior execu-
tive official within his district and who shall perform such
ID
functions within his district as the High Commissioner may
direct or as may be provided under the laws of Micronesia.
90^
BILL OF EIGHTS
Sec. 11. (a) No law shall be enacted in Micronesia re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
23
'U
exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of conscience, or
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to form
71 associations and peaceably to assemble and to petition the
2 government for a redress of grievances.
3 (b) Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
4 as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
5 duly convicted, shall exist in Micronesia.
6 (c) The rights of the people to be secure in their per-
7 sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
8 searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
9 shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
10 affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
H searched and the persons or things to be seized.
12 (d) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
13 property, without due process of law; nor shall private prop-
*
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation; nor
1^
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
. put in jeopardy of life or limb ; nor shall any person be com-
1
'
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
1°
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
1"
to a speedy and public trial ; to be informed of the nature and
2^ cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
21 against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
22
nesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
^ his defense. No crime under the laws of Micronesia shall
2^ be punishable by death.
81 (e) No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
2 pairing' the ol (ligations of contracts, shall be enacted.
3 (f) Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
4 fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.'
5 (g) No law shall be enacted in Micronesia which dis-
6 criminates against any person on account of race, sex, lan-
^ guage, or religion ; nor shall the equal protection of the laws
8 be denied.
9 (h) Subject only to the requirements of public order
10 and security, the inhabitants of Micronesia shall be accorded
H freedom of migration and movement within Micronesia.
12 (i) Free elementary education shall be provided
13 throughout Micronesia.
14 (j) No person shall be imprisoned solely for failure to
15 discharge a contractual obligation.
16 (k) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
1? be suspended, unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion or
18 imminent danger thereof, the public safety shall require it.
19 (1) No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in
20 any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of
21 war but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
22 (m) The High Commissioner and the legislative bodies
23 constituted under this x\ct, by appropriate regulation or law,
24 may restrict or forbid the acquisition of interests in real
91 property and in business enterprises by persons who are not
2 citizens of Micronesia, and shall give due recognition to local
3 customs in providing a system of law, and nothing in this
4 Act shall be construed to deny this authority.
5 (n) Any person or group of persons in Micronesia shall
6 have the unrestricted right of petition. It shall be the duty
7 of all officers of the government of Micronesia to receive and
8 without delay to act upon, or forward, as may be appropriate,
9 any petitions submitted.
10 LEGISLATIVE
11 Sec. 12. (a) The High Commissioner shall establish
12 under such provisions as he shall think to be best suited to
13 the ethnic status of each district a district congress. Such
14 congress shall be an elected body with its membership repre-
15 senting as democratically as possible the representative views
16 of all of the people within each district.
17 (b) The areas of authority over which the district con-
18 gress may legislate shall be those which the High Commis-
19 sioner or the United States Congress shall from time to time
20 delegate to it: Provided, That the district congress shall
21 not have any powers which are inconsistent with this Act.
22 (c) On the first day of July on the year following the
23 effective date of this Act there shall meet at the seat of gov-
H.R. 9278 2
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1 eminent of Micronesia a Legislature of Micronesia (herein-
2 after referred to as the legislature) , which shall consist of a
3 single house of not to exceed twenty-one members.
4 (d) The number of representatives from each district
5 in the legislature shall be determined by the population of
6 the districts sending representatives, provided that each dis-
^ trict shall have at least one representative in the legislature.
8 At least once each ten years the legislature shall reapportion
9 itself so as to conform with equal population proportions
10 throughout Micronesia in, accordance with this Act.
H (e) Members of the legislature shall be elected to their
12
seats by majority vote of the district congress of the district
13 which they represent.
14 (f) The legislative power of the legislature shall extend
15 to all subjects of legislation of local application not incon-
16 sistent with this Act and the laws and treaties of the United
17 States applicable to Micronesia. Taxes and assessments on
1^ property, internal revenues, sales, license fees, and royalties
19 for franchises, privileges, and concessions may be imposed
20 for purposes of the government of Micronesia.
21 (g) The legislature shall not appropriate any sums of
22 money in anticipation of revenue to be received nor shall
23 any public indebtedness be authorized.
24 (h) The legislature shall be the judge of the selection
25 and qualification of its own members. It shall choose its own
11
1 officers, determine its rules and procedures, not inconsistent
2 with this Act, and keep a journal.
3 (i) Regular sessions of the legislature shall be held
4 annually for a period not to exceed sixty consecutive days,
5 exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. Such
6 sessions shall convene at the seat of government of Micro-
^ nesia on the first Monday of July. The High Commissioner
8 may whenever he shall think it necessary convene the legis-
9 lature in special session for such period of time as he shall
10 designate. All sessions of the legislature shall be open to
H the public.
12
(j) Every bill passed by the legislature shall, before it
1* becomes law, be entered upon the journal and presented to
14 the High Commissioner. If he approves it, he shall sign it
15 and it shall thereupon become law. If he disapproves it, he
16 shall within ten legislative days return it to the legislature
17 with a statement of his objections for their reconsideration.
18 If, after reconsideration two-thirds of the legislature shall
19 agree to pass the bill, it shall become law ten days there-
to after unless it is a measure which, in the opinion of the High
21 Commissioner, is in conflict with this Act, imposes an undue
22 burden on the government of Micronesia or its employees,
23 or requires an unwise expenditure of funds appropriated by
24 the United States. In such cases the High Commissioner,
25 having so advised the legislature within said ten days, shall
12
1 transmit it to the Secretary of the Interior. If the Secretary
2 approves the bill, he shall sign it and it shall thereupon
3 become law. If he does not approve it, he shall return it to
4 the High Commissioner and the legislature with a state-
° ment of his objections and it shall not become law.
6 If any bill presented to the High Commissioner or
1 the Secretary contains several separable items, parts, or
8 portions, he may object to one or more of such items, parts,
°
or portions, while approving the remainder of the bill. In
™
such case he shall append to the bill at the time of signing
H it, a statement of the items, parts, and portions, to which
12 be objects and his reasons therefore, and they shall not take
13 effect unless repassed, or repassed and approved, as herein-
14 before provided.
15 All laws enacted by the legislature shall be transmitted
16 by the High Commissioner to the Secretary and by him to
17 the Congress of the United States which reserves the au-
18 thority to annul the same.
19 (k) Upon the request of the legislature the Secretary
20 of the Interior shall provide legislative counsel who shall
21 not be an employee of the government of Micronesia.
22 (1) All laws passed by the legislature must apply
23 equally and be uniform to all parts of Micronesia. Any law
24 which fails to be so inclusive shall not be valid.
25 (m) All legislative powers herein delegated to the legis-
13
1 lature of Micronesia except the power to appropriate from
2 funds raised by the legislature of Micronesia, are also hereby
3 granted to the High Commissioner who may prescribe any
4 law required for the government of Micronesia: Provided,
5 That it is consistent with broad policies approved in advance
6 by the Secretary of Interior. Such policies shall be made
7 public upon or before the promulgation of laws thereunder,
8 and the policies and laws shall be in conformity with the
9 trusteeship agreement, with this Act and with international
10 agreements and laws and regulations of the United States
11 in force in Micronesia.
12 (n) In the event that a law passed by the legislature
13 or the High Commissioner should conflict with a law passed
14 by the High Commissioner or the legislature, until such time
15 as the Congress of the United States shall provide otherwise,
16 the law of the High Commissioner shall prevail: Provided,
17 That should the legislature in two successive sessions of
18 the legislature vote to repeal a law of the High Commis-
19 sioner the law shall be repealed if the Secretary of Interior
20 approves.
21 (o) The title of members of the legislature shall be
22 "representative." The title of the presiding officer of the
23 legislature shall be "speaker."
24 (p) Appropriations, except as otherwise provided by
H.R. 9278 3
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1 this Act, and except such appropriations as shall be made
2 by the Congress of the United States, shall be made by
3 the legislature.
4 (q) Representatives shall receive compensation in the
»
5 amount of one dollar a day for every day the legislature is in
6 session and shall receive reimbursement for their expenses
7 at standard rates while the legislature is in session and
8 while traveling to and from their home districts.
9 JUDICIAL POWER
10 Sec. 13. (a) The judicial power of Micronesia shall
11 be vested in a high court and such inferior courts as the leg-
12 islature shall provide. The existing courts, their jurisdic-
13 tion, the form of procedure, the various officers and employ-
14 ees thereof, and other provisions relating to the judiciary
15 of Micronesia, shall continue to he as provided under
16 regulations of the High Commissioner in force on the date
17 of approval of this Act, except as amended by this Act,
1^ and until otherwise provided by law.
19 (h) The high court shall have a chief justice and two
20 associate justices who shall he appointed by the President,
21 by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
22 chief justice and the associate justices shall each hold office
23 for a period of eight years or until a successor is appointed
24 and qualified, unless sooner removed by the President for
25 cause. The chief justice and the associate justices shall re-
15
1 ceive a salary payable by the United States which shall be
2 at the same rate as prescribed for judges of the United
3 States district courts.
4 Sec. 14. In a criminal proceeding in a court of Micro-
5 nesia, the prosecution shall be conducted in the name of the
6 "Trust Territory of Micronesia". In any civil proceeding to
7 which the government of Micronesia is a party it shall appear
8 and be represented as the "Trust Territory of Micronesia".
9 Sect 15. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
10 Circuit shall have jurisdiction of appeals from final decisions
H of the high court of Micronesia in all cases, civil or criminal,
12 wherein the Constitution or a statute or treaty of the United
13 States or any authority exercised thereunder or this Act is
14 involved, in all other civil cases wherein the value in contro-
ls versy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $5,000, and in
1"
all habeas corpus proceedings.
17 Sec 16. The High Commissioner shall appoint a public
1° defender with appropriate staff, who shall serve in case of
19
need, as counsel for defendants in criminal proceedings in
2^ Micronesia.
21 Sec. 17. The laws of Micronesia shall comprise
—
^ (a) the trusteeship agreement;
23 (b) this Act;
^4 (c) all existing laws and regulations in force in
25 Micronesia on the date of enactment of this Act, except
16
1 those laws and regulations repealed or modified by this
2 Act, or found to be otherwise inconsistent with this Act
;
3 (d) existing treaties and other international docu-
4 ments in force with respect to Micronesia and treaties
5 and international documents of the United States which
6 affect Micronesia;
7 (e) further laws of the United States which are
8 made applicable to Micronesia and further treaties and
9 other international documents of the United States or
10 Micronesia which are made applicable to Micronesia;
11 (f) enactments of the Micronesian legislature;
12 (g) laws and regulations prescribed by the High
13 Commissioner;
14 (h) enactments of legislative bodies established
15 under section 12 of this Act; and
16 (i) customary law or common law recognized in
17 any part of Micronesia in matters in which it is ap-
18 plicable and to the extent that it is not in conflict with
19 any other law or treaty of Micronesia.
20 CUSTOMS
21 Sec. 18. (a) No customs duties shall be levied upon any
22 goods brought into Micronesia except that, if necessary in
23 the public interest of the citizens of Micronesia, customs du-
24 ties may be levied on goods without discrimination as to their
17
1 country of origin : Provided, That nothing in this section shall
2 be construed so as to prohibit the participation by Micro-
3 nesia in a customs union or free trade area.
4 (b) No customs duties shall be levied in the customs
5 territory of the United States upon articles which are the
6 growth, produce, or manufacture of Micronesia, except to
7 such extent, and at such time after the date of the applicable
8 proclamation, as the President, after taking account of the
9 responsibilities of the United States with respect to the
10 economy of Micronesia, shall hereafter determine and pro-
11 claim to be justified to prevent substantial injury or the
12 threat thereof to the competitive trade of any country of the
13 free world.
14 NATIONALITY AND MIGEATION
15 Sec. 19. All persons heretofore or hereafter born or
16 naturalized in the territory now constituting Micronesia shall
17 be deemed to be citizens of Micronesia, except
—
18 (a) persons, bom in the territory now constituting
19 Micronesia prior to the effective date of this Act, who
20 have acquired another nationality;
21 (b) persons, born in Micronesia on or after the
22 effective date of this Act, who at birth shall acquire
23 another nationality;
24 (c) persons, born in the territory now constituting
18
1 Micronesia, whose principal and actual dwelling place
2 in fact has not been in Micronesia, or Guam, at any time
3 since July 18, 1947, and the effective date of this Act;
4 (d) Provided, That nothing in this section shall
5 deprive any person of his nationality who was born
outside of Micronesia while his parents were absent
7 temporarily.
8 Sec. 20. Any person born in the area now constituting
9 Micronesia now living in the Trust Territory of Nauru and
1^ any person now living in the Trust Territory of Nauru whose
H parents were born in the area now constituting Micronesia,
12 who possesses at least 50 per centum Micronesian blood, and
13 their wife, or husband, and children shall have right to pass
14 the borders of Micronesia and take up residence therein.
15 Sec. 21. The High Commissioner, with the approval of
16 the Secretary of Interior shall prescribe regulations for entry
1^ into and residence in Micronesia. No citizen of Micronesia
18 shall be barred from entering Micronesia. The consular serv-
19 ices of the United States may be utilized in the implementa-
20 tion of these regulations without charge to the government
21 of Micronesia.
22 Sec. 22. All persons legally resident for a period of five
23 years prior to the enactment of this Act in Micronesia are
24 citizens of Micronesia unless they should declare otherwise,
25 except for those persons who are American citizens.
19
1 Sec. 23. The legislature may prescribe regulations under
2 which persons who are not citizens of Micronesia may ac-
3 quire Micronesian citizenship.
4 Sec. 24. The legislature shall prescribe regulations
5 setting forth the conditions under which naturalized citizens
6 of Micronesia may be divested of their citizenship.
7 Sec. 25. The United States, through the Department
8 of State, shall afford diplomatic and consular services and
9 protection to citizens of Micronesia traveling outside of
10 Micronesia in countries other than the United States.
11 ADMINISTRATION
12 Sec. 26. All officers and employees of the government
13 of Micronesia, other than those whose salaries are specified
14 in this Act, shall receive salaries in amounts to be fixed by
15 the High Commissioner: Provided, That appointments and
16 promotions shall be on a merit basis : Provided further, That
17 American citizens shall be employed as Federal emplo}^ees
18 in accordance with applicable Federal laws and shall be
19 entitled as Federal employees to all the rights, benefits, and
20 obligations provided under such laws. In no case shall the
21 salary of a judicial officer be reduced while he is in office.
22 Sec. 27. All officers and employees of the government
23 of Micronesia shall, if their homes be outside of Micronesia,
24 be entitled to transportation at the expense of the United
25 States for themselves, their immediate families and household
20
* effects, from their homes to their dut}^ stations upon appoint-
2 ment and from their duty stations to their homes upon com-
3 pletion of their duties: Provided, That if the period of
4 service has been less than two years, the furnishing of return
5 transportation shall be at the sole discretion of the Secretary
6 of Interior unless the officer or employee was separated
7 for reasons beyond his control, in which case return trans-
8 portation shall be mandatory. American civil service em-
9 ployees shall accrue leave in accordance with the Leave Act
10 of the United States and shah be entitled to accrue leave up
11 to a maximum of ninety workdays and once each two years
12 shall be entitled to transportation for themselves and imme-
13 diate families from their duty station to their homes and
14 return. For purposes of transportation to their homes and
15 return, they shall be allowed travel time not to exceed thirty
16 days without charge to accrued annual leave and during such
17 travel time they shall be paid their salaries as prescribed by
18 this Act and the laws of Micronesia. Every additional two
19 years that an employee serves with the Micronesian govem-
20 ment, he shall be entitled to transport not to exceed one
21 thousand pounds of additional household effects from his home
22 to his duty station. During his term of duty in Micronesia or
23 Guam the American employees shall each be entitled to re-
24 ceive appropriate quarters to be furnished by the United
25 States at established rentals. In no instance is the govern-
21
1 merit of Micronesia to furnish housing to Micronesian employ-
2 ees living in the district of their origins: Provided, That the
3 quartering of proctors in school dormitories shall be author-
4 ized.
5 Sec. 28. All persons holding office in the Trust Territory
6 of the Pacific Islands on the date of enactment of this Act
7 may continue to hold their respective offices until their
8 successors are appointed and qualified as employees of the
9 Trust Territory of Micronesia.
10 Sec. 29. The General Accounting Office shall examine
11 the financial transactions of the government of Micronesia
12 annually and shall submit a report of its findings and recom-
13 mentations to the Congress.
11 Sec. 30. The legal tender of Micronesia shall be the
15 coins and currencies of the United States. However, no
16 restriction shall be made on tbe use of local forms of barter
17 and exchange in transactions among citizens of Micronesia.
18 Sec. 31. (a) The United States will provide postal serv-
19 ice. The Postmaster General is authorized to take such
20 steps as are necesssary to provide such service within Micro-
ti nesia.
22 (b) The Postmaster General shall cause to have printed
23 a Micronesian stamp which shall he sold only within MicO-
24 nesia. the proceeds from the sale thereof shall be paid into
25 the treasury of Micronesia : Provided, That nothing in this
22
1 section shall be construed to prohibit the sale and use of
2 United States postage in Micronesia.
3 Sec. 32. The President shall have authority to desig-
4 nate part of Micronesia as reservations of the Department
5 of Defense, Department of Treasury, or other Federal agen-
6 cies. The President shall have authority to specify parts or
7 all of the trust territory as closed for security reasons and
8 to determine the extent to which the provisions of articles
9 87 and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be
10 applicable to such closed areas, in accordance with article 13
H of the trusteeship agreement.
12 Sec. 33. The High Commissioner shall submit to the
13 Secretary of Interior an annual report on the Trust Territory
l -*
of Micronesia and copies of such report shall be transmitted
I5 by the Secretary of Interior to the President and the Con-
1" gress. The Secretary of Interior in collaboration with
1' the Secretary of State shall be responsible for preparing the
1°
annual report to the United Nations.
I9 LAND
Sec. 34. (a) The title or interest to all real property
1 in Micronesia which is held by the United States, directly
^
or indirectly, shall pass to the government of Micronesia
^
ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act, except
ofa with respect to such real property as the President may
reserve within such ninety days.
23
1 (b) Any real property which the United States has
2 reserved which ceases to be needed for Federal purposes
3 may, at the request of the Secretary of Interior, be trans-
•1 ferred to the government of Micronesia without reimburse-
5 ment.
6 (c) At the beginning of each fiscal year hereafter, each
7 agency of the United States holding reserved property in
8 Micronesia shall submit to the President a report stating
9 what property is being held and showing justification for
10 the continued reservation for such property. Any property
11 which in the President's opinion should no longer be re-
12 served, shall be turned over to the government of Micronesia
13 without reimbursement.
" (d) Lands succeeding to the government of Micro-
15 nesia through preceding governments of the area, shall consti-
1" tute the public domain.
17 (e) The government of Micronesia shall take such steps
1° necessary to grant and record titles to real property in
19 Micronesia.
20 (f ) No person not a citizen of Micronesia shall be per-
21 mitted to hold title to property in Micronesia: Provided,
22 That nothing in this section shall be construed to divest any
23 person of the right to hold title in property which he now
24 owns in Micronesia or to will title in property which he
25 now holds in Micronesia.
24
1 (g) Hereditary claims to lands considered to be of the
2 public domain shall not be valid if the land has been alien-
3 ated prior to the Japanese administration of the area.
4 MISCELLANEOUS
5 Sec. 35. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated
6 annually by the Congress of the United States such sums as
7 may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions
8 and purposes of this Act but not to exceed $20,000,000 in
9 any one year.
10 Sec. 36. Unless otherwise ordered by the President, the
H administration of those parts of the Marianna Islands now
12 administered by the Navy shall be taken over by the gov-
13 eminent of Micronesia within six months after the effective
14 date of this Act.
15 Sec. 37. This Act shall become effective on the 4th day
16 of July in the year next following its passage.
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APPENDIX
<;nt by Mr. Andon Amaraich, Adviser, in the Trusteeship
:ions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands*
it:
It is indeed a great honor for &e to be one of the few Micro-
nesians to have the opportunity to obtain first-hand know. md
information on the function of the Trusteeship Council. I con-
sider this the most significant event in my career as an employee
of the Trust Territory Government under the Administration of the
United States. Blot only because it enables me to convey to the
Council v of the Trust Territory,
but also because I am certain that the experience gained from my
visit will be of great value to me, t4 the Administering Authority
and to the people of the Trust Territory.
most grateful to the government of the Trust Territory and
that of the United States for ^rtunity to serve as an
adviser to the United States delegation at this meetin . / know-
frust Territory U tat in
iy present pt a as District fa .'or
the Truk District limits my activities to that district. However,
on several occasions in the past for a period of at least six months
each, I was placed in administrative charge of the Office of the
Trust Territory Public Defender and in this capacity I was a
to travel
.
stricts. During thi3 travel, I gain
II be helpful in my capacity as an adviser to
the United States delegation.
I am pic- ) inform this Council that the people of the
Trust Territory are aware of the purposes of the United Kations.
They look up to the United Kations not merely as an organization
in which people 'erent parts of the world meet together
and discuss world problems, but as the only body through which
world peace and security may be maintained.
One evidence of the. awareness of the people of the importance
of the United Kations and t ship Council can be seen
through the acts of the district congress^ and municipal councils
in appropriating money for the celebration of United Stations every
year.
.:-P
r
r
tmmi
ns
d Nations Day in the Trust Territory not be-
cau is a cu far us tc but b ;3W that the
United Nation :ie only organization in which our hope for
peace and hap m placed.
During my to one districts of the Trust Territory, I was^
gratified lowing the efforts and in
showing in the management of their own affairs.
In Pont pie, I had the opportunity to observe the Ponape
Distric 3 in session. president, Jtr. Bethwei Henry,
who two year .ame before this Council, is a young man. He
pr over t: ^ress an ;.ressed its members, most of w .
are much older than he. This is very important because it shows
that the people are demonstrating confidence in the ability
of trie yot oration who wi:< mine the future of the
Trust : isons why the people of the
Trust Territc ough their district congresses and other private
organisation :aking an active part in the promotion of educa-
ritory. They have . that
nation is the key to the door of successful living.
On \t step undertaken by our district congresses
in the devel of educa the inservice education pi
grto last year* Hr* I , who served as an advis
last year, ai. ability respect, presen.
ini :on on thi icil. However, certain
>pments ha\ lace duri year under review an
Dur .oen from Palau
Truk were aware :pective . 3 for
special study 1 e of Guam, This program was estab-
lished on an experimental basis to c whether a program of
a and made a part of the overall educa-
rust Territory. This program was successful,
.0 have fifty young men from all c
the Ti rrito, e of Guat. pecial cours
during the summer. These young men already hold important positions
with the Trust Territory Governme
Th .he people to obtain . ucation is demon-
str dforts of the district congresr
but al30 /idual efforts. Besides those who are under
regular scholarships awarded by distric ises and the Trust
Territory Government, there are about If; nding
ols and the college on Guam this year unde. sponsor-
rogram. During the next school year the number of Trust
ats on Guam is expect
. Young peop
-at ion.
IE
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In the past few years the people of Micronesia hav
their rer the f it a very Is; the school
popu c go any higher than
to the
joI which
ritory
i
Tfcu. that stopping the educational pr of a child
ilf of the W
wha very badly to satisfy his hun;.. is beyond L
ability . tain. This - not in any way be intei, as
f the Trust i ruaent .ssion
heir chi 1 K>oi.
very important to not si understnad it, during the
Japanese Administration, becauj aaily atu parents v\
;tant 1 to school. Today this is
! |
Another significant change in the attitude of parents toward
at ion was also noted during sy visit to the Marshall Is Ian
.rict last »ont ds visit I was iopre. * find
I young girls of 17-20 year3 of age living together in
naitory under a set o£ rules which they themselves had created.
ne students of the Dental I hool. With the
Ipan, all tin
in tass school was iuost o luiow that with
exception of the m the Harshalls, t iris left their
homes Mt corner of the Trust Territory to t
the purpc obtaining training which will benefit those
who &ay fall under the 3* In another cor.
-he Trust Territory — the Pal^ — anot - oup cf
young girls, the s -iiool are strugglir
the saae purpo.
.he ve records of the .ing of this
mcil relative t I . . Trust Territory,
I noted with great >n the emphasis pla.
by Members of the Council on the iiaportf ./eloping the
Trust Territor; iaay beco&e politically
nt. At this st& .elopiuent, I feel that it is
.11 preaature t judge when and to what extent the Trust Terri-
tory can be inc. it. But there is one" thing defin;
the Trust Ter
sound political unit.
of the fflost significant politico cits in the Trust
Territory took place last year when the sixth annual conferer.
of the Inter- District Advisory Coamittee t h Coaauissioner
»et and its members voted to e the naae of the to
that of "Council cronesia" an for the first tin

sian to be its rly in »t
these dedica rio mad ry Joamittee, and
jst Territory,
will Md tc
of _.
.
eain tnat ii
ijsistr ie Admlni rity„
will soon become am ;lativt t
which will determine the future of Itory.
If I may exprc personal opinion witn respect to granting
nee to the Trust Territory, I have this to say. The people
of the Trust not act like a child who ask3 his
father to give him southing just becau ^tnows that his
brother has been given the same thing* Liaewije, the United Nations
shoulc not act lite rather who, aft m ell
feels that he must also give the 3aae thing to his
younger chile at I ime just for the sake of pleasing both
of thea.
The Trust Territory Is still in the stage of growth and develop-
Bient and the people are aware of this. They are also aware that
the success of any government can only be attained through the
I :ated efforts of its people. It is on this basis that we
orocee :.o report that in their corresponc
with each other, district co *en are saying: "United we til
divided we fall.' Unfortunately, however, the Trust Territory was
eade the way it is and is therefore hand i capped. in man,
First, the i3lans are scattered over a vast expanse of ocean as
large in size as the contint \ tal United ;tates and there; is I
great probity of transportation which hi aany of our programs.
It is difficult to achieve political unity without first having
put the people into closer and constant contact with each other
so that mutual understanding of problems can be reached,
there are the difierences in languages which make it necessary xor
the people to communicate through an interpreter which is often
embarrassing and ineffective in convey || to the ao-
ainistration personnel or to ti'ie people from another district.
Last but not the least in importar .*> problem of meeting
the financial needs of the territory due to limited budgets. At
present t still the ability of the peop
themselves to solve and we are thankful to the Administering
Authrity for the effort it has made towz ir solution.
changes in our social life are taking place. Not
too iong ago, the people of the Trust Territory were very super-
stitious in many ways. They were reluctant to accept modern
medic in . anitation meant almost nothing to them. Today t
havv 9 real-. At they were wrong in this attitu
They are now tteeendlng more doctors, curses and sanitation
fcyfiis £<:
Jot
i-tiL,
193
workers. In many instances, because of ary reasons and
length of time needed for training, the Trust Territory can n
always raeet these demands for mor*.- '.ced personnel in the
public health field. In an effort to meet this demand, the
Public ffealc .rtment established a Territory-wide program for
training midwives, sanitation worker food handler ;3t of
are paid by their local government. Further
ade in this field through ti ice
training on Guam for medical officer^ oal officers and nurses.
on of small but worthwhi iness enterprises
plays an important part in onomic development program. 1
Faichul - Zocoa Proc .. . j iation which cane into being
in t . rict through the effort of the people themselves
th the assistance of the Trust Territory Government, the
g of the Trukese Government Employees Credit Union and
the Housing Co-operative in Ponape are excellent examples. To
further the growth of these and many other private enterprises,
the Trust Territory Government h j.oyed co-operative officers
and economic advisers.
On the basis of thes. achievements, we may conclude
that the Trust Territory has a goo .ce to attain the goal of
the Trusteeship system. We shall continue to do our part in t
/slopment of our islands but your assistance and guidance is
needed. We have had our failures in the past but we are not
afraid to admit such failures knowing that it is by trial and
error that men can and have made great accomplishments.
In conclusion, I wi3h to reiterate that I am deeply grateful
for this opportunity to appear before this Council and express
appreciation of the people of the Trust Territory for whose
welfare this body is concerned. ml£ of the people of the
Tr - rritory I wish to acknowledge our indebtedness to t:
Administering Authority for its continuous efforts in making the
Trust Territory a better place in which to live. I shall look
forwar ^eting f the members of this body during the m
Visit >sion visit to the Trust Territory. I can assure you
that the people of the Trust Territory are also looking forward
to your visit. On behalf of the people of my country, I wish you
a successful lug and everlasting success in the maintenance
of happiness, peace and security for the people who believe in
and respect the integrity and wisd this organization.
U. >sion to the United Nations, Press Release No. U002,
June 5, IS
11
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APPENDIX 3
Public Law 87-&1

Public Law 87-541
87th Congress, S„ 2775
July 19, 1962
2n get
To amend the Act of June 30, 1954, providing for a continuance of civil govern-
ment for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the appropria- Trust Territory
tion authorization in section 2 of the Act of June 30, 1954 (68 Stat, of the Pacific
330), is hereby amended by increasing it from $7,500,000 to $17,500,000 : islands.
Provided, That not more than $15,000,000 is authorized to be appro- 48 U5C 1681 note -
priated for the fiscal year 1963.
Approved July 19, 1962.
GPO 8 5 139
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